

# RELIGION IN LIFE

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### CONTENTS

	PAGE
Dwight Lyman Moody.....	Gaius Glenn Atkins 323
Intercessory Prayer.....	James S. McEwen 334
The Church and Communism.....	Paul Tillich 347
The Church and Fascism.....	Cornelius Krusé 358
The Church and Democracy.....	Georgia E. Harkness 368
Presenting Religion to Youth.....	Frederick C. Grant 381
Church Union in Canada and in the United States.....	William E. Gilroy 392
The Foolishness of Preaching.....	William G. Chanter 406
Walter Rauschenbusch.....	Vernon P. Bodein 420
The Crock of Gold.....	J. Frederic Berg 432
Religious Books Which Endure.....	Edward Mack 443
Recent Theological Books: British and Continental.....	R. Birch Hoyle 448
Book Reviews.....	455
Bookish Brevities.....	479

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## Dwight Lyman Moody

GAIUS GLENN ATKINS

**M**R. D. L. MOODY (he had and sought no other title, being neither an ordained minister nor the recipient of any honorary degrees) was born in Northfield, Massachusetts, on Sunday, February 5, 1837. He died in Northfield, December 22, 1899. His son-in-law, Arthur Percy Fitt, has furnished, in *Moody Still Lives*, the chronological pattern of his life. The swift sequence of dates (which cannot easily be more condensed) is really necessary to any account of his life. He left Northfield for Boston in 1854, was converted in 1855, joined Mt. Vernon Congregational Church in 1856, went to Chicago in 1856, gave up business (in which he showed promise of conspicuous success) and devoted himself to religious work within five years.

He served with the National Christian Commission during the Civil War, visited Great Britain first in 1871. Within the next four years he conducted extended evangelical campaigns in Great Britain and was thereafter accepted as the outstanding evangelist in the English-speaking world. He made Northfield his home again in 1879, and within the next eight years had founded both the Northfield Schools and inaugurated the Northfield Conferences. In the early '90's he called the first Student Conference, conducted a third campaign in Great Britain, faced death in a helpless vessel in winter seas, conducted the World's Fair Evangelistic Campaign, and visited many American cities again and again.

His last public service was held in Kansas City and from there he came home to die, having achieved in his sixty-two years a variety and range of religious action unparalleled in his century and, writing restrainedly, hard to parallel in the history of the Christian Church. A romance attaches to the work of Francis Xavier in the Far East with multi-colored crowds yielding to the Cross, and the self-immolating passion of the Jesuit, which belongs to another world than Moody's, but Xavier's work, remote and detached, remains only a romance.

The index of any inclusive history of the American religious scene, such as Garrison's *March of Faith*, supplies long lists of men who were Moody's contemporaries. There are amongst them men of distinction in

fields in which Moody takes no primacy; theologians whose influence upon Protestant religious thinking still endures; preachers whose insight, literary form or splendid passion for the great causes of humanity have enriched the English-speaking pulpit; teachers whose influence persists; ordained statesmen of the Christian Church who urged masterfully the bearing of Christianity upon the entire social structure. "All these were honored in their generation, and were a glory in their days." But the centenaries of their births pass for the most part unnoted, while the tenacity of the Moody tradition is arresting.

Something is due, of course, to the promotion of the Northfield Schools and Conference. Moody himself knew the values of publicity and was a master of its technique with the means then at his disposal. (How he would have welcomed and used the radio!) He was never afraid of sensationalism. During the World's Fair at Chicago he rented Forepaugh's circus tent for a Sunday morning service and was content to have the manager advertise: "Three Big Shows: Moody in the Morning, Forepaugh in the afternoon and evening." Northfield inherited and has continued the tradition of effective publicity. The widely observed centenary of his birth has been by no means a spontaneous and unorganized uprising of the devout.

Moreover, Moody still lives in Northfield. His spirit broods over the campuses of its schools and the elm-shaded village street he has made famous. Few know where the wise and great in Garrison's index are buried. Year after year, quietly and prayerfully, beneath the whispering pines on Round-top, thousands watch the day die and the last low level light fade from Moody's gravestone. The schools keep his birthday unfailingly and thus perpetually renew the memories of him in the imagination of youth. Academic associations, like ivy on school walls, have strong tendrils and are unbrokenly renewing themselves. But even Northfield with all its associations could not by any genius for organization and publicity have evoked in a time like ours, desperately preoccupied with its own affairs, so widespread a response to the centennial of Moody's birth, were not Northfield itself the outer and evident sign of the range and issue of his creative spirit.

## I

Nor could the response have been evoked if Moody's own personality had not been so vivid, so picturesque, so variously human, so prodigious in force and action, and by the testimony of all who knew him, in a hidden way

which no one of his biographers explains, so essentially great. Even an outstanding institution cannot by all the arts at its command vivify a pallid shade. There is no end therefore to the possible analysis of Moody's personality and the evaluation of his career. He furnishes the biographer a subject of endless challenge and allure.

My own bookshelves are fairly representative in the field of religious biography and autobiography. For the nineteenth century, Phillips Brooks, John Henry Newman and Alexander Whyte touch each other through the covers. These three, with Beecher and Booth, would seem the only religious leaders (English-speaking) who compare with Moody in vividness, variety and allure of biographical material. I should, personally, put Newman and Moody on the same level—and at the top. For the biographer each of them supplies the elements of drama without which biography is colorless—and yet with a world of difference. The drama of Newman's outer life was subordinate, though a pilgrimage from evangelical Anglicanism to the scarlet of a Roman Catholic Cardinalate has drama enough to capture any imagination. Newman himself furnished forth with matchless literary art the drama of his inner life for all the world to see and understand—if it could.

Moody's popular appeal has been and is in the drama of his outer life. It had all the elements America has loved and magnified—an individual expression of the epic of America. Catalogue those elements: a long native ancestry, brave, tenacious and laborious (there have been Moody's and Holtons in Northfield since it was a frontier settlement in peril of the Indians and the French); a near-to-the-soil boyhood leaving anecdotes of unruly humor; a mother widowed in his early childhood to whom he gave the last, full measure of devotion; the discipline of poverty—the appraisal of his father's personalia is on record in the Franklin County Probate Court, bare item by bare item, three hundred dollars would more than cover it all; little schooling; an energy to overcome any obstacle; mastery over men and situations; success, fame and his name a household word.

Make a pageant of his life, and it becomes rich in color and movement. It begins in a low farmhouse on a stony hillside farm; touches Boston for a year or two (epochal in Moody's religious development); continues through the raw, fermenting Chicago of the '60's, magnificent then only in destiny, fire-swept, rising from its ashes. It detours through the rich, black lands which nurtured Lincoln. It touches battle fronts, hospitals, camps of

Confederate prisoners. ("I have gone," Moody said once, "into hospitals where men's flesh was rotting from their bones with small-pox. Wherever a doctor will go to save men's lives, I will go to save their souls.")

It crosses the sea; two men going almost unheralded and unknown to win an unprecedented response from a culture with which, it would seem, they could establish no connecting bonds. Thereafter it moves from city to city, attended by such crowds as not even Gladstone and Disraeli could assemble. It repeats, this pageant of his life, the successes of Great Britain in the cities of America. He is said to have spoken to 100,000,000 people. If that be approximately correct, no one voice—before the radio—has ever been heard by so many. It returns to his native valley whose brooding hills are thereby crowned with schools. It is increasingly attended by the religious leaders of many nations. It ends beneath the shadows of the pines within sight of the house from which it set out. It was always a singing pageant creating itself the quick and heartening music to which it marched, a praying pageant.<sup>1</sup> A pageant of the seeking, saved and the serving. And always, always, at the head of it a grave, humble, masterful man, grown old and gray too soon, asking everything for his cause, nothing for himself, and inwardly apart and remote, though he came trailing clouds of glory—and hearers.

## II

Moody was as reticent about the inner drama of his life as Newman was not. Newman had his excuse; only by taking his world into his confidence could he justify himself to his world. Beyond that need he lived and moved and had his being in his own fears and faiths. There was his pilgrim's progress, all else was a shadow—"ex umbris et imaginibus in veritatem." Moody wrote no *Apologia Pro Sua Vita*; he did not need to, nor could he. As far as he spoke of his own experience—apart from his experience with people and situations—it reveals (according to Fitt) four major spiritual crises: His acceptance of Jesus Christ as his Saviour; his first experience in soul-winning in Chicago; his first realization of the immeasurable fullness of the Bible; his filling with the Holy Spirit. He himself would have attributed all his power to the baptism of the Spirit. He measured all power by the degree of its consecration to God's will.

<sup>1</sup> It was not a "shouting" pageant. The physical phenomena which attended Wesley, the frontier, camp meeting and even Finney were markedly wanting. Moody and even holy hysteria do not belong to the same world.

But his inner life, using that phrase very inclusively, has challenged at least one penetrating biographer. Gamaliel Bradford made a study of him from exactly that approach. Bradford has discussed quite impersonally, his own method which he called psychography. Its aim, he says, is this: "Out of the perpetual flux of actions and circumstances that constitute a man's whole life, it seeks to extract what is essential, what is permanent and so vitally characteristic." Naturally the psychographer chooses a subject for his alluring inner self-contradictions, the strategically elusive, the subjective drama. So Sainte-Beuve, the spiritual ancestor of all modern psychographers, was as much interested in Cowper, who furnishes no pageantry at all, as in Franklin, who was the delight of a French Court.

Bradford—though he was doubtless led to the subject through his personal knowledge of the Mount Hermon of the '90's—would write a study of Moody because he suited his ends. Sainte-Beuve, if he had been in attendance at a Northfield Conference, might have given him a Monday afternoon or done a *Profil Américain* of him for the same reason. For them his apparent simplicity would be by no means simple. The forces which combined to create and shape him must be traced to their sources. He must, if possible, be classified and compared—as Bradford had done in his delicate and penetrating way—with men of whom Moody never heard. So the psychographer's picture emerges and Bradford sums Moody up in one phrase: He was a "Worker in Souls." The preposition carries the insight of Bradford's characterization. Moody himself would likely have said "for souls." Actually he went deeper than that. He sought by every means at his command to capture, recast, and direct personality at and from the heart-source of it, rightness with God.

All that Moody did, Bradford held, was subject to that master control. Ancestral inheritances, his almost untutored youth, the backgrounds of heaven and hell which lay alike beyond the Northfield Hills and the horizons of all human life, his matchless resource and ingenuity, his tireless force, his self-taught power as a preacher, his selfless devotion to his Lord and Master Jesus Christ, all focused upon one end—to save and mould men. They might be "souls" theologically, actually as Moody dealt with them they were then-and-there living men and women as various as human state and quality can be. He knew, as Dante knew, how dark and piteous a stream of blood and tears our conjoint fault and failure create. He heard it falling from level to level in the confessions he heard as Dante heard it in the

Inferno. He grew immensely and sadly wise in human nature and served it as much by his own great wisdom in his clinic of the soul as by his gospel of grace.

### III

It is not easy to combine Moody the evangelist, the man of action, the grave figure in so vast a pageant, with the Moody the graph of whose spirit at once fascinates and escapes his most penetrating biographer. It seems easier in some ways to characterize the man—though not in Bradford's way—than to evaluate his work. Those who knew him with any intimacy—and there is still a considerable though diminishing group of them—remember him with arresting distinctness. As far as they belong, or belonged, to the Northfield groups, their recollections are sharpened by his dominance in the town, the schools and the conferences. The stage was always set for him there; when he appeared he filled it, when he was gone it was in a strange way empty. But those who had no connection with Northfield remembered him with amazing vividness. He left something persistent after the most casual meeting. Woodrow Wilson remembered how Moody left the men in a barber shop talking in awed undertones: "They did not know his name; they knew something had elevated his thoughts." The testimony to the range and force of personal impressions he created is beyond possible quotation.

I saw him first standing on the steps of a vanished "Connecticut Valley Railway" car at Mount Hermon station of an early winter night while three hundred shouting young men welcomed him home from the near shipwreck of the Spree. Their torches cast moving shadows about him, illumined his face and figure. He could not speak above their tumult; while he bowed the train moved on, the hills above regained their dark silence. But the memory remains. Thereafter—always at Mount Hermon and Northfield—he was the one constant in a rich variety of scenes and relationships to which now after more than forty years he alone gives unity. It is always the memory of a moving picture and in and through it always a solid figure whose weight masked his height.<sup>2</sup> Sometimes he was a boy again, always

<sup>2</sup> A study of his photographs is revealing. The best sequence is Bradford (page 84 and over) and W. R. Moody (page 143) combined. At seventeen his face is sensitive and appealing (the eyes are continued in his younger son). At twenty-five he is still slender and his real height shows. After thirty-five his full-lipped mouth is always bearded. The extremely characteristic poise-relation of the head, neck and shoulders is fixed by his thirty-third year. MacNeil's bust in Sage Chapel I do not think satisfactory. Moody immobile is not himself. His face needed to be lit from within.



himself and never twice quite the same, rejoicing in a practical joke; sometimes the farmer asking about cows and crops; sometimes—and often—he spoke as a father to young people who hung upon his words while he turned the piano into the lion's den and shouted down to a Daniel therein, or else splashed water into their faces while he filled one of his wife's fruit jars from a recklessly poured pitcher to illustrate how life can be emptied of the wrong only by filling it with the right.

Now it is Sunday and he is asking the students of his schools in Northfield Church to confess their faith. He asks them no more than that they should say, "I will trust and not be afraid." The responses come in fresh young voices, from floor and gallery, "I will trust and not be afraid." Now he unleashes all his power and passion—I never heard him thus pull out all the stops but once—as he goes with Paul from prison to martyrdom and carries him from outside the Appian gate to an expectant heavenly city over whose battlements the angels hang in welcome, shouting back to the celestial throne, "Paul's come, Paul's come." Then the walls and ceiling of the church opened and we saw the thronged and shining walls of the new Jerusalem. He was always the Supreme Court of Appeals for errant youth who broke the rules he himself insisted upon. He ran errands, overlooked no detail, drove good horses with a generous mastery, upset school schedules with holidays, came and went as a visitant from a vaster world—and always came back to Northfield as one coming home.

#### IV

Out of such reminiscences enlarged and multiplied by a great crowd of witnesses certain characteristics emerge. First, the gravity and weight of his personality. That he never lost. He might drive a "Concord buggy" in a velveteen coat, preside over an assemblage of the most notable English and American preachers, roll on the grass in inextinguishable laughter, or become a prophet of passion and power. No matter, he had that personal weight which is the indefinable, but always recognized, expression of depth and force of character. When the last word is said, that gravity came up and out of that quality of "apartness" which his biographers confess themselves unable to explain. As near as may be it was the hiding place of his power. He might have said it was the issue of his complete consecration to God's will. But he did not draw back the curtains of his own Shekinah.

Out of this issued the strange and powerful impact of his mind and

purpose. He was a hard man to stand against, not because he was dictatorial or nursed a pride of power, but because he was about a business not his own. He had a sometimes disconcerting habit of ending a session of discussion by dropping on his knees and carrying the whole issue bluntly to the Throne of Grace. After which he left it there and went about something upon which he had light.

Next, his practical sagacity, his executive capacity, his adventurous originality. He was an executive by breadth of vision and grasp of detail, his faculty to find agencies suited to his purpose (this needs a chapter), his power to evoke and keep their loyalty, and secure their unstinted co-operation. Great executives and captains of finance and industry recognized him as one of them in this field and gave him what he asked. He could assume command in any situation and his command would be wise. Something of this masterfulness came from his long control over great assemblies and situations about which he must say the final word. But the genius for it was native to him.

Next, his unwillingness to leave anything at loose ends. He was not through with his converts in the inquiry room. They must thereafter live godly, sober, righteous and above all useful lives in corporate association with a church. He occasionally naïvely and unfavorably appraised the activities of the average minister—as far as results go. There must be something, he thought, wrong with them because they could not fill their churches with the godly Sunday mornings and sinners seeking salvation Sunday evenings. And he told them so. For all that he wanted no denomination of his own and rebuked schismatic proposals.

All this leads directly to the one quality which distinguishes him, and pre-eminently, from the other nineteenth century evangelists; his strong, creative institutional sense. He wanted something left beside confessions, something corporate to carry on. This explains his interest in the Y. M. C. A. whose then *raison d'être* and technique he understood. Its buildings were the outward and evident sign of the co-operative Christian spirit of a city and they rose after his campaigns in city after city. He and Sankey gave to such enterprises generous shares of royalties which might have made them both rich. The rest went to the Northfield Schools.

It is often said that he founded these schools and thereafter made them his chief concern because he foresaw the twilight of evangelism. Actually he founded them to give young people a chance, lonely girls on hill farms,



boys whom he came across in his work who deserved an open door. But beyond that was his passion for a corporate, institutional, enduring issue of his work. The schools were from the first baptized into his own religious spirit and have so continued. He also set the mark of his own practical originality upon them. "Work hour" was on the same schedule and carried the same sanction of merit or demerit as Latin, English, or algebra. The Mount Hermon of the '90's was astoundingly self-supporting and was probably then the only school in America where a man of thirty-five and a boy of sixteen could study grammar side by side.

He encouraged athletics but kept them intramural and secured balanced education with a democratic simplicity many schools would be glad to recover. The schools were international and interracial from the first. They chose the needy and the promising, challenged the ambitious, established and have since maintained a high standard of sound scholarship. They exalted the service of God and man. The roll-call of their graduates would girdle the globe and the records of their accomplishments are noble and often sacrificially bright. There were many D. L. Moody's, I mean in the range and variety of his enterprise and relationships, but the Moody of the Northfield Schools in vision, in grace, in wisdom, endless surprise and wealth of human quality, was a man whom to have known was a priceless privilege and whom to remember is to make time of no account.

## V

Much of this may seem marginal; actually it is not. There were no margins in his life, only frontiers and his ultimate frontiers were Godward. His faith began and continued the inherited faith of Evangelical Protestantism. It is impossible to overstate the centrality of the Bible in and for his believing, teaching, and preaching. Its characters were as real to him as his neighbors on Northfield Street, and his power to make them live again was magical. Men were lost and needed to be saved. Only the Cross could save them, so he preached the Cross. He was not a speculative theologian, though his preaching and teaching reveal the outlines of a supporting doctrinal system. The revival of the '50's and '60's undoubtedly determined his lifework for him, and his modifications of the system he took over were structurally simple. His discovery of Sankey was almost an accident, his use of gospel singers and gospel hymns was a demonstration of his sure sense of cause and effect. (This history of his evangelism could not be written

without such an examination of the gospel hymns as they have not received.) He added the inquiry room, the precursor of the modern clinic in souls, and he added himself; his devotion, his power over assemblages and the strange, simple, searching life-changing quality of his message. The rest is history.

His voice was not musical, but it could fill any hall. He broke the minor rules of English grammar, but conveyed the sense of a noble culture. He struck powerfully the great chords of human emotion. Kipling has said in substance that the artist should not himself be affected by the emotions he arouses, but Moody seemed to feel deeply and sincerely the emotions he evoked and his power to communicate them was an aspect of his popular appeal. His shrewd wisdom was his balance wheel and he was never, so to speak, saccharine. His faculty to invest the time-worn with human interest was pure genius in debt to creative imagination and just the right, telling touch: "No doubt forty-eight hours before the flood Noah couldn't have sold the ark for more than kindling wood."<sup>3</sup> He drew his illustrations from his own vast experience; laughter and tears were never far apart as you heard him. At times he could sway an audience with his passion as the winds move the sea. He excelled in plain, telling epigrams. "Give me a half-acre of purgatory," he said once, "and I will stop all the wars in the world"; and now and then he touched the heights, as when, for example (and there are many such passages), he imagines Jesus after the resurrection charging the apostles with messages of forgiveness to those who crucified Him: "Yes, Peter, go find that man that made that cruel crown of thorns and placed it on my brow and tell him I will have a crown ready for him when he comes into my kingdom and there will be no thorns in it. . . . Search for the man that drove the spear into my side and tell him there is a nearer way to my heart than that."<sup>4</sup>

## VI

It is impossible now to characterize the results of his lifework since so much is gone. And also because those results persist through so many channels. For the nineteenth century I would compare him again with Newman

<sup>3</sup> Moody kept most of his doctrine for what he called addresses. His sermon topics were usually concise and concrete: "Reaping and Gathering Fruit," "Power of Faith," "Lost and Saved," "Heaven and Who Are There," "Stones to be Rolled Away," "The Ten Comes," "Noah's Carpenters." Of course, he used the same material over and over but it always seemed to issue new minted (a rare gift). His prayers should be in any preacher's study. (The sermon on "Noah's Carpenters" is pure genius in its power to "contemporize" that old story.)

<sup>4</sup> W. R. Moody, page 445.

and his associates who left Anglo-Catholicism, Booth who left the Salvation Army—and with no others. As for the issue of his evangelistic work, there is a general testimony that he contributed new currents of power and devotion to the Church and religious life of Great Britain and America, “solemnizing the thoughtless, checking the vicious, silencing the scoffers, and leading multitudes, not yet brought to Christ, to think of death, the judgment and eternity.”<sup>5</sup> Forty years after his 1874 mission in Scotland, an Edinburgh newspaper said in an editorial,<sup>6</sup> “Moody set a torch to Scotland.” He set a torch to the religious life of two great nations.

I venture, however, to believe that his most distinct and enduring service was to have “set a torch” to the purposes of individual lives. That power transcended his theology and technique. One might or might not agree with not a little he said and taught, but once he touched another personality something was there both evoked and released which, though it might find channels apparently remote from his, was thereafter more and other than it would have been without him. His name is in the indices of more biographies and autobiographies of English-speaking religious leaders than any other nineteenth-century name save Newman’s. And always with something more than impersonal recognition. Such references are woven through with living filaments.

A study like this leaves a world of things unsaid. He had his limitations, though they really contributed to his power. The “Social Gospel” was not above his horizon, nor, clearly, the far-reaching consequences of the impact of the scientific and critical spirit upon inherited religion. It is unfortunate that rival movements now claim him. He belongs to neither of them. “Modernism” can by no exercise of the imagination claim him. A conservative orthodoxy mediated through his understanding humanity, as his orthodoxy always was, would be entirely different from its mediation through the now militantly conservative. He dealt with timeless things: life and need and sin and sorrow and the saving love of God shining from the Cross.

One who knew him, honored him and acknowledges an indebtedness to him not easy to put into words, can only venture to say: if he had lived to be a hundred and were, in some strange plenitude of unchanged power, among us now, he would belong to our world, he would understand our minds and his gospel would meet our needs.

<sup>5</sup> *Idem*, page 151.

<sup>6</sup> *Idem*, page 169.

## Intercessory Prayer

### Its Reasonableness and Efficacy

JAMES S. McEWEN

THE subject of our discussion opens up every major problem connected with prayer. Had we been conducting a general discussion on the reasonableness and efficacy of prayer, we might have rested content with considering it as a kind of self-adjustment to the will of God, or a wordless ecstatic contemplation of His glory or realization of His power. As regards the nature of its efficacy, we might have hinted at some form of auto-suggestion. In other words, it might have been possible to consider prayer offered by myself and for myself, without raising the thorny question of the reasonableness of *petition*. Further, in discussing the nature of its efficacy we might have shelved the whole question of how God responds to my petition—how divine grace, without forcing my personality, reinforces my will.

But when our subject is the reasonableness of *intercessory* prayer, I do not see how we can avoid a careful consideration of the reasonableness of petition. It is true that some prayer on behalf of others professes to do no more than gather up their unspoken praises—as for example, the evangelist in Farnol's *Broad Highway* makes himself the mouthpiece of the inarticulate creation in praise to God. But, beautiful though this idea may be, it is hardly what we mean by intercessory prayer—which seems to me to be essentially *petition* on behalf of others.

Again, in discussing the nature of the efficacy of prayer for others—if indeed it has such an efficacy—we ought to give some consideration to the problem of how God can act on the spirit and will of those for whom I pray, without “depersonalizing” them.

There are two aspects of petitionary prayer: (1) prayer for spiritual blessing, and (2) prayer for alteration in external circumstances. And curiously enough, their relative “reasonableness” in intercessory prayer is the reverse of their relative “reasonableness” in prayer on one’s own behalf. Thus, many find it much easier to pray for their own inward blessing than for changes in their external circumstances: but if the reasonableness of

petitionary prayer be once established, it is easier to see how one can pray for changes in the environment of others than for changes in their wills.

Our discussion will therefore first concern itself with the reasonableness of petitionary prayer—and that, not merely for “inner” but also for “outer” blessings. If we succeed in establishing that it is reasonable to pray for changes in our own external circumstances, it will follow that we may just as reasonably pray for such changes in the external circumstances of others: for if God can and will alter the one set of circumstances, He can and will alter the other. Thereafter we shall have to consider whether petition for *spiritual* blessings on others is reasonable. When we have completed this investigation we shall have made a survey of the *reasonableness* of intercessory prayer. The *nature of its efficacy* we shall try to bring out as we proceed.

The divisions of the discussion are as follows:

I. *Can God answer my petitions*—(a) for internal goods, (b) for external goods? II. *Will God answer our petitions?* III. *Will God act directly on the spirits of others in answer to my petitions?* IV. *A practical consequence.*

#### I. *Can God Answer My Petitions*—

(a) for “internal” goods? There is a certain extreme view of petitionary prayer, held apparently by some psychologists, in which it is nothing more than “self-suggestion,” its action being merely reflex. They hold that prayer of this kind is useful and should be encouraged; for continual and earnest petition for goodness, courage, purity, tends by its constant and powerful suggestion to produce in the petitioner the qualities for which he prays.

But the very existence of such “petitionary prayer” depends on the belief of the petitioner that a response may be obtained from a Reality beyond himself. Deny that such a response is possible, and you make petitionary prayer impossible: for no man will pray to a Being who either does not exist—or who, if He exists, does not heed—for an answer which he knows will not be given. If the possibility of a response from beyond be denied, petitionary prayer is made absurd. Various forms of suggestion may remain, but petitionary prayer must necessarily vanish.

Further, *with it must go all sense that we are in living touch with a Divine Being*. If prayer means no more than periods of arguing with oneself in the presence of a “Silent Witness,” varied by periods of praise ad-

dressed to that Silent Witness, it is hard to see how the unbroken silence of the "Witness" will not in the end suggest the feeling that He is not there at all—or that He neither hears nor cares. Prayer which met with no response from the divine side would be like talking to an imbecile—a being who sits with blank, expressionless face, giving not the slightest sign that he hears or understands. Contact of personality with personality demands some degree of response from both: without some such response, no personal relationships are possible.<sup>1</sup>

For this reason, all who hold the belief that men can come into living contact with a Divine Being, must be prepared to allow that *some* form of answer can be expected to petitionary prayer.

Thus we reach the answer to our first question—"May I expect an answer to my petitions for 'internal goods'?" If we define religion as a personal relationship between the individual soul and Reality, and if we agree that such a relation is possible, then we must, at the very least, admit that petitionary prayer for "internal goods" is reasonable.

(b) for "external" goods? We now deal with the objection that while we must admit that God can answer petitions for internal goods, He is unable to answer prayers which would necessitate changes in external circumstances. The reason for this attitude is without doubt the influence of science on the modern mind. The argument in its essence is simply that science must be left free to account for every event in its own way and according to its own laws: and that when so left free, it uncovers a network of causal series, each member of which is sufficiently accounted for by the antecedent members, without leaving room for any reference to a divine initiation of any event.

Thus, it is claimed on the one hand, that God could not interfere in the causal series, without making irreparable havoc of the "laws of nature"; and on the other that to venture to assert that He *has* interfered is to fly in the face of science—the fundamental postulate of which is that *every* event can be fully referred to and explained by causes which are themselves comprehensible to science—that is, which are "natural."

So deeply has this attitude penetrated the popular mind—so thoroughly have certain religious thinkers been intimidated by it—that there are places where he would be considered a bold man who dared to suggest

<sup>1</sup>There remains the possibility that the personal nature of the relationship might be guarded by making God issue *commands*, to which man only *responded*. This point of view, however, we have met and refuted, so that our argument here is made "watertight."



that a Christian might still pray for his daily bread. In a recent issue of a religious weekly paper, a very eminent preacher has a long dissertation on "Prayer for the Modern Man." The burden of this article is, how many different ways a man can pray without asking for anything! And toward the close there is the tentative suggestion that, after all, some mild form of petition may be indulged in.

The same widely circulated and influential paper runs a "Question-Box" for its readers. Until recently, this was conducted by a clergyman who made it his mission to get people out of the habit of praying for any form of external blessing, because "miracles don't happen." All that they might pray for was strength to meet whatever events might come. The physical world runs like a machine, and not even God, in answer to our most earnest prayers, can intervene to turn its wheels one inch aside. The machine, once set in motion, must grind irrevocably on, to the bitter end.

As a preliminary consideration in our answer to this, we would point out that the idea of "causal chains"—series of discreet events, each "caused" by a single previous event—is now discredited. Stout,<sup>2</sup> in his criticism of Hume, has shown the way to a truer view of causation, as the immanent tendency in an ever-developing situation: so that in theory at least, an "event" is determined not by one antecedent "event," but by the whole developing World-System, within which it develops. Thus, it is impossible for science to trace *all* the conditioning factors of any event:<sup>3</sup> in practice it can only trace such factors as are relative to its purpose for the time being, and can never give a *complete* history of any (artificially isolated) "event."

We have no wish to take refuge in this "practical weakness" of science as against its theoretical claims. Still less do we wish to approve of the amazing conclusion drawn from the above facts by the late Bishop Gore,<sup>4</sup> namely, that Christians may go on trustfully commending their wishes about the weather to God, "*until science has got the power . . . of predicting events in these districts of experience*, since such power of prediction would show . . . that these events *also* are determined by physical laws without reference to moral or spiritual causes."<sup>5</sup>

<sup>2</sup> *Mind and Matter*—(Gifford Lectures).

<sup>3</sup> (Indeed it might be argued that since separate events are—when considered in their separateness—abstractions from the web of Reality, the relation holding between them will not be the living tendency immanent in the system as a whole, but a more or less abstract "reflection" of it. It is with this "second-hand" causation that science deals.)

<sup>4</sup> *Asking Them Questions*, p. 51 (edited by R. S. Wright).

<sup>5</sup> *Italics mine.*

We have no interest in a kind of prayer which must forever be in retreat before advancing science: nor do we understand how we can "*trustfully*" pray for certain things, simply because science has *not yet* shown them to be impossible. Our intention in the above paragraphs has been simply to combat the idea of the "causal chain" of events, each determined by a single previous event—and the corollary of this, that unless a divine act appears as a link in this chain, no divine intervention has taken place.

Having made this point, we proceed simply to assert that since the human will can and does<sup>6</sup> alter the course of physical events, a like power must (*a fortiori*) be conceded to a Being infinitely wiser and more powerful than man. Further, we note that the human will alters the natural course of events, not by "breaking the laws of nature" but by *using* them. We use, for example, the law of gravity itself to make water run uphill. Every product of human hands is something which physical forces, left to themselves, would not have produced: yet these products come into existence not through the breaking of any physical laws but through the "playing off" of one physical law against another. The human will is able so to play upon physical forces that they produce in its service what they would never have produced by themselves. But if the power of the human will to alter physical conditions be admitted, why should a similar or greater power not be ascribed to the divine will?

An objection which has been advanced against this argument, is that an event due to human interference can always be traced back, in theory at any rate, step by step until the investigator reaches the direct action of the man who initiated the interference; whereas, however far we trace back the causes of an alleged miracle, we never come upon anything which the scientist is compelled to regard as the direct action of the divine will: the causal chain stretches back infinitely.

But besides bringing in the fallacy of the "causal chain," this argument overlooks the fact that the human will is an embodied will, and the divine will is not. Certainly every product of human activity can be traced back to some action of the human body: but is it not the case that theoretically at least it can be traced back beyond the body through chemical processes (etc.) to the physical again? If the "Law of Conservation of Energy" is true, no "mind energy" passes over into the physical world through the

<sup>6</sup> We have no space to consider the academic objection that the human will has not this efficacy. This is a belief which—to adapt Hume's words—can be held in the study but not in the street.



brain: and consequently it can never be more than a metaphor to speak of the mind "acting on the brain," or through the body on external events. The causal series, therefore, stretches back through the brain to the food we eat, the air we breathe, and to a hundred other things, but it *does not* lead back to any "act of will." All that we can say is, that the brain is probably the region in which the human will obtains its "purchase" on the flow of physical events: but in itself the human will is just as remote and mysterious to the scientist who searches for it along the "causal trail," as is the will of God.<sup>7</sup> Neither makes any appearance within the causal series.

If then the processes of the human body respond in this mysterious way to my will, and through them I can in a measure control my environment, it is completely reasonable to suppose that the universe is to God's will even more perfectly what my body is to mine—an instrument responsive and under control to the minutest degree. The fact that science knows nothing of this, need not distress us nor surprise us: for here we stand where one infinite world touches another—at the boundary of the spiritual and the physical dimensions. And as Karl Heim points out, here we can expect nothing but mystery and paradox if we attempt to comprehend the more complex dimension from the standpoint of the less complex—the action of the Spirit from the standpoint of physical laws.

So we can answer our second question—"Can God answer our petitions for outward goods?"—with an emphatic "Yes." The whole flow of events is under His control, as religious men have always held: and science cannot lay its hands upon any sphere and say—"this at least lies outside His power to change or to control."<sup>8</sup>

## II. Will God Answer Our Petitions?

We no longer need to keep apart consideration of petition for our internal and external goods, for both forms of petition (as we have seen) are reasonable. Further, as we saw earlier, we can now take it as demonstrated that God can alter the circumstances of *others* in answer to our

<sup>7</sup> To take this comic analogy a step further, the scientist who tracks an "act of will" back along a causal series, is like a hunter who finds that the bear which he is trailing is inside a certain cave, although the tracks lead straight past the mouth of it!

<sup>8</sup> We do not enter here upon the question of whether nature in all its workings is a *direct* expression of the divine will, or whether it has a relative independence.

H. H. Farmer (*The World and God*, page 173) argues that the religious awareness of miracle presupposes some settled order of nature which God has in this special case overruled.

Another ground for assigning a relative independence to nature, would be the pressure of the problem of evil. The point to notice, however, is that these are questions which must be settled, so far as they can be settled, by *religious* insight. Scientific arguments, as we have striven to show, are irrelevant.

prayers, if He so wills. There can, therefore, be no objection to our now taking this possibility for granted.

The objection which we must now face is, that although God *could* answer my petitions, it is *unreasonable* to expect Him to do so. The reason behind this assertion is almost always that God's will is perfect and good; and therefore the best that I can do is simply to be prepared to obey whatever that will may be. The extreme form of this attitude would of course do away with the necessity of prayer altogether: God's will will be done *to* me and *through* me, whether I like it or not—whether I pray about it or not.

Few however will be prepared to take this as the whole truth: most religious people hold that there is a will of God—a purpose which He has relative to my life—which does not simply “happen to me,” but which I must find out by prayer before I can do it. Prayer would then—by the opponents of petitionary prayer—be conceived as a fixing of the mind on God, until His will becomes clear to me: thereafter I must simply seek to obey.\* It is never permissible to start with *my* desire, and pray that it be granted: I must always, only, pray that His will be revealed, and then for grace to do it. For His will is *ex hypothesi* perfect; and any alteration, made as a concession to my short-sighted requests, would be in the nature of a “*pis aller*.”

To this point of view we make two answers, which though distinguishable are closely related.

(1) It is not true to experience to say that God's will usually or even frequently comes to men “out of the blue”—out of all relation to their desires, wishes and thoughts. It is not true that God's will comes to me normally when I kneel down and remain passive in His presence. It is not true that I can at any time sit down with paper and pencil and a quiet mind, and simply write down as if to dictation, God's orders to me for the day. We do not wish to deny that such revelations of His will may or do take place: but we do wish to indicate that the mass of testimony points to the fact that God's will is not always given clearly and unmistakably. Often it has to be sought by laborious means—by thought, study, effort and the discipline of recognized error. If, for example, two courses of action lie before me, I am often left apparently “in the dark” as to which is God's

\*There is a truth here—that it must always be a sin to pray against what is *known* to be His will. That would be to pray that an exception be made in our favor, so that we might do what we know to be wrong, *with God's connivance!*

But we are here speaking of a situation where there is no such clearly known will of God.

will for me. I must then weigh them up and decide which—taking all known circumstances into consideration—is in my opinion best. I am then morally bound to set out upon that course which seems to me best, and earnestly to pray God to further me in this course of action, *if it be His will*. And I may be left to deduce whether or not it is His will, from the blessing or the barrenness to which my action leads.

But without *my* decision, *my* willing of the course of action, *my* beginning to carry it out, there may come no revelation of God's will. "Man proposes and God disposes"—but before God will dispose, man must often propose and even act: and it is hard to see how character could otherwise be trained. We must remember that Jesus, who perfectly did the Father's will, is pictured as prefacing a prayer with "Father, *I will . . .*": and again makes this direct request—"All things are possible to thee: *take away this cup from me*: nevertheless, not my will . . ."

Our contention then has been that often it is only when a man places his own will and desire before God, and really asks and wants its fulfillment, that God's will becomes clear to him. Thus, to know God's will for us, we must often lay before Him our own will.

(2) Not only may the laying of my will before God be the only means of discovering His; but more—there is nothing unreasonable or irreligious in the belief that God may really grant that petition and desire.

For what is God's will relative to us? Is it not the training of our character, the building up of our spirits, the making of us into beings fit for a life of communion with Him? And how can this end be attained by simply ignoring all our wishes and desires? No sensible parent or teacher will begin with a cut-and-dried conception of what a boy is going to be, and proceed to drill and "drum-major" the lad into that pattern, without listening to his protests or wishes: the attempt so to do will produce either a spiritless creature or a rebel. Instead, he will make it his first business to discover what are the desires of the lad, and will then attempt so to control, direct and integrate them as to produce the finest possible character. That is to say, the detailed "plan" does not precede an amorphous material, and determine the form it is to take: the truth is that all the details of the "plan" must be determined with constant reference to the nature of developing material.

Therefore it seems to me the height of absurdity to concede on the one hand that God's great concern with us is our spiritual training and

development, and on the other to assert that our wills and desires are quite irrelevant to His purpose. The reverse must be the truth: the materials which God must use in building me up into a being fit to worship and commune with Him, can be nothing else than those very desires and purposes. What indeed is left of "me" if these be passed over and ignored?

We must conclude then, that my will and desires are not passed over or ignored; but are very relevant to God's will for me: indeed that His will for me is formed with these desires in view.

Perhaps in making this point, we appear to have run to the opposite extreme, and to have laid too great a stress on the importance of human will and wish. If we have done so, it has only been in order to make clear that human desires and aims cannot be described as a "matter of indifference" to God: to show that since God's purpose is to make of man a being fit for communion with Himself, He can no more ignore the human will, than a chess-player can ignore the moves of his opponent. If we take the relation between God and man to be really the relation between a Father and a child-in-training: if we take it to be what Christianity has always asserted it to be—a genuinely *personal* relationship, we must give up all idea of a rigid unalterable will of God for each man—a will of God which is without relation to the will of man. And we must substitute for it the belief in a will of God which meets and deals with man's changing desires as they arise. Few or none of these desires may ever be brought to the exact fruition we hope for; but we may be certain that anything that is worthy in them will be blessed and made to bear perhaps unexpected fruit. No worthy desire will ever be simply ignored: the dross may be washed from it, but the fine gold is precious in God's eyes, and will assuredly be given its due and proper place.

We have spoken above of the "will of man" simply in itself, and not as expressed in petitionary prayer. We would of course insist that this will and desire should be formed in prayer in the presence of God. In so far as this is done, then my *real* desire and will—a very different thing from what I think proper to say that I desire!—will be something which God can more fully grant me.

We have now reached the point at which we can affirm with all confidence that God is able to grant our petitions not merely for inward blessings but also for changes in outward circumstances. Further, we have seen that He is not only *able*, but also that He is *willing* to answer—subject

to His wise and loving Providence—every worthy petition. But this cannot mean only desires and petitions for ourselves: some of our deepest, strongest and purest desires are for others, and it would be unbelievable that they carried no weight with God, while our desires for our own good were considered. God is surely willing to listen to them also, and to respond to them as lovingly as He responds to prayer for our own good. Our next section brings our attention directly to intercessory prayer.

### III. *Will God Act Directly on the Spirits of Others in Answer to My Petitions?*

The question of the *nature of the efficacy of intercessory prayer*, is raised in the minds of many Christian people by this consideration: Is it possible that a good and loving God will withhold from any of His children, certain great and vital blessings, merely because nobody has prayed for that person? For that seems necessarily to be the converse of the belief that by praying for another person I may be able really and vitally to bless him.

The difficulty of believing that God waits to bless any child until others have prayed for him, and retains blessings unconferrred because intercession has not been made, inclines some people to deny that intercessory prayer works through any act of God: rather, they assert that intercessory prayer acts directly on another person by means of telepathy, or suggestion, or by "altering the spiritual conditions surrounding the person."<sup>10</sup> In this way, my failure to intercede is purely *my* fault: God is not made an "accessory after the fact," who withholds from another the blessing because I have not asked Him to give it.

But if the efficacy of intercessory prayer depends on suggestion—on the knowledge that one is being prayed for—then many of our intercessions, particularly for the sinful and the heedless, are a waste of time. Either they do not know that prayer is offered for them, or if they know, they do not care. But the main objection to the belief that the efficacy of intercessory prayer lies in suggestion, or telepathy, or in the altering of "spiritual conditions," is the same one which we made to the idea of prayer itself as mere auto-suggestion. Here again, once a man realizes that the addressing of prayer to God is pointless, since the answer will not come through Him but

<sup>10</sup> This alteration is conceived as resulting simply from my fixing my mind upon the person in question, and "willing" an improvement in him or his circumstances. The phrase comes from some popular treatment of prayer—source now forgotten.



through—say—telepathy, he will be very foolish if he persists in this method of prayer. But if the direct appeal to God be dropped, then what is left is *not* prayer; it is an effort directly to manipulate certain obscure psychical or “spiritual” forces—and to such manipulation, no particular religious interest attaches. Experiments in healing by suggestion have been tried, and experiments in healing by telepathy no doubt will be tried, by the most atheistic of scientists. Nobody would dignify such attempts by the name of “intercessory prayer”; and yet there is no essential difference between this, and the attempt to benefit others by “prayer” which does not call upon God to intervene.

This does not mean, of course, that “changes in spiritual environment,” or even suggestion and telepathy, *may* not play a God-appointed part in intercessory prayer. To make this point clear, let us take the story of the party of Scottish Covenanters who realized from the scattering of the sheep on the brow of the hill, that the dragoons were upon them. As they knelt in prayer for help, a curtain of cloud from a neighboring ridge trailed across the moor in such a way that the soldiers passed within a few hundred yards of the conventicle without seeing it. The Covenanters believed that a miracle had taken place: and if somebody had offered to explain to them the meteorological factors which had brought down the curtain of mist, they would not have been greatly interested. They might have admitted that all these forces had been at work; but they would have added that the important thing was, that it was God who had set them at work—and further, that they had no great interest in these forces, since they had no guarantee that God would use these particular ones on another occasion.

So with intercessory prayer: God may use a variety of means to accomplish His purpose. But, to begin with, we have no certainty that He will always use these particular means in every similar situation; and secondly, even if He did, it is in subjection to His will—not ours—that these means serve that end. Hence our religious interest is with the will of God and with that alone—not with the nature of the methods He may use in any particular case. Let the scientist investigate these if he will: they are of no vital consequence to the religious thinker.

We seem then to be shut up to the conclusion that where there is a failure in intercessory prayer, God is an “accessory after the fact,” in that He does not bestow that benefit which the prayer would have secured.

This conclusion, however, ought not greatly to surprise us. May it not

be the expression in the realm of prayer, of a fact which seems to appear in every sphere of human activity—the fact that we are “bound together in one bundle of life”; so that one can bless many, and (conversely) the innocent must suffer with and for the guilty?

Thus, at the physical level, the very factors which make it possible for parents to pass on to their children healthy minds and bodies, also make possible inherited disease and weakness.

At the social level, every citizen is dependent for his food, comfort, and security on a whole army of fellow citizens, who in turn are in a measure dependent on him. Through this social organism, one great man may benefit thousands: but through the very same mechanism, a bad or foolish man may bring to thousands misery and disaster.

At the mental level, we find that knowledge is in a sense a communal possession. Of the ideas “in the head” of the wisest man, only a fraction can be his own: the main body is drawn from countless past and present sources. So a great thinker can provide good “mental furniture” not for his own age only, but for succeeding generations: but a bad or slipshod thinker may poison the well of knowledge and so bring unhappiness to many—as for example the nineteenth century scientists sometimes did by hasty generalizations in support of materialism or naturalism.

This being unquestionably true in these other ranges of human activity and experience, there does not appear to be any reason to deny that it may also be true of our spiritual life and of our prayer life: that it is not merely as individuals that we stand before God, but as a prayerful company in which the individual is dependent for his blessing on the prayers of all.

Nor is this unity merely a vague, emotional “band-of-brothers” feeling. It must be, to say the least of it, a bond as real, compelling, inescapable as the unity of knowledge—as the organic unity of society—as the physical solidarity of the race. The failure of a member of the spiritual community must necessarily produce a real, deep, inward loss, not only to the community as a whole, but in an intimate way to many or perhaps all of its members.

This being so, my failure in intercessory prayer may work real harm to others. We are placed in a fellowship in which we are meant to hold one another up in prayer, so that two together may have the strength of ten, and ten be stronger than an army. And it is through this living “community of prayer” that God has promised to bless each: if some of the community fail in prayer, the blessing for all is impoverished.

Those who really understand this, find an amazing power of blessing others put into their hands. Those who through laziness fail to pray for others in their times of need, are offering a *real offence* to "these little ones who believe"—are depriving them of a spiritual resource<sup>11</sup> on which they have the right to count—and woe to that man by whom such offences come!

It will be seen that we have shelved the question of how God can act on the will of another in answer to my prayers. This is an aspect of the question of the relation of nature and grace: and even if we imagined we had the ability to discuss it, we should lack the space. We have contented ourselves with stating our reasons for believing that by intercessory prayer, spiritual resources *are* opened up to others, which they would not otherwise have.

#### IV. *A Practical Consequence*

And now, briefly, we may raise the practical point, of what are fitting subjects for intercessory prayer. It may be argued that we must ask only for such things as conduce to the eternal welfare of the person for whom we pray. But while it may be true that we ought in prayer to seek first the kingdom of God and His righteousness, and leave the other things to be added, it is sometimes very hard to draw a clear line between lesser things and the things of the Kingdom. And it is surely better to pray earnestly and in good faith, even if mistakenly, for some non-essential happiness, than to refrain through a priggish and false "spirituality" from praying for many things which it might be our Father's good pleasure to give us.

There remains also this practical point: We saw that it was of a man's *real will* that God takes account. To imagine that God is going to alter His divine plan, merely because a certain form of words is recited in church on Sunday, is superstition; we shall certainly not be heard by reason of our much speaking. Therefore, a "gabbled," unfelt petition stands self-condemned as useless.

Does not this explain why so much of our intercessory prayer seems to be unanswered? It is unanswered because we do not *want* the things which our tongues ask for. It is the effectual *fervent* prayer of a righteous man that availeth much.

<sup>11</sup> It might be said that all this is to reinstate the doctrine of "spiritual conditions," with which we have quarrelled. But we only objected to the idea of manipulating these conditions independently of God: we did not deny that men might be bound together in a "spiritual system" with certain definite laws.



# The Church and Communism

PAUL TILlich

THE following propositions and explanations presuppose the conviction that the strategy of the Christian churches toward Communism has been predominantly wrong and pernicious. The gap between the churches and the masses of those who have found a new meaning of life by their communistic and Marxistic belief has become as deep as it actually is largely because of the attitude of the churches. Events like the present crusade of Catholicism against Communism must still deepen that gap and provoke in the masses of the disinherited an invincible resentment against the Church and religion. The Protestant churches are in a better strategic position, since they do not identify the Church of Christ with the visible Church. Consequently, they do not have to identify an attack against the Protestant Church with an attack against the Church of Christ or the kingdom of God. The Protestant churches are able to agree with the most radical criticism launched against themselves. They are even able to intensify this criticism from their own ultimate point of view. But this great advantage is balanced by the fact that Protestantism, because of its lack of a hierarchy, is delivered in a dangerous degree to social powers by which it is abused as a means of stabilizing and preserving their political control. It is a test for Protestantism—perhaps the greatest and the most difficult in the present situation—whether it will develop a new and better strategy toward Communism than Catholicism, and than Protestantism itself, usually have applied.

It is understood that Communism in this statement does not mean one political party only and not only all those parties which call themselves communistic; but that it means also those socialist movements which are rooted in an essentially Marxian interpretation of history and social life.

## THE THEORETICAL STRATEGY

### I. Knowledge and Interpretation

*The churches ought to acquire an exact knowledge of Communism.* This seems natural, but it is not, because the political strategy against Com-

munism consists to a great extent in the prevention of knowledge about it, and in the replacement of knowledge by defamatory slogans. Consequently, the Christian churches in their mere attempt to gain true knowledge of Communism, become suspect of political sympathy with it. Nevertheless, they are obliged to do so, by the command of honesty as well as of prudence.

*The knowledge which has to be acquired is primarily a true insight into the theoretical foundation of Communism.* It is difficult for many reasons to understand the theoretical foundations of Marxism and consequently of Communism. The first reason is, that Marx himself uses a kind of thinking which challenges the usual way of thought, the so-called dialectical method. Dialectical thinking seems to unite contrasting assertions and to replace logical necessity by paradoxical arbitrariness. Although this is not the case—since the dialectical method tries to discover and to describe more exactly than non-dialectical methods can the contrasting tendencies within the structure of life itself—it is not easy to penetrate into the stratum of reality for which dialectical method is adequate. But Christian theology should not be afraid of it, because theology itself was dialectical from its very beginning and it is dialectical in all its basic doctrines. Dialectical thought should rather unite than separate Christianity and Marxism. The second reason for the difficulty of understanding Marx is the development of Marx and Marxism. In his first period Marx created the philosophical, ethical and anthropological presuppositions of his later period in which the economic and political problems prevailed to such an extent that they covered for the general consciousness the achievements of the first period. This was supported by the trend of the later part of the nineteenth century toward metaphysical materialism. Although Marx very strongly had refuted Feuerbach's materialism, he was interpreted by many of his followers in the sense of metaphysical materialism. But this is a misinterpretation, and the living power of Marxism cannot be understood without a knowledge of the earlier period of Marx.

The third and greatest difficulty for the understanding of Marxism and Communism is the fact that the political propaganda for and against Communism has popularized and distorted all the main categories of Marx's thought. Concepts like materialism, ideology, historical dialectics, proletariat, class-struggle, classless society, have become slogans on both sides of the struggle. It is hard but necessary also for Christian theology to re-discover the genuine meaning and eventual truth of these concepts.

*The knowledge which has to be acquired is, second, a true picture of the historical reality of Communism.* There are two groups of facts which should be considered very exactly and non-partially by the Christian churches. First, the aggressive attitude of Communism to Christianity and religion, which is quite understandable from the historical and sociological situation of rising socialism; the masses of agrarian workers with very few religious traditions, flooding into the industrial centers and losing in their new conditions all traditional remnants, religious as well as cultural; the theoretical and practical materialism of the ruling bourgeoisie; the support of the ruling classes, feudal and bourgeois, by the stabilized churches in all countries; the complete lack of political and social criticism of the governments in German Lutheranism and Russian Orthodoxy. The second important point which has to be known exactly by the churches is the communist revolution and reconstruction in Russia. In this regard it is necessary to distinguish between the genuine Russian and the genuine communistic elements in Bolshevism; between Russia's entrance into the technocratic period and the attempt of Russian Communism to avoid the capitalistic form of industrialization; between the period of revolution and civil war with its barbaric destruction and the period of dictatorial reconstruction. These distinctions are not intended to weaken any justified criticism of Communism, but to give the basis for every righteous criticism.

*An exact knowledge of Communism by the Christian churches would enable them to give a new and original interpretation of it.* The Christian churches, especially, are capable of doing so, since they can interpret Communism from the ultimate point of view; the meaning of human existence. Christianity is obliged to interpret all contemporary movements in this way, since all of them have arisen on the basis of Christian culture and education. This makes Christianity responsible for them, even when they attack the Church and faith. If there may be any apologetics today, this is the only way to perform it: not defense of Christianity and negation of its foes, but interpretation of them from the Christian point of view. Protestantism is especially able to do so, since it is not captivated by the Roman Catholic Church-Absolutism, and Protestantism especially is forced to do so, because it cannot make an ultimate separation of sacred and secular spheres. For Protestantism the kingdom of God is neither identical with the Christian Church, nor with a sacred sphere generally. God can work and is working both in the holy and in the secular realm. Therefore it can happen that

God's prophetic word to a special situation is more manifest in a secular movement even if this movement brands itself anti-religious and anti-Christian. God's activity is not confined to the sacred sphere.

*The message of Communism must be interpreted as a secularized and politicized form of Christian prophetism.* This interpretation, although demanded by all types of religious socialism for more than half a century, yet did not penetrate strongly enough into the general Christian consciousness. But it is not possible for Christianity to have a fair strategy with reference to Communism without recognizing the large analogies between Communism and prophetism. Only a few instances to prove this assertion (the great differences are mentioned later): prophetism like Marxism has an historical interpretation of human existence, contradicting the non-historical interpretation of the world in Greek religion and philosophy, in non-Christian and Christian mysticism, in the mechanistic and the vitalistic philosophies; even more: both Christianity and Marxism deny the ecclesiastical and conservative restriction of history to past events and are in the first place directed toward the future. This is connected with the fact that both Christianity and Marxism judge the present period as something which comes to an end by a catastrophe, because the demonic powers have become too powerful. The basic eschatological feeling with its revolutionary impulse is common to both. It is natural that the negative criticism of the present is rooted in a positive expectation of a future which overcomes the demonic powers and ends— injustice, lie, class-struggle and the social and natural evils. For the lack of social justice is the main point in prophetic criticism as well as in the Marxian analysis of class-society. Consequently, both deny a nationalism which is used for disguising social injustice; the nationalistic prophets are in prophetism as well as in Marxism characterized as "false prophets." This leads to a final point: prophetism as well as Marxism knows and reveals the way in which human will to power uses religious or philosophical ideas in order to justify itself. The "self-made" God of the prophets and "ideology" in Marxism are rooted in the same interpretation of human nature. This analogy could be carried through in many other respects; the mentioned points seem to be most important.

*The attitude of the followers of Communism must be interpreted as a mixture of religious faith and heroism, of political and social passion, and of a mass movement in a period of mass disintegration.* Only an interpretation from the point of view of the meaning of life is able to understand the

inner tensions of the communistic attitude. Taking it purely politically, the churches would overlook its religious and psychological power; taking it purely psychologically, the Church would overlook its religious and political power. In each case, the strategy of the Church would fail. There are many points in which the latent religious character of the communistic movement becomes transparent: the enthusiastic commitment till death by its followers, decade after decade, the replacement of all other creeds by the communistic one, the totalitarian claim for all sections of human existence, the dogmatic character attributed to the Marxian doctrines, the adoration of some communistic leaders as revealers and saviours. The fact that all this is interwoven with mass-psychological tendencies and political passions, and that it expresses itself in quite secular terms, does not change its basic character.

## II. Positive and Negative Criticism

*The positive criticism of Communism by the churches has to precede the negative one, and has to imply a sharp self-criticism of the churches.* Since the churches aspire to speak in the name of God, they have to direct every criticism, first of all, against themselves, admitting in this way that they are met by the same judgment as those criticized by them. For the churches, Communism should be a symbol of their lack of prophetic spirit. In Communism they have to recognize themselves as far as they stand against social demonries, exploitation and injustice. They have to recognize that the divine judgment over the world, which is always a general and special judgment at the same time, was not pronounced by themselves strongly enough and, consequently, was given into the hands of a secular movement, inimical to the churches. They have to acknowledge this as a divine judgment over themselves.

*The churches have to accept the communist challenge to capitalism and nationalism as far as this challenge concerns the demonic elements in both.* The present social, political and intellectual system is characterized by later capitalism and the fascist form of its self-defense. The outcome of this situation is a tremendous mass disintegration on the one hand, and attempts at a reintegration on the basis of totalitarian nationalism on the other hand. The mass disintegration is a consequence of industrialization, class-contradiction and secularization in the bourgeois period of history. It has penetrated into the churches themselves, and has weakened their resistance to



the threat of decay and meaninglessness. As far as Communism represents a challenge of this situation, Christianity has to agree with it. The attempt at a mass-reintegration on a national basis could be supported by Christianity in so far as it avoids nationalism and totalitarianism. But since this is not the case in Fascism and all related movements, Christianity has to join the communist challenge to Fascism as idolatry and tyranny.

*The churches have to accept the communist hope for a new future as representing, although in a secularized way, the Christian hope for the coming of the kingdom of God in history.* The Christian churches, generally, have decided for the ecclesiastical interpretation of history against the sectarian one; that is, they have accepted the Augustinian idea that the final stage of history, the Thousand Year's Kingdom, is realized in the Church. For Augustine, the government of Christ is identical with the administration of the Sacraments. Luther, although denying the hierarchical claim of Catholicism, maintained the conservative attitude which was consistent with his pessimism about the world generally. Calvinism gave rise to a more revolutionary attitude by its theoretical trends and the political situation of its congregations. So it could link itself with the anti-hierarchical sectarian tendencies which always were alive in church history. Since Joachim di Fiore and the radical Franciscans, the Augustinian interpretation of history has been attacked: the fulfillment of history is not yet given, but must be expected in a third stage of equality and justice. The Anabaptists and other Protestant denominations, first of all in the Anglo-Saxon countries, continued this trend. Communism is to be considered as a secularized form of this sectarian attitude, and is to be acknowledged insofar as it represents that part of Christian hope which is concerned not only with individuals and transcendence, but also with community and history.

*The churches have to challenge the communistic distortion of the prophetic spirit by the complete secularization of it.* The fact that Communism is a rational and political movement cannot be criticized. Even its attack of the Christian churches insofar as these support, politically and intellectually, capitalism and nationalism, cannot be used as a basis for a religious challenge to Communism. Christian criticism of Communism is justified by the complete secularization of the communistic interpretation of existence, by which the transcendent meaning of existence is denied and human mind is kept within the boundaries of a mere immanence. Insofar as the communistic atheism expresses this view, the Church has to direct her

prophetic word against it, and against its moral and psychological implications.

*The churches have to challenge the utopian distortion of the Christian hope by the communistic interpretation of human existence.* Utopianism is the idea that the fulfillment of history lies in history itself. It cannot be refuted by the assertion that the fulfillment of history is to be sought exclusively beyond history, but only by the prophetic message that the kingdom of God at the same time is in history and beyond history. This is especially important for the valuation of individual existence beyond history, which is neglected to a great extent in Communism. The doctrine of man is the most neglected part of Marxist and communist theory. They never revised the liberal optimism regarding the nature of man, although they have an extremely pessimistic view of its present distortion, but since they did not explain this distortion in anthropological, but only in sociological terms, the transition from natural perfection to existential distortion and from this to existential fulfillment, is described in a very utopian way. Here Christianity, which deals with the same problems, has to criticize, and, if possible, to transform communistic thought.

*The churches have to challenge those activities of Communism, as of other political movements, which are based on lies and tyranny.* The churches would not be right in attacking power as power, and even force as a means of supporting power. The prophetic attack of the churches has to be directed against the abuse of power by systems of lies and tyranny. As far as this is the case, not only in Fascism but also in Communism, the churches have to condemn it. This is the only admissible interpretation of the demand that the churches have to defend the "rights of men." It does not mean the support of a special, for instance democratic, constitution, and the negation of non-democratic forms of political life. The religious problem of democracy is primarily not a problem of constitutional forms, but it is a problem of ethical principles and human behavior. Since the valuation of every man as an image of God is a general Christian principle, every form of government has to be denied which disregards by its very structure this Christian valuation of man and treats him as the means for ends which finally are sub-personal, as for instance, power, wealth, organization, etc. If such a principle is implied in a constitution, the constitution itself has to be attacked, not for the sake of democratic parliamentarism, but for the sake of the elimination of this anti-Christian principle. Perhaps even more im-

portant is the attempt of Christianity to bring about a democratic behavior of benevolence, fairness, and mutual acknowledgment which makes tyranny impossible in a nation. Only with these restrictions should the Christian churches criticize Communism from the point of view of its dictatorial character.

#### PRACTICAL STRATEGY

##### I. The Strategy of the Church Authorities

*An adequate practical strategy of the churches toward Communism is possible only on the basis of a right and thorough theoretical strategy.* This assertion implies the demand that not only the theologians, but also the Church authorities, ministers and laymen, who act in the name of the Church, shall be helped to achieve an adequate knowledge, interpretation, and criticism of Communism. Consequently, Communism as well as the whole historical situation in which it has arisen, should become an essential subject in ecclesiastical instruction and interpretation. The lack of it was one of the main causes for the alienation between the Church and the masses, in the European countries.

*The church authorities: Synods, Bishops, Presbyteries, etc., have to avoid even the appearance of supporting a political movement, either a communistic or an anti-communistic.* It is obvious that the church authorities never can join any political movement as such. In doing so, they would identify the kingdom of God to which the Church points, with a finite and always distorted reality. The presupposition of such an attitude is the Catholic identification of an organized Church with the kingdom of God as far as it appears on earth. Since Protestantism has denied this doctrine, the Protestant churches are not allowed either to support politically even those political movements which are favorable to them, or to attack politically even those political movements which are inimical to them. Supporting or attacking the organized Church is not identical with supporting or attacking the Christian faith. It may be the opposite. The Church has to do with the spiritual principles eventually implied in political movements and not with these movements themselves.

*The church authorities, although concerned with the order of social life, are not allowed to give preference to the political system in power, since it may not only maintain order but also destroy justice.* This proposition refutes those who confuse order with justice, and become always allies of the



existent political system, thus denying from a Christian point of view any revolutionary movement, including Communism. Divine, ecclesiastical, and political hierarchies are combined and constitute a system of authority the defense of which is considered a defense of Christianity itself. This conscious (or in some cases more unconscious) alliance of authorities makes an adequate strategy of the churches toward Communism impossible.

*The church authorities have publicly to join and to transform the communistic criticism of the present social demonries, and the religious heresies, linked to them.* The most important utterance of church authorities is their challenging a heresy and giving a dogmatic decision against it, and creating in this way a new constitutive element of Christian doctrine. Heresies are doctrines which rise within the Church and claim to be the true interpretation of Christianity. The doctrines of political movements can become heresies only when they make this claim, as totalitarian nationalism does today. The church authorities can join the communistic criticism in public and solemn refutation of such heresies, although from a different and higher perspective. Beyond the refutation of heresies the church authorities are obliged to challenge demonries in mental, social, and political life, from the point of view of the coming of the kingdom of God. The anti-demonic struggle of the Church is to be considered as the continuation of the victory of Christ over the demonic powers. The churches should not conceal the fact that in this respect they agree with the communist criticism, although their own criticism has different roots and consequences.

*The church authorities have publicly to challenge Communism for the sake of its own demonic and heretical elements.* This demand is a mere consequence of the preceding explanations. With respect to its heretical elements, immanentism and utopianism, the church authorities have to emphasize the basically bourgeois character of this attitude. They should not prefer the idealistic and religious concealment of immanentism in the bourgeoisie to the frankly revealed immanentism of Communism. The communistic heresy is older than Communism. With respect to the demonic element in Communism, tyranny, the church authorities must acknowledge that Communism takes tyranny as a transitory stage, while totalitarian nationalism takes it as a final stage.

## II. The Strategy of the Church Ministers

*As far as the church ministers directly represent the Church from the*

*pulpit and at many other occasions, all demands concerning the church authorities are valid for them too, but in a more concrete way.* It is obvious that the minister, for instance in preaching, is not allowed to identify himself with a political party. Those of his hearers who do not agree with him politically, would not admit that he speaks either in the name of God to the community, or in the name of the community to God. The Christian message does not imply scientific or technical suggestions, concerning more perfect forms of intellectual, social, and political life. Consequently, the minister, as a representative of the Church, must not make such suggestions, either in communist or in any other direction. On the other hand, he must not keep the Christian demands in a merely abstract sphere, making them inefficient thereby. But even in dealing with the most practical and concrete matters, he has to restrain himself to a negative and positive application of the ultimate criterion, given in Christianity, and to avoid any technical suggestions.

*As far as ministers represent the Church only indirectly, in their private thought and life, all demands concerning the Christian layman are valid for them, but with many more severe tensions.* In the Protestant view, the church minister is not priest but layman with special functions. As a layman he may have a philosophical and political conviction of his own, and as a Christian layman he should connect this conviction with the Christian principles, as, for example, in Christian pragmatism as a philosopher, or in religious socialism as a citizen. The problem is in how far he is able to distinguish his character as a Christian layman from his character as a church minister. This again depends on the situation in his congregation and denomination. The more the political matters become decisive for the totality of existence, the less is it possible to keep the mentioned distinction. There is a situation in which he is obliged to give up his private life as a philosopher or as a citizen for the sake of his vocation as a church minister.

### III. The Strategy of Christian Laymen

*The Christian laymen may become Communists and try to unite the Christian principles with the principles of Communism.* The religious socialist movements are attempts to perform this task. They should be continued, even if Communism denies them and their present political success is very little. There may be a great change in the future in this respect; but even if not, the effect of religious socialism on Christian theory and practice, as

well as its apologetic effect on the alienated masses, justify this movement, the special items of which cannot be explained here.

*Christian socialism, although extremely important for the Christian churches, cannot become an affair of the Church itself.* The very existence of Christian socialists refutes the assertion that the gap between both cannot be bridged at all. Therefore, the churches should support their tasks indirectly by admission, sympathy, and self-criticism. On the other hand the Church cannot take the risk of such an attempt upon herself. She has to leave the risk to those who dare to take it and are willing to subject themselves to the judgment of history.

#### IV. The Strategy of the Church as a Whole

*The practical strategy of the Church as a whole is a continuous attempt to make herself a representation and anticipation of the kingdom of God and its righteousness.* The Church as such cannot solve the social problems with which Communism deals; even if a great number of capitalists and workers became real Christians, the permanent class-war between them could not be stopped since the class-war is not a matter of free decision, but a natural law of capitalistic economy. Consequently the Church can solve the social problem only in herself, as far as the community of faith and love is concerned. A representative attitude of this character is tremendously efficient in safeguarding the consciousness of a better form of existence and as a silent criticism of the present historical situation and its special injustice.

*The strategy of the Christian churches toward Communism as to all intellectual, social, and political movements, is to find the right balance between religious reservation from history and religious obligation toward history.* The duty of the Christian churches to reserve from history is rooted in the fact that they represent another meaning of life than that which is expressed in historical life. But since they represent this meaning in history and for history, they have to combine their ultimate reservation with a feeling of actual obligation toward history. The balance of these two essential elements of Christian church activities must be sought in every period of church history, in every confession and denomination, again and again.

## The Church and Fascism

CORNELIUS KRUSÉ

**I**N view of the well-known plight of the Christian Churches, both Catholic and Protestant, in Fascist Germany, where they are now heroically fighting for their very existence, any threat of Fascism, open or disguised, even if only incipient, in our own country should become a matter of grave and urgent concern to thoughtful Christians. To consider what measures Christian churches should adopt in the face of a threat of Fascism may seem to many a premature anxiety. The German churches, however, would no doubt be in a better position today if they had not belatedly realized that victories are more assured when the enemy has not yet entrenched himself and that time is an important factor in any conflict. It is clear that, if possible, it would be strategically desirable to prevent any potential Fascism from arising in our country rather than wait until a "return to the catacombs" might become a real necessity. In any case, this paper raises the question as to what measures the Christian Church should adopt in preventing or combating Fascism.

A preliminary but important question that requires a careful answer is, Are we right in assuming, as the title of this paper does, that churches will *wish* to be anti-Fascist? Unfortunately, one cannot be too sure. There, no doubt, are many, both among the clergy and the laity, who would view the rise of Fascism with horror and dismay, but many others would probably regard the movement as the coming of a savior and a friend. Do not churches in Spain and elsewhere, for example, explicitly pray, and perhaps work, for the success of what seems to be Fascism, or very much like it? Are there not among Protestants in Germany German Christians to whom German Nazism gives promise of an important spiritual rebirth? One ought not to be surprised if many churches in our own country should welcome a rising Fascist movement as a return to seriousness of living and religion.

These doubts raise the further important question of what may be meant by "The Church," and whether we have the right to use the term in this unitary sense. We all know only too well that here in our country we have not The Church but many churches. Their attitudes and acts will be diverse if not sharply contradictory. Even in churches in which a militant

minority has been able to make the church go on record as ready to combat Fascism, will not the more or less acquiescing majority in a period of decision soon turn itself into an opposing majority? These considerations reveal the necessity of strategy *within* the Church. The danger of Fascism to the very life and mission of the Church as seen in Germany must be brought home with lively force to the clergy and laity within our various forces. Without this will-to-combat Fascism as an enemy of all true religion, any discussion of further strategy becomes otiose.

But let us assume that the American churches are firmly determined to combat Fascism. Will that be enough? Obviously not, for will they be able to recognize Fascism when they see it? It will not be easy. If Fascism comes to our country, it will not come conveniently tagged and labeled. A Fascist movement will not be gracious enough to call itself "Fascism." Both "Communism" and "Fascism" are horrendous foreign-sounding terms to American ears, and inspire aversion and abhorrence in our country. Instinctively, any possible Fascist leaders will not be stupid enough to call their movement by a name that will damn it before it gathers momentum. The more astute among them will have observed the plight of socialism, no matter how otherwise appealing, in getting itself accepted in the United States. They will have learned from the last election that a fly-by-night party, generally regarded as "crack-pot," has, if it but sound American, far greater political success than a movement that bears an import label. No, Fascism, if it comes at all, will come with all the unction of traditional American slogans. It will no doubt make much of the Constitution and democracy. It will no doubt be atavistic—to be sure we have no Ancient Rome nor has Tacitus paid our forefathers compliments, but there is always the Mayflower and the "good old American way." There will, therefore, no doubt be eloquent references to our forefathers, to Washington, Lincoln and perhaps even to Wilson. If well led, however, it will not too simply come in the guise of hundred per cent Americanism nor will it have the ineptitude of the Liberty League. Former Liberals and Socialists without public recantation, will be in the movement. There will be serious doubt among anti-Fascists themselves whether this is indeed Fascism or no.

What will be most confusing to the churches is that it will not only come clothed in respectable political garments but that, if one is to judge by its European forms, it will appear, at least at first, as a defender of the



faith and co-worker with the churches. Unlike Communism, which has much religion in its professed atheism, Fascism and Naziism are atheistic in religious disguise. Publicly and solemnly they profess the highest regard for religion. Mussolini, for all of his earlier atheistic utterances, after seven years of experience as Duce, made his peace with the Vatican and terminated in the Concordat of 1929 the long previous conflict between the Catholic Church and the Italian State. Hitler, more promptly, instructed, or possibly allowed, von Papen to sign a similar Concordat with the Vatican in the very year of his accession to power. Mussolini states that Fascism, unlike the French Revolution, has no desire to dethrone God, and that it is more than glad to teach religion in the schools. "In the Fascist state," he adds, "religion is considered as one of the most profound manifestations of the spirit; it is, therefore, not only respected, but defended and protected." Hitler again and again refers the world and his lieutenants, to Article 24 of the National Socialists' program, which solemnly declares that the movement, while not bound to any particular denomination, is based on "positive Christianity." In his autobiography<sup>1</sup> he had tried to show his appreciation for religion by writing: "I regard the founding or destruction of a religion as essentially greater than the founding or destruction of a state, not to speak of a party."

What will make detection all the more difficult is that Fascism and Christianity actually have things in common. That statement should not be too shocking, since all existing things, perforce, have some things in common. Milton's devil shares the language of God, and Scripture warns against false prophets. Fascism, like Christianity, extols the life of unselfish and heroic self-sacrifice for the good of others. Christians would agree with the German Nazis that "*Gemeinnutz geht vor Eigennutz*" (welfare of the group takes precedence over welfare of the individual). Love of neighbor, with what restrictions, however, we shall later see, is a commandment common to both. Both reject a materialistic interpretation of the universe, and, as Giovanni Gentile, the Italian philosopher and spokesman of Fascism, would say, "take life seriously." Similarly, obedience to law and order are held in esteem by both Church and State.

By a strange paradox, that aspect of Fascism which makes it centrally antagonistic to Christianity will seem, at least at first, to bring it into intimate relationship with it: namely, its professing itself to be a religion. While an

<sup>1</sup> *Mein Kampf*, p. 125.

official Fascist writer<sup>2</sup> actually asserted with surprising frankness that political considerations had been uppermost in Mussolini's mind when he concluded the Concordat, Mussolini demurs. "Fascism," he maintains, "is a religious conception. . . . Whoever sees only considerations of mere expediency in the religious policy of the Fascist regime has not understood that Fascism, bound by a system of government, is also and above all a system of thought."<sup>3</sup> Giovanni Gentile, on his part, boldly declares: "Fascism . . . is a religion." Rosenberg, speaking no doubt as the "Beauftragter des Führers zur Überwachung der weltanschaulichen Erziehung der national-sozialistischen Bewegung" (the leader's personally designated supervisor of philosophical education of the national socialist movement) extols in terms of religion the new "Mythus" and sacrament of blood which is to replace the traditional Christian religion.

What may deceive the undiscerning, however, becomes a positive sign of recognition to those forewarned. Fascism in becoming too religious discloses its most profound antithesis to Christianity. The totalitarian State has become even more sovereign than "that great Leviathan," which Hobbes spoke about, on quite other presuppositions, however, for there are really no other gods before it. Gentile has at least the merit of frankness in writing: "The authority of the State is absolute. It does not compromise, it does not bargain, it does not surrender any portion of its field to other moral or religious principles which may interfere with the individual conscience."<sup>4</sup> In Hitler's autobiography, referred to above, which has become Germany's new Bible and which in sales far surpasses that of the Bible, considerable attention is given to the churches as *ecclesiastical* organizations and the hope of their eventual national unity is expressed, but there are few references, other than interjectory, to God, and then only to express confidence that He, conceived as a tribal Protector, will prosper Germany's righteous undertakings. Neither Hitler nor Mussolini seem to understand that only a Byzantine Church, accepting subservience to the State, could be satisfied with the place allowed it in a totalitarian State that claims to be all in all. Neither seems at all able even to comprehend that no matter how willing some churches at least may be to disclaim absoluteness for themselves as churches, they could not disclaim, without betrayal of their mission, serving a God who transcends both Church and State. A German pastor

<sup>2</sup> *Encyclopedia Italiana*, article "Fascism," Vol. XIV, pp. 876-7.

<sup>3</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 847.

<sup>4</sup> *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. VI, January, 1928, p. 304.

confiding to a correspondent pathetically declared: "We are told to confine ourselves to the religious field when our fight has no other object but to save some field for religion."

It will not be easy to convince many within the Church that Fascism endangers the very life of what the Church holds most dear, especially if any demagogue raises the hue and cry of Communism. In recent months the spectre of Communism has already been conjured up in Christian churches, although any one acquainted with the facts knows that real Communism is in its pitifully small range of influence not a present American danger. Sharp discernment will be required to detect that religion may be prized by Fascism—even sincerely—but as a means only and never as an end. Americans have been brought up in utilitarianism, and therefore approval, and not shocked outrage, greets the declaration of a public leader, shaking his head over crime waves and lax morality, that what America needs is more religion. Few detect that such a declaration amounts to an open invitation to religion to join the police force. American practicality demands that what is good be good *for* something. A religion that demands that all else be good for it is not commonly accepted in our churches. Obedience to law is regarded as much more vital and meaningful than obedience to God. The same ears that will approvingly accept, through the familiarity of repetition, the declaration of Peter and the other Apostles: "We must obey God rather than men," would be shocked at its rephrasing in Emerson's modern version: "the good man dare not obey the laws too well." Leaders in the Church, wishing to prepare their members for resistance to Fascism, will have to embark upon a wide and deep educational movement to bring about a sympathetic understanding and approval, for example, of Professor Macintosh's—or now Karl Barth's—reservation of loyalty to the State. Clergymen should acquaint themselves with Rosenberg's "new" philosophy to realize how insolent Fascism and racialism can become in asserting the supremacy of the State and race. It would take dullness of religious sensitivity indeed not to be outraged by a statement such as this: "It was not Christianity that brought us moral culture (*Gesittung*), but the Teutonic character that gave Christianity its enduring values. The values of Germanic character are therefore those eternal values to which all else must be subordinated."<sup>5</sup>

Up to this point we have considered those aspects that may most easily

<sup>5</sup> *Der Mythos des 20. Jahrhunderts*, p. 636.

delude the undiscerning and those whose sense of the sovereignty of religion is dull. We have stressed as the central fact of Fascism its claim to absolutism which brings it of necessity sooner or later into irreconcilable conflict with vital religion. This demonic claim is the deep but hidden central root of Fascism. To see it, it must be exposed. But Fascism has its branches too that are quite visible to all except those who cannot, or will not, see. These branches are, therefore, more easily attacked. Their lopping off, one by one or altogether, would keep the tree from flourishing and covering all with its baneful shade. It is these branches that we shall now consider.

Whatever form an American Fascism may otherwise assume, it would no doubt share the following features with European Fascism:

1. A low estimate of individual personality and a complete reversal of the Christian doctrine which Kant expressed in philosophical terms in his famous maxim: "Act so as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal and never as a means." Signor Rocco, whom Mussolini endorses with typical enthusiastic abandon as an inspired spokesman for Fascism, writes: "For Fascism, society is the end, individuals the means, and its whole life consists in using individuals as instruments for its social ends." Individuals are "but ephemeral and infinitesimal elements of the complete and permanent life of society."<sup>6</sup>

2. The logical consequence of a low view of individual human personality, namely, contempt only for the liberty of press, speech, and assembly. Any abridgment of these classic presuppositions of democracy represents an inclined plane leading down to Fascism.

3. An atavistic and retrogressive glorification of war "as that which alone ennobles," to use Mussolini's terms. This same conviction is shared by Hitler, who solemnly declares: "In eternal warfare mankind has become great—in eternal peace mankind would perish."<sup>7</sup>

4. A shameless avowal that the end justifies not only the means (which may be innocent enough, since nothing but some end could justify a means), but *any* means whatsoever. Signor Rocco declares that "Fascism never raises the question of methods" and outspokenly celebrates Machiavelli as "not only the greatest of modern political writers" but "also the greatest of our countrymen. Fascism learns from him not only its doctrine but its action as well."<sup>8</sup>

<sup>6</sup> International Conciliation, Carnegie Endowment, Bulletin, No. 223, pp. 403-4.

<sup>7</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 149.

<sup>8</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 400 and p. 412.

5. A brutal declaration that in all circumstances Might is Right. Mussolini baldly asserts: "The State in fact as universal ethical will is the creator of right." Hitler, on his part, brushes aside all ethical overlay and falling back upon a supposed naturalistic sanction simply announces: "The stronger must rule . . . only weaklings can regard this as cruel."<sup>9</sup>

6. A contemptuous rejection of the ethic of love and a narrow restriction of the brotherhood of man to the nation, state, or race one happens to belong to. We have previously seen that Fascism apparently shared with Christianity acceptance of the commandment of love of neighbor, but all confusion with Christianity is made impossible by the shock of this declaration made by a prominent Nazi: "Love thy neighbor—yes, but thy neighbor is not a Hottentot." While racialism is not a part of Italian Fascism, and while its manifestation in Germany seems a little amusing and crude to Italian Fascists, a possible American Fascism might well express itself in part in race hatreds. Racialism is an American temptation.

If the churches then seriously wish to avert Fascism it would seem strategically wise, nay, even ineluctably necessary, for them to take a courageous stand, within and without, in all these matters, *for* the very things Fascism denies and *against* those which Fascism affirms. In short, with Karl Barth churches must learn to say, No! and with their Master, to say, Yes!

It is regrettable that even among implacable foes of Fascism there results, on account of the present fashion to decry liberalism, what looks dangerously like a wavering on at least some of these important issues. "Rugged individualism" and "hypocritical" or "stupid pacifism," for instance, may well be rejected without giving up Christian reverence for personality and without yielding on the incompatibility of the Christian ethic of love with the gladiatorial ethics of war. Not to take a strong stand against war simply plays into the hands of whatever incipient Fascism there is. War and Fascism are indissolubly linked. Preparation for war is what Fascism most excels in and it glories in its erection of an altar to war. If war as a method is not denounced as un-Christian, a rising Fascism need only come forward, and may be depended upon to come forward, with a new version of a holy war, this time not indeed "to end war" but possibly "to end Communism" or perchance even "to end Fascism," if the leadership is Machiavellian enough. All the tragic futility of the last war will then be

<sup>9</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 848 and p. 312, respectively.



repeated with churches becoming once again the subservient spiritual auxiliaries of the militant state, or the militant party.

There is indeed much else besides war that is un-Christian, but in insisting that peace is not enough is there not danger of seeming not to care for peace at all? There can be no doubt that in the event of another war—fought for no matter what ostensible end—our liberty to teach and preach will be curtailed as if we were living under Fascism. Fascism exults in the fact that often it forces even its enemies to become like it. Furthermore, it is illogical to maintain that since some force or coercion is always used in any state, the Church may have to sanction war. War may be just that extreme of force that the Church can never sanction, for reasons *both* of principle and practical consequences. One of the first things learned in logic is that differences of degrees are among those important differences that often "make all the difference." A few drops of strychnine might, under definite circumstances, be a necessity for the organism, the gulping of a bottle of it would certainly be catastrophic for the patient. Disregard of important differences is a well-recognized fallacy and Aristotle had not a word, but a whole expression for it. In this crepuscular world in which we live differences of degrees are so important that to sweep them aside is not only logically indefensible, but also tragically unwise in its consequences.

Though as part of their preventive attack upon Fascism churches should renounce war as an instrument of Christian policy, they would make the gravest mistake if they allowed Fascism the exclusive right to appeal to youth's readiness to live heroically and dangerously. Mussolini offers his youth not comforts but hardships, not life but glorious death. "Credere-ubbedire-combattere" is what is proclaimed in huge posters on many walls in Italian cities, especially in Naples, as youth's glorious destiny. Yet many follow his banner with boundless enthusiasm (to be sure, many do not). But one can consent to live dangerously, and if need be, to die, only if one's cause has and maintains a meaningfulness so great and so attractive that nothing else seems to matter. The churches are in possession of such a heritage of meaning, but is it not often offered simply as an heirloom? For churches that wish to avert Fascism there is nothing more important than to strive mightily to repossess and proclaim their faith with such vitality that youth will not only look upon it with respect, as something once held dear, but come to feel personally its dominance within. Fascism, as Professor Tillich has pointed out, rushes in where spiritual emptiness

invites it. Nationalism is a spurious religion, but it wins youth to its support because it is none the less a vital religion. A Christianity become vital has the tremendous advantage over Fascism that its transcending nobility constantly challenges its adherents, whereas the tragedy of Fascism is that it is often served by a youthful idealism that morally transcends it.

Furthermore, if youth, eager to believe and eager to throw itself into a meaningful cause, is to be appealed to effectively, it dare not have its spirit quenched by a religion that seems to eternalize the *status quo*. Tillich's discernment of the religious spirit outside of churches is eloquent of his sensitiveness to the moving of the spirit. Everybody knows that in the Fascist states the real conflict between the Church and the totalitarian State is over the prize of youth. It is tragic that, for all of the courage shown, at least by German churches, youth in Fascist countries seems largely lost to the Church and what it stands for. That now by state decrees all children of ten years of age and older, without exception, must enroll in the Hitler-jugend under Baldur von Schirach, a violently fanatic anti-Christian, does not bode well for the future of religion in Germany. American churches will be well advised to redouble their efforts to make youth acquainted with the revolutionary spirit of Christianity. This will mean no doubt, an inner struggle within the Church, for many church people want youth, but are unwilling to pay the price of obtaining them.

A final question must be asked, Should the Church itself enter the political arena? It might be one way of attracting youth, but it would not be the right way. But neither can the Church remain indifferent to the type of government it lives under nor to the degree of social, racial, and economic justice which prevails in the society it seeks to minister to. This is all the more important, since Fascism seems a doctrine of desperation—the result of humiliation and smarting under injustice. Is Fascism a plant that flourishes on poor soil only? It would almost seem so. At least that has been true of it so far. Attempts to avert Fascism, then, must mean attempts to establish more justice, and foster better and friendlier understanding among races, classes and nations; in short, to help with all one's might to establish a Christian world-community. In addition to working through church movements, it would seem to be strategy for the churches to support also secular movements which are making for a more just society and which are also combating Fascism. Churches will need to be discriminating and statesmanlike, however, in carefully assessing the further implications of any such

movements. Otherwise they would simply embrace the opportunistic policy of Mussolini, who declares that he will co-operate (always distrustfully, of course) with all those whom circumstances force to walk the same way with him for the time being. On the other hand, critical appraisal of movements like the Co-operative Movement, or organizations like that against War and Fascism and many others, should not necessarily mean indiscriminate criticism and rejection. When the insufficiency of humanism and the social gospel is preached, care must be taken not to retreat into a do-nothing tower of transcendence. To criticize *sub specie aeternitatis* is needful for perspective, but disastrous if it means perpetual postponement of decision and action. Life is rhythmic. Jesus withdrew to the mountain tops but did not regard it compromise to descend to mingle with the people below. Churches might well consider whether with the due protection indicated above there is not wisdom in applying here Jesus' saying: He who is not against us is for us. The action to be taken would probably have to be not directly political, but chiefly preaching and teaching within the Church and co-operating with larger movements in attempts to reach the masses without.

In conclusion, then, this paper has tried to show that to avert Fascism the churches must arouse and establish the will to combat Fascism, by making clear to its members what Fascism means and what it threatens. The will to combat Fascism should at the same time be informed and enlightened so that Fascism, though it comes disguised, will be recognized as such. Churches must at all times emphasize that speaking in the name of the Lord is not wanton civil disobedience but obedience to the highest standard they know. This is and always will be the central point of conflict between a totalitarian State and the Church. But there remain many other characteristics associated with Fascism—though not identical with it—which churches will be strategically wise to combat if aversion of Fascism is the aim. All of this is predicated on the assumption that Fascism is not yet in our midst and that tendencies toward it can be held in check. The fact that our American churches are more under the sway of the Calvinistic than the Lutheran conception of the relation of religion and the State may mean that, once aroused to the danger of Fascism, they will offer stiff resistance to a rising Fascist movement. Should Fascism, nevertheless, establish itself also in our midst, the best strategy of the Church would be to emulate the heroic courage of the German churches of today.

# The Church and Democracy

GEORGIA E. HARKNESS

**T**HIS paper will consider the following questions: (1) What is democracy? (2) In what respects is it a fundamental element in the Christian gospel? (3) Is the democratic state the best form of government? (4) How should the Church attempt to further the attainment of the democratic ideal within its own structure and in the political milieu?

## I. *The Meaning of Democracy.*

Democracy, as the term will be used in this paper, connotes both an ethical ideal and a form of social organization. As an ethical ideal, it means a recognition of the intrinsic worth of every person with the corresponding right of every person to the fullest possible self-realization. As a form of social organization, it means a type of government in which there is social control through authority which is vested in and delegated by the people in their capacity as individuals. The two meanings converge only in small, close-knit and highly moralized groups. The more complex or the more ethically insensitive the group, the greater the divergence. In this divergence lies the central problem, not only of this paper, but of the structure of organized society.

Democracy as an ideal is not to be identified with *equality*, although it is closely related to it. Equality may mean (1) equality of intrinsic personal worth (that is, spiritual equality before God), (2) equality of endowment, (3) equality of opportunity, or (4) identity of function. A democratic ideal presupposes equality in the first and third senses, but not in the second or fourth. It is obvious that all persons are not created "free and equal" from the standpoint of either biological or cultural inheritance, and therefore ought not all to do the same things or enjoy the same experiences. Yet within a framework of disparate biological inheritance fixed by nature, and of disparate social inheritance which is the result of both biological and human forces, the democratic ideal requires that every person be given an opportunity to experience "the abundant life" and do the work for which he is best fitted.

Democracy as a form of social organization usually clashes with democracy as an equalitarian ideal. This happens when persons of inferior intelligence or ethical sensitivity are able by force of numbers to exercise coercion upon other persons in such a manner as to thwart their fullest self-realization. It happens also when for the real good of the greater number, legislation is enacted the enforcement of which works injustice to a minority. The former situation presents a problem to be dealt with through education—particularly moral education. The latter is imbedded in the metaphysical problem of evil. Neither can be wholly eliminated in a complex social order.

The democratic ideal is a principle of *liberty* as well as equality, but again it is necessary to distinguish among types of liberty. Liberty may mean (1) freedom to do as one pleases without social restraint, (2) freedom of thought, worship or expression of opinion, or (3) freedom to act in social relations within limits set by the group. All three are types of individualism but with quite different social consequences. The first conforms to the democratic ideal of respect for personality only in small, highly-moralized groups. Ordinarily it coincides with egoistic hedonism, anarchy and "rugged" (that is, ruthless) individualism. The second, which is a major presupposition of both secular and religious liberalism, is not only consonant with but essential to the maintenance of the democratic ideal, and is formally guaranteed in all democratic societies but often violated in practice. The third, which is an extension of the second to a wider sphere of activities than those covered by the so-called "natural rights," is both an indispensable prerequisite to the democratic ideal and a primary source of its corruption. Rightly used, it grants "liberty under law," uniting freedom with order; misused, it unduly restricts freedom for the sake of order, or upsets order for the sake of freedom. A large part of the problem of social and political ethics lies in distinguishing between its use and misuse.

Democracy provides a greater measure of liberty in all three of these senses than does any other existing form of government. But whether this is desirable depends on the degree to which the liberty thus provided is used in consonance with the democratic ideal of respect for personality—an eventuality by no means ensured by democratic government. Two naïve popular assumptions (1) that these types of liberty are identical, (2) that democratic organization will guarantee the democratic ideal, have been responsible for much political chaos.

A third term which is related to but not identical with democracy is



*brotherhood*. In the Enlightenment trilogy of *liberté, égalité, fraternité* the third is the most important element; because it both supplies a norm by which to judge whether the other two are rightly used, and gives a dynamic by which to make them operative in opposition to the selfishness and lethargy imbedded in human nature.

Brotherhood, like equality and liberty, has more than one connotation. It may mean (1) an intimate, personal sense of fellowship with another individual, or (2) a generalized sense of social responsibility prompted by concern for other persons as persons. This distinction is particularly relevant to Christian ethics, for it is possible for an individual to be dominated by a Christian love for all persons in the second sense, as it is not possible in the first. Whether love is an "impossible possibility" depends on what kind of love is meant.

The distinction is pertinent to the problem of democracy for the reason that, however desirable brotherhood in the first sense might be, it is out of the question in a large, very complex, highly impersonal social organization like a State or a world society. The only kind of brotherhood we can there hope for is the second type. But while a generalized sense of social responsibility is the only kind available, it is very important that this should not be lacking. Its presence in a social group does not guarantee the attainment of the democratic ideal, but its absence ensures its negation. Without it, mutual distrust and inertia undercut both stability and action; with it, even in the absence of desirable social intelligence regarding the best strategies to be followed, a nation may "muddle through" with reasonable effectiveness.

No social group possesses this type of brotherhood completely; therefore no democracy is completely successful. The crucial question, however, is not whether democratic organization can ever fully embody the democratic ideal, but whether it can do so more effectively than any other type of government. Not perfection, but the capacity to bring about a progressive elimination of imperfection, is its criterion of success. To the degree that democracy makes possible the concrete realization of the ideal of respect for personality, it makes possible a just society.

## II. *Democracy and the Christian Gospel.*

To discuss the place of democracy in the Christian gospel it is necessary to raise two related, but quite separate, issues: (1) What was the attitude of

Jesus toward democracy? (2) What has been the professed faith and the actual practice of the Christian Church?

a. *Jesus*

This is not the place to debate the question as to whether we really know anything about the historical Jesus. What I shall say rests on the assumption that the records present a picture which in its general outlines, though not in every detail, is reliable.

In so far as the records can be trusted, there seems little doubt that the central note in the ethical teaching of Jesus is respect for personality; that is, recognition of the democratic ideal. It seems equally clear that He made no attempt either to set up, or to induce His followers to set up, a democratic political state. If the democratic state is the Christian form of government, it is so by implication of his teachings rather than by the authority of Jesus.

The primacy of respect for personality in the teaching of Jesus, enunciated throughout the Gospels, appears most vividly in such instances as the healing of a Samaritan leper or a Roman centurion's son, the encounter with the Syro-Phoenician woman and the woman at the well, the washing of the disciples' feet, and other incidents in which racial, religious, sex or class cleavage was openly transcended in opposition to the prevailing mores. This suggests that the kind of democracy which Jesus taught and practiced was primarily one of attitude and act in the events of daily living. It cannot legitimately be argued from this that political action to establish or maintain a democratic state is unnecessary. It does, however, suggest that political democracy, in so far as it is Christian, must have personal, uncoerced democracy of attitude as its precondition.

Furthermore, in shifting the focus of reference from self-love to the love of God and other men Jesus announced a moral principle essential to any stable democracy; namely, the exaltation of obligations over rights. Democracy roots in the right of every man to free development of his powers and enjoyment of the good of life. But it can be won only through acceptance of the obligation to secure these rights for everybody. Violation of this principle is responsible for the presence of both anarchy and tyranny within states ostensibly democratic.

A third element in Jesus' attitude toward the democratic ideal is the fact that it is based on a realistic view of both the shortcomings and the

possibilities of human nature. It was because of the hardness of men's hearts that divorce was necessary; the seed falls on good ground in only a small proportion of instances; the man who calls himself the chief of sinners is approved above the self-righteous. Yet equally clear is the evidence that Jesus believed in the potential capacities of individuals to live on a high level of moral achievement. There is neither an over-blithe optimism nor a despairing pessimism in His attitude toward men. "Neither do I condemn thee; go, and sin no more" may not be an historically authentic statement, but it is true to the total picture given in the Gospels. Any democracy which does not rest on such a realistic estimate of human nature gets out of gear by trusting men either too much or not enough.

A fourth point of relevance is the fact that Jesus' faith in man is always linked with faith in God; the duty to love one's brother with the duty to love God. That the contrast between human achievement and divine grace is less clearly drawn in the Gospels than in the words of Paul seems to me to indicate that Jesus was less willing than Paul to make a dichotomy. Service of God and service of fellow man are two aspects of one duty to live the fullest possible life and make this possible for all persons.

The bearing of these facts upon a Christian ideal of democracy is clear. Such an ideal must have its starting point in the ordinary areas of the common life; it must center in the acceptance of obligation rather than the claiming of rights; it must be based on an awareness of what persons are and what they may become; it must have a transcendent reference which neither sets up a cleavage between God and man nor submerges the one in the other.

Such an ideal is not easy to put into operation, even in small group relations. Yet to a high degree it is possible for the Christian conscience to become sufficiently sensitized to make it operative where the issues are relatively simple as in family, school, or community relationships. What is not possible, even with the best of Christian consciences, is to make it operative in a society where (1) many wills and many interests are in conflict with the result that to serve some is to injure others, or (2) the consequences of action are so complexly interwoven as to be largely unpredictable, or (3) the outcome though predictable is uncontrollable, because of forces in man or nature, or their juxtaposition, which neither God nor man can overcome. All of these conditions are present in the modern state, and present in multiplied form in relations between states.

If anything is evident from the foregoing facts, it is the falsity of the statement that "all the world needs is the spirit of Jesus." Yet without the spirit of Jesus, no adequate solution of national or international problems can be expected.

### b. *The Church.*

As a form of social organization within the Church, democracy has ranged through all the levels, from the Roman Catholic hierarchy to the Society of Friends. As a form of political organization within the State, it has had the sanction of the Church in varying degrees. Regarding those aspects of democracy which center in equality and liberty, the Church has been very equivocal. Yet as an ideal of human brotherhood, democracy has never been repudiated by the Church.

The statement that the Church has never repudiated the democratic ideal of human brotherhood requires clarification. This ideal has often been snowed under by exaltation of purity of doctrine over human fellowship, with unbrotherly schisms or the persecution of heretics as a consequence. The concept of the divine sovereignty led Calvin to say, "We must not offend God for the love of our neighbor,"<sup>1</sup> and Jonathan Edwards to echo this sentiment.<sup>2</sup> Predestination itself is an undemocratic concept. Evangelistic preaching has lacked "the social emphasis." Democratic fellowship has been vitiated by absorption in mystical piety. The concept of a stratified society as ordained of God has dulled the sense of obligation to create the conditions in which the democratic ideal can become operative. Militarism and capitalism have been friends of the Church and foes of democracy. The Church has repeatedly thwarted the realization of the democratic ideal by taking the side of the stronger temporal powers. There have been many individuals within the Church who have felt, if they did not say, what is attributed to the Duchess of Buckingham at the time of the Methodist revival, "It is monstrous to be told that you have a heart as sinful as the common wretches that crawl on the earth." Yet neither exaltation of doctrine, nor the divine sovereignty, nor predestination, nor evangelism, nor mysticism, nor the hallowing of the *status quo*, nor war, nor capitalism, nor any other alliance with the world, the flesh or the devil has ever led the

<sup>1</sup> Institutes, II, xix, 13.

<sup>2</sup> "Only in subordination to love for God, or Being in general, is love for a creature justified. . . . And hence love for the non-elect, who in reality do not share at all in the divine nature, has no justification." *The Nature of True Virtue*, in *Works*, Vol. II, p. 264.

Church explicitly to say that it was not a Christian's duty to love his neighbor.

This constant adherence to the ideal of brotherly love in principle, in spite of an equally constant repudiation in practice, is very important for two reasons. The first is that it is *the only constant* in Christian doctrine. Until the emergence of religious humanism, the duty to love and worship some kind of deity might have been put with it as an unchallenged element in Christian belief. Now, the obligation to Christian fellowship alone stands unchallenged. It is the basic ground of Christian unity.

The second reason for its importance lies in its positive results. These accomplishments, I believe, can be claimed for it: (1) By supplying a sense of common mission, it has held the Church together in the face of social and political opposition and has kept it from being wholly dismembered by doctrinal disagreement. (2) By supplying a sense of social responsibility, it has enabled the Church to remain prophetic in spite of much compromise and has made the voice of the Church the chief incentive to the humanitarian progress of the past nineteen centuries. (3) It has created the only truly international organism now in existence. (4) In conjunction with emphasis on the primacy of God, it has enabled the Church more vigorously and effectively than any other power to resist the claims of the totalitarian State.

These things the Church has accomplished not simply through giving lip service to an humanitarian ideal of brotherhood, but through clinging tenaciously to the democracy implicit in the Christian gospel. In spite of the gathering of much débris upon its teaching, the Church has stood on a solid foundation of Christian brotherhood in daily living, acceptance of social obligation, faith in man, and faith in God. It is these which must not be surrendered if the Church is to maintain its mission and its potency.

### III. *The Democratic State.*

The best possible government would be one in which power was used with a combination of intelligence and social responsibility. This would mean one in which the governing body was actuated by respect for personality, and one in which "the consent of the governed" essential to any stable government would be elicited by wise and high-minded rule. There is no inalienable right to govern, nor does the human spirit demand it. What the human spirit does demand is to be governed with justice. Politics, like preaching, is not the function of everybody, but ought to be the function of



those best fitted to perform its duties. The best possible government would be one in which coercive power was exercised only to restrain members whose conduct was antithetical to the common good—and exercised then without brutality or violence; one in which every member had his basic material needs provided for with security against the hazards of sickness and old age; one in which education adapted to the powers of the individual was available for all; one in which every member's energies were released for his most creative service.

Political democracy does not provide such a government. Democracy, by its inherent structure, places too much power in the hands of a voting public which is largely incompetent and ethically insensitive; it places in office the relatively unfit, while others of far greater ability are excluded by the party system; it legislates *en masse* with a consequent disregard of individual differences; it offers too many "pork-barrels" and chisels by which to open them. To push further an analogy suggested in the preceding paragraph, if we were to say that anybody, whether trained or not, whether consecrated or not, should be elected by majority vote to exercise the functions of the Christian ministry, we should have something comparable to what actually exists in a democratic state.

Could any government do better? The question as to whether democracy is the best form of government available in the existing situation depends upon whether it is better calculated than either Communism or Fascism to further the democratic ideal of respect for personality. It was stated in the first section of this paper that such an ideal implies: (1) equality—not an impossible equality of natural endowment or equality of possession of material goods, but equality of opportunity to attain the fullest possible self-realization; (2) liberty—not unrestrained liberty, but freedom of thought, worship, expression of opinion, and action within limits set by the welfare of the group; (3) brotherhood—not an intimate personal love for every individual, but a sense of social responsibility to promote the true welfare of all persons.

In regard to liberty, it seems clear that in spite of the ghastly travesties upon it which exist within every democratic state, democracy is better calculated to preserve it than is either Communism or Fascism, which have as an essential political principle the denial of liberty in the interest of regimentation. In regard to the other two elements the issue is less clearly drawn.

Fascism makes no pretense of equality, but does assert a certain power-

ful type of nationalistic brotherhood. The brotherhood of race and blood and soil is more intense in its emotional dynamic than is the more diffuse brotherhood which constitutes the patriotism of the democratic state. It generates a high degree of social responsibility of a sort, but since a Fascist state draws the lines of its brotherhood at national and racial boundaries and exploits ruthlessly those who lie beyond them, its structure offers less of either equality or brotherhood than does the democratic state. Within democracy a world community is possible; within Fascism it is not.

Communism derives its meaning and driving power from a living faith in the equality and brotherhood which it sees denied to great numbers of people in a capitalistic society. Capitalism and democracy are not identical concepts, but they tend practically to become so from the fact that every democratic state is a capitalistic state. The result is that Communism in its drive against capitalism drives also against democracy. Communism, like Fascism, draws a circle which excludes from its concept of equality and social responsibility the persons who fall on the other side of the line. Exploitation and violence ensue, and whether it is Jews and Ethiopians or kulaks and White Russians who have to take the brunt of it, there is the same repudiation of equality and brotherhood when these are viewed in their wider setting. Unlike Fascism, it has as its ultimate ideal equality in a classless society; but in pursuit of this Utopia it abrogates the equalitarian temper.

It is impossible to argue from the fact that both Communism and Fascism are antithetical to the ideal of respect for personality that democracy guarantees it. In practice democracy in conjunction with capitalism does not. There is a significant difference, however, in that the other two systems *in their essential presuppositions* are hostile to important elements in this ideal, while democracy in principle supports it. The solution is not to reject democracy as a political system but to release it from economic and other barriers which prevent its functioning to make possible true self-realization.

The Church for its best service to the State needs to commit itself without reservation to the democratic *ideal* and to work for the revision of those elements within the democratic *system* which thwart its attainment. This every social institution, educational, remedial or coercive, ought to do. Yet the Church has a special obligation since it alone, of all our historic institutions, combines a moral enterprise with a religious faith. It not only sets forth an ideal of what ought to be, but it asserts in its basic message the possibility of a union of God with man, of love with suffering, of tragedy

with triumph, of temporal with eternal values. In such union lies great power. This union, for man at his best only a high possibility, is actually achieved in the nature of God and is manifest to man in Christ.

Democracy ought never by any easy or superficial synthesis to be identified with Christianity. Political power and spiritual power are by no means one. Yet democracy, unlike any other existing form of government, presents a channel through which the Church with at least partial success can achieve its ethical ideal, and upon which it can build a structure of religious meaning when all political structures fail.

#### IV. *The Function of the Church.*

##### a. *Within the Church.*

The Church must set its own house in order before it can do much to promote the democratic ideal within the State. I do not mean that its denominational structure must submit to a drastic overhauling. Presumably it is harder to maintain democracy in an hierarchical system, whether Catholic or Methodist, than in a congregational. But as I have suggested, it is not the form but the end to be achieved by the form which is most important. Some of the most democratic churches in which I have worshiped were Catholic and some of the most undemocratic were Congregational.

I shall mention a few of the barriers to democracy prevalent in churches without attempting to say how to eradicate them. The first step toward their eradication is for the Church to educate its members to an awareness that they exist in opposition to the Christian ideal of the intrinsic worth of every person. Among the most obvious are divisive denominational loyalties, class cleavage based on economic or social prestige, racial exclusiveness, economic domination by large givers, outcroppings of the will to power among those who "run things," whether in pulpit, choir loft, congregation, or Board of Bishops.

A particularly corrupting type of the will to power, antithetical to democracy, is the tendency of the clergy to estimate their own success and that of their brother clergy by the kind of churches to which they are called. Not salary only, but urban location, the "urbanity" and general gentility of the congregation, and other factors out of keeping with the religion of a peasant carpenter are either explicitly or unconsciously set up as criteria of a minister's success. I do not mean that there is lack of consecration

among the clergy, but rather lack of vision. Abstractly, all persons are children of God and worthy of service. Concretely, fellowship with dirt farmers, the unwashed, and those whose speech and table manners are uncouth is not greatly desired.

A subtle barrier to democracy, which infests both clergy and laity, is spiritual pride. The medieval church did well to make *superbia* the worst of the seven deadly sins. A particularly subtle and deadly type leads the comfortably situated Christian to assume that *anybody* could achieve spiritual transcendence over limitation if only his life were sufficiently dedicated to God. This crops out in another form in the intellectually élite Christian who smiles at the cultural crudity of a revival service, despises the ignorance of a fundamentalist, or damns Buchmanism as pure poison.

The type of intellectual exclusiveness into which high-minded professors of theology and philosophy are most in danger of falling is that of limiting their diction and action, for the most part, to what elicits response from their peers rather than the common people. Because of a broad gulf between educational institutions in general and the isolated or semi-isolated churches where the majority of people are to whom religion is still vital, it happens in the latter that "the hungry sheep look up and are not fed." I do not mean that the person whose vocation it is to be a scholar should cease being a scholar to become an evangelist, but I believe there is a possibility of greater union of these functions than has yet been achieved.

b. *Within the State.*

The Church in its attempt to create the conditions within the State which are required by a democratic ideal of reverence for personality needs to work along a number of fronts at once, achieving what is possible and not being discouraged by failure to achieve the impossible. Among these fronts are the following:

First, the Church must never relinquish its spiritual task of engendering the fellowship of attitude and personal living, acceptance of social obligation, realistic faith in man, and sense of divine dependence which were earlier cited as essential elements in the democracy of the Christian gospel. These are requisites for the effectiveness, and in the long run for the existence, of any form of political state. Without them class cleavage, inertia, mutual distrust and despair undermine society.

Second, the Church should lay much more stress than it has upon

participation in politics as a religious vocation. The kind of emphasis placed in the past upon going into the ministry or becoming a missionary should be given equally to going into politics, but with as much discrimination. Politics as a vocation is not everybody's business. But politics matters so much to everybody that the choicest young men and women, rather than aspiring shysters, should be choosing it as a life enterprise.

Third, the Church should make every possible effort to secure the detachment of coercion from violence in both class and international situations of conflict. It must dispel the popular illusion that coercion and violence are synonyms, place a high estimate on the actual social efficacy of love, and create faith in it beyond the evidence of surface appearances. It is equally false to assert that goodwill is completely effective, and that it is ineffective, in political conflict. Assuredly, (1) in complex industrial or international issues there is *no perfect solution* but only a choice of the less of evils, (2) coercion must be used, but may be used without ill will or brutality, (3) coercion in war destroys more values than it preserves and inevitably degenerates into ill will and brutality.

Whether the Church should stand for a pacifist philosophy depends both on the meaning attached to pacifism and on the degree of tolerance with which pacifism is championed or rejected. However much a Christian may hold that absolute pacifism is the only position consonant with the ethics of Jesus, it would be pharisaical to hold that every other Christian must believe the same. It is equally pharisaical for the non-pacifist Christian to regard the pacifist as a romanticist or a menace to peace. There is room for latitude of opinion. Yet certain aspects of the question are clear and these the Church must be unequivocal about. Among these are the futility of trusting to military force to eradicate war and the depravity of allying the Church with the sword-bearing arm of the State.

Fourth, the Church should give support to, and education in, a Christian socialist philosophy. By this I mean a philosophy of economic democracy, based upon the convictions that social justice and the well-being of all require a less profit-centered production, more equitable distribution, and wider consumption of goods. The Church as an institution should not align itself with any political party, nor try to secure unanimity of agreement as to the best strategy for securing social change. As there is a diversity of gifts among Christians, so there is a legitimate diversity of opinion in moot



matters. The more important the matters, the greater the need of Christian grace to work with people of differing opinions.

Fifth, the Church should arouse its members to non-partisan political action, not only in general, but in particular, on any issue where the principle of respect for personality is clearly at stake. Among such issues are child labor, agricultural peonage, racial discrimination, housing, public health, education, the right of workers to bargain collectively.

Sixth, the Church should resist vigorously, again not in general but in particular, any move in the direction of exalting the power of the State above the Christian conscience. Whenever the Church compromises its ethical ideal or its spiritual message, it not only undermines its own power but proves a deceptive ally of the State. The Christian conscience needs, however, at every point to be guided by an enlightened judgment of the most inclusive values and the means best suited to attain them, both the possibilities and the limitations of every situation being taken into account.

Seventh, the Church should lay upon its members a sense of their responsibility to be a nucleus from which a new democracy can be built if the present structure of civilization collapses. It may be that neither military nor spiritual force will prevent war, and that neither revolution nor political action will enable a socialist to replace a capitalist society. The chances in both cases are adverse. The only thing certain is that while any persons are left upon earth, the Church has a function to be a channel through which a new structure of social meaning can be built.

Finally, the Church needs to make a more effective synthesis between reason and revelation as approaches to truth, between rationally directed progress and divine grace as means of salvation. This is a political as well as a theological issue. Without reason there is no knowledge of how to act in civic affairs, without revelation one sees comparatively little to act for. Instead of decrying either, it is supremely important that both theologians and "plain men" unite intelligence with spiritual insight toward the preservation and creation of a civilization based on reverence for personality.

Social progress, though not automatic or unbroken in its progressiveness, has indubitably taken place. It has given us an heritage of democratic thought and action now in such jeopardy that only divine resources in conjunction with the wisest human action can keep it from being lost. The Church, least shaken of all our institutions, has a mission and the potential capacity to execute it. Whether it will execute it depends on how it is led.

## Presenting Religion to Youth

FREDERICK C. GRANT

I. It may occur to some persons to ask, *Why is this a problem?* Are the youth of today any different from the youth of former generations—our own, say, ten or twenty or twenty-five years ago?

It is sometimes assumed that the youth of today are different from those of other generations. At least that was the assumption of Dr. Stanley High, who wrote *The Revolt of Youth* a few years ago, in the heyday of "the Youth Movement" in Europe, when it was supposed that youth was about to redeem a world all but destroyed by the War, and when it was hoped that American youth would assume a leadership on a par with those in Germany, France, and Italy. But the explanation of the difference between present-day youth and those of earlier generations is probably to be made in terms of our altered, post-war circumstances; and at the same time it is a question if the difference has not been considerably exaggerated. It may even be true that it is not so much youth which is peculiar as the elders who are observing youth: the inner revolt we oldsters feel, and the revolution we ourselves would like to see take place in society, are attributed to the younger generation whom we idealize, and among whom we would like still to be numbered!

One at least gets this impression from the reports of questionnaires which circulate from time to time. To be really representative, the questions would have to be submitted to much wider groups than is the rule; and even then an average or composite reply might not be a fair expression of the multi-minded, diversely interested youth of our day. Some—perhaps most—of these reports on youth are about as valuable as the opinions collected by "The Inquiring Reporter" for the newspaper, who interviews five persons each day, chosen at random on the streets. We often have the impression that if the committees had chanced to find opinions of youth other than those reported, the reports would be very different in tone; that is, if the reporter had chanced to meet five other persons, with five quite different outlooks upon the world. As it is, there is little unity or unanimity in the opinions—they remind one of the Irishman in the old

story, who "didn't know what he wanted, but was dissatisfied until he got it."

II. *And yet no one can deny that a new situation has arisen.*

Those of us who lived through the War, and remember the old world that existed prior to 1914, have seen great changes. But the changes are always, for us, changes *from* a more stable order, which is still remembered and is still our standard of reference. We consciously or unconsciously assume that when change has done its worst we shall get back to something like the settled order of the late 19th and early 20th century, prior to the World War and the revolutions that have followed in its wake. We are like those brokers and investors who are still hoping for "a return of prosperity," meaning the era of the middle and late twenties.

For our present-day youth, on the contrary, this new world is the whole world of their experience. They have no memory of the War, or of what preceded it. Their standard of reference is the turbulent, threatened civilization of the twenties and thirties—or at most, if memory goes back that far, the chaotic conditions of the almost quarter-century from 1914-1936. The contrast between such a background for thinking and that of the generation just behind them—that of their parents—needs no exaggeration; and it explains this gulf which we are expected to bridge in presenting religion to youth today.

III. *Hence it is not youth which is peculiar, but the situation in which this new generation finds itself.*

The remarkable thing is not that youth is different—it is not—but that in spite of new conditions, the rising generation is so conservative, so human, repeats so many old and really ancient patterns of behavior. It is one more instance of the perennial adaptability of the human species—far more marked and quicker to respond than any other species in the world. It makes one think of Goethe's oft-quoted saying: "Mankind is always advancing; man remains ever the same."

The widespread unrest, the occasional flaming protests, the patient—or impatient—boredom, the towering self-assurance, the insatiable appetite for discussion, the unwillingness to accept the dicta of unproved authority, the thirst for adventure, the response to novelty—all these qualities most of us can recall from groups we knew and shared in our youth; or if we

have forgotten, or if our own youth was too smug or passive, we can find parallels further back—in the literature of the Romantic movement in the early 19th century, for example, or the bold, defiant Rationalism which accompanied the rise of modern science in the Victorian age. Modern youth is not different; these are qualities of youth in every generation, certainly every generation that undergoes great social, political, or intellectual change. The chief difference, if any, is that modern youth is more vocal, more articulate, thanks to present-day freedom of speech, cheap printing, travel, and easy communication, all of which aid and abet the natural gregariousness of human beings and the uninhibited outspokenness which modern life, especially in America, seems to foster. Perhaps too there is actually more youth in the world today: plenty of persons in middle age are still bravely staying young, who, two generations ago, would have “settled down” in mind and habits by thirty, would have passed for aged at forty, and been completely passé and antiquated at fifty. Youth is not different, then, but is more articulate today, and—there is more of it!

IV. *But this does not lessen our problem: instead, it brings it into clearer focus.*

It is of course quite artificial to divide history into generations. Society is continuously replacing itself, not just once in twenty-five or thirty years. About as many persons are born and survive in one year as another—or if the birthrate is going up, or down, it follows a fairly steady curve. There is no clear demarcation between persons born in 1920, say, and those born in 1919 or 1915. But for convenience we may refer to “youth” and mean by it persons now between fifteen and twenty-five years of age. Like many other vague and even inaccurate terms, everyone knows what we mean.

The problem then is the old one of the transmission of tradition, custom, habit from one generation to the next. There are no gaps in history, and there is no real hiatus between one generation and those next on either side of it. But there is always tension whenever a set of ideas or practices is being handed on at the very time it has been called in question. Adolescents are not necessarily destructive critics and flaming rebels. But it would be strange indeed if adolescents did not accept with some misgiving a legacy which those who hand it on assure them is not entirely above criticism; or if they did not ask, “Why perpetuate this system which you yourselves admit is not the best conceivable or practicable? Why hand it on? Why not

scrap it, and devise something better?"—We elders certainly cannot complain if some such reaction follows our not-too-enthusiastic handing-over of this legacy, this battered, war-torn civilization, this unjust economic system, this religion which we ourselves confess has not completely dominated and transformed either our own lives or the society in which it has been somewhat expensively maintained for the past several centuries. Instead of labeling youth "rebellious," we might better note that in many ways it is rigidly and rigorously logical. We are the critics, not youth. We are the ones open to criticism, not youth. We are the ones who have left our religion and our civilization open to criticism, not youth—for youth has not yet tried out either Christianity or our Western, European-American industrialized civilization. Youth merely draws the clear inferences from our half-conscious admissions of failure, impotence, compromise, or dull satisfaction with partial success. In religion, certainly as youth must view it, partial success is really relative failure. And apparently the saints, the real spokesmen for religion, would seem to agree with youth on this point.

Right here, I think, our problem comes into clear focus. We are trying to hand on a religion which we ourselves do not wholly believe. Or if we think we wholly believe it, then one which we do not wholly practice: and that amounts to about the same thing. As Sir Henry Jones observed, "What a man really believes is what shapes his conduct, no matter what faith he may profess." And youth, clear-eyed and taking us at our word, and justifying our real beliefs from our practices, cannot fail to see the weakness of our position. (When I say "our," I mean the tradition we represent and are engaged in handing on.) It would not take ten questions to establish the truth of this:

1. The Sermon on the Mount—is it the authoritative statement of Christian ethics, or not?
2. The Church—is it really one, or just a group of sects? And if Christianity is true, how can there be dozens of different churches, instead of one? If Christianity is a real force in the world, and growing in power rather than declining, why is it not united?
3. Christianity claims to have put an end to gladiatorial shows and slavery and the debasement of women; if so, why does it not put an end to poverty and war and other evils?
4. If God is a real Person, and not just an abstract idea, why is public worship ever dull, or monotonous, or uninspiring?
5. In order to get ahead in life, doesn't a person have to forget all the fine talk



about "loving your neighbor as yourself," "turning the other cheek," and so on?

6. If Christianity is a living force, why is its language so antiquated and out of touch with life? Science has its own terminology, of course; but you don't have to go back to ancient history to find out what the words mean. In church, on the other hand, the hymns and prayers and sometimes the sermons make use of words we don't understand. Why is this?
7. And speaking of science, you don't doubt, do you, that the *real* world is the one the scientists deal with, not the imaginary one religion takes for granted?

Well, there are seven sample questions—not ten. And it seems to me they reflect the suspicion, in which I believe youth is entirely justified, that our ideals of conduct and our professed beliefs do not quite square with what we really and truly believe in our heart of hearts—no matter what our own views, or those of our group, or even which particular Christian Church or denomination of Christians we belong to. The problem confronts all the churches, Catholic and Protestant, and every school of churchmanship. Not that all youth share this suspicion; but a large, and probably an increasing, number of them do.

- V. *We may study our problem from still another angle if we consider some of the substitutes which are offered for religion, even by religious groups, at the present time.*

Of course they are not looked upon as substitutes for religion by those who propose them. They are thought to be "applications" of religion to contemporary conditions and needs. Or, if they are substitutes, then they take the place of a type of religion that has gone to seed and lost its appeal to our day. One need not consider many of these types of effort; one or two will suffice. And it must be remembered that whatever the view of those who propose them, to the mind of many persons, including many persons under twenty-five, they appear as substitutes for religion.

1. The first is social reform. Now no one will suppose that the Christian Church ought to oppose social reform; it ought rather to inspire it. Nor is social reform the substitution of something detrimental in place of the beneficial influence of religion. But it is not the same thing as religion. And to try to keep the effect without retaining the cause is manifestly impossible—or to substitute the effect for the cause. One cannot help feeling now and then that the ardor with which social reform is sometimes advo-

cated as the real task of the Church stands in inverse ratio to the dwindling degree of conviction with which religious beliefs are set forth. All honor to those brave spirits who are spending and being spent in the task of human betterment. And by actual count it would not be surprising if the great majority are religious men and women. But what of the Church, which should back up and support their efforts, which should continue to supply the driving force and inspiration of their toil, but which seems at times to prefer to compete with them rather than to support them, and to become itself an agency of reform rather than to remain a school for character and a shrine for worship? The danger, as the Archbishop of York pointed out during his recent visit, is that the Church may become so committed to one particular program that upon its realization or failure the Church will either become a stagnant, stationary institution engaged in sanctioning and perpetuating the achieved reform or, in case of failure, will be crippled and impeded from further effort. As he asked, "What if the Church had, for sound reasons of social or political policy, committed itself, in the 17th century, to the theory of the divine right of kings?" Or to that of capitalism in the 19th century, we might add, or to Socialism in the 20th?

The great principles of justice and compassion are fundamental to Christianity, and these the Church should teach and exemplify unceasingly. But in a particular situation, where division of opinion is possible regarding the proper methods of applying these two principles, the Church as a body ought not to take sides. Its position is far stronger if it does not take sides. And in the long run the Church can do more by the slow process of education and the inculcating of ideals than by the more immediate and tangible procedure of going out and collecting votes. In fact, if the Church stuck valiantly to its real task, some of the reforms might not be called for, but would take place automatically.

Important, and indispensable, as social reform is, and inevitable whenever the power of the Gospel conflicts with evil custom, it is not the whole of religion, nor a fair substitute for it. And yet that is all that is presented to youth in some places. The deeper hunger of the soul for communion with God has been left to take care of itself:

"The hungry sheep look up and are not fed."

2. Another substitute for religion—as it appears to youth—is psychiatry, or mental healing, or hygiene, or whatever name may be used. As

social reform as an application of the Gospel to society tends to occupy the whole foreground in some areas, so mental health as the application of the gospel to the individual does the same in others.

There is no doubt that the Church has much to learn from the newer schools of psychology and psychoanalysis. But there is nevertheless something more to pastoral care and spiritual direction than the application of the rules of psychiatry. In fact, the power of religion as a healing, uniting, transforming influence in the lives of men is something that lies outside the range of psychiatry, and as such—as a positive force greater than any system of mental technique—is taken for granted and used by many practitioners. Obviously, then, the world is the poorer whenever religion abandons its own sphere and enters, competitively, into that of mental therapy.

It is not only the amateur psychiatrist—I have no quarrel with the expert, be he priest or layman—and a few priests supplement their pastoral ministry very effectively as psychiatrists—not only the efforts of the amateur in psychiatry, who blunders as often as he succeeds; but the whole tendency to concentrate religion upon individual and personal problems is a mistake, I believe, whether it takes the form of “spiritual healing,” psychiatry, “soul-surgery,” or relentless, unreserved “sharing” of spiritual experiences. This is not even the main task of the Church, let alone the whole of it. The work of the pastor is certainly individual work, and includes “soul-winning,” “soul-saving,” and private nurture and guidance. But the chief task and public function of the Church is worship and teaching: and to abandon sowing and planting the fields, and the care of the whole orchard, in favor of the hothouse forcing of a few rare plants is surely a perversion of the Church’s real ministry and function in society. And one gets the impression now and then that the ardent advocates of some one program, to the exclusion of all else, are really abandoning the major program as unworkable. What they are advocating is meant to “save the Church,” and prove that it is useful to society, directly and immediately—and unless their program succeeds the Church may as well close up shop. But that is a rather poor way to save the Church, or religion—by turning it into something else, either an agency for social reform or a psychiatric clinic. Why not frankly close the churches, or make them over into museums, as in Russia, but keep the parish houses open, especially the offices and the pastor’s consultation rooms (no longer “studies”), and go in for the modern secular scheme of saving society—or individual souls—by machinery, systems, techniques, “plans”?

It is this acute secularization of religion that underlies many of the problems facing the Church at the present time—problems of attendance, of money, of waning interest in missions, and of youth, wherever these are real problems. (And that is not everywhere, I gladly grant.) The true center of religion, that is, of the religious life, is God, not man. Until we get back to that simple, plain fact, and let it reshape our thinking and our programs, we need not be surprised if religion (as we understand and represent it) makes no compelling appeal to many of our youth. They do not see that we—or the Church—put first things first. We try to show the usefulness of religion, rather than its truth and beauty. We try to explain that the world is comprehensible and life livable upon terms compatible with religion, rather than that religion itself provides the ideas and the motives which alone make the world intelligible and life supremely worth living. We offer youth sugarplums and cakes, rather than plain bread and nourishing meat, and try to “interest” them in religion by means of the attractions of pleasant companions, good entertainment, and cheap recreation. Don’t think that youth is fooled, like children who have been deceived into belief in Santa Claus. Youth sees clearly enough that this is not religion, and infers logically that if we really believed in our religion we would not offer so many substitutes for it, or so many cheap inducements to try it.

Surely there must be some more excellent way of presenting religion to youth; and it is that of which we are now in search.

VI. *Religion is the experience of God, together with the consequences, personal and social, which inevitably flow from that experience.*

Religion is not purely an individual concern: it is, like all our experience, molded and conditioned by the society we live in; nor is it purely a social force, within which the individual is submerged and lost. We are not prepared to follow the recently-given advice of a New York psychologist: “Instead of spanking naughty children, we should spank society”—though there appear to be a number of persons for whom religion seems to consist in little else than an attack upon the evils of the present social order, which is, I take it, a way of “spanking society.” Nor, on the other hand, are we prepared to limit the gospel to “personal evangelism,” as if a private experience of conversion, when participated in by a sufficient number of individuals, would inevitably alter the outer structure of society. No doubt

it would do so, in the end; but we cannot ignore the fact that some of the present evils of society—chiefly its false standards and ideals—effectively prevent the very conversion and growth in the spiritual and moral life the Church is committed to promote.

It is no use trying to hand on a religion which has come to be identified with anything else than the vital experience of God. It simply doesn't "take." The outward forms, manners, customs, language, ideas of the religion may be transmitted; but they wilt and fade, like flowers transplanted out of rich soil into a bank of dry, hot sand. Vital religion has to be rooted in vital experience—and then the forms and the language follow as a matter of course, adapting themselves to the existing situation. As Dean Inge has remarked, "There is a profound sense in which it is true that religion must be caught, and cannot be taught." Given a really religious person, something of a saint, one who proves his faith by his works, and men and women—and especially youth, which is responsive to new ideas—"catch the spirit" at once, and their lives are molded, sometimes inspired and transformed, correspondingly. It is not a question of money and equipment, but simply one of absolute reality—as Doctor Fosdick puts it, of "taking Jesus in earnest."

VII. *Hence the problem of presenting religion to youth is to be solved by getting back to the vital heart of religion, and letting the experience of God work its own transformation in private lives and in society at large.*

This is not to ignore the fact that some of the practical "ways and means" that have been proposed are worthy of careful consideration. On the principle that the first and the last test is to be *reality*, here are a few that surely deserve to be thought over:

1. Why not give youth more responsibility in the Church—and bring down the average age level of the local vestry, the Presbytery, the General Conference? Most vestries, presbyteries, conferences, need "fresh blood"; and if youth were better represented it would surely be an advantage both ways—to the vestry or presbytery and to the youth who, at least, would be gaining experience in the tasks of administration.

2. Why not try the experiment of shortening the church services?—at least some of them? Most services are adapted to the outlook and interests of adults, and there is surely nothing sacrosanct about that! A service an hour long, including prayers, lessons, hymns, anthem, and sermon, is not



impossible; and some who have tried it report a growth in interest and attendance, not only on the part of youth, but also of adults.

3. Why not have a greater variety in the church services? Is there any real reason why other prayers, other services, should not be used now and then? If worship is real, it must produce new forms from time to time; that is the way a liturgy grows—not by the method of scissors and paste, and counting votes in committees and conventions.

4. If worship is real, it should express itself in new hymns, voicing new needs, aspirations, praise, and thanks. Half the hymns in most hymnals are antiquated and unsuited to the worship of God at the present day. It is not their age that condemns them: some of the most vital hymns are from the 13th century, great hymns of objective devotion; rather it is their subjectivism, their one-sided theology, and their narrow, impoverished range of thought and feeling that condemns many of them. For example:

"O joy all joys beyond,  
To see the Lamb Who died  
And count each sacred wound  
In hands and feet and side!"

The whole tone and tenor of that hymn is bad—almost pathological. Or take another so-called "gospel hymn"—which has little enough to do with the Gospel, taught and lived by our Lord!

"Just as I am, without one plea,  
But that thy blood was shed for me."

Contrast the subjectivism and morbidity of those hymns with Marianne Hearn's paraphrase of the latter, written for youth:

"Just as I am, thine own to be  
Friend of the young, who lovest me,  
To consecrate myself to Thee,  
O Jesus Christ, I come.

In the glad morning of my day,  
My life to give, my vows to pay,  
With no reserve and no delay,  
With all my heart I come."

5. In our *teaching* of religion, more simplicity and directness are needed, and more emphasis upon matters of primary importance. No lesson

should be taught merely as information about the past, without concern for its permanent meaning and application—the time is too short, and there is too much ground to cover, for that. Religion still, as always, means action, not merely feeling or even thought. And therefore a religious experience which is not momentary, but permanent, and growing with the years, must carry with it (and be enriched and guided by) a rule of life of some kind. The test of a genuine religious experience is what it makes you *do*. “By their fruits. . .” There are certain things, few and simple for the most part, that mark the conduct of a Christian, just as there are others that mark the behavior of a Buddhist or a Mohammedan. What are they? And are we setting these forth positively and concretely enough for boys and girls, and older youths, to understand, appreciate, and adopt?

6. In brief, is it not time we thought of “religious education” as the process of teaching Christianity, and—on the pupil’s part—as growth in Christian life, work, and worship? I seriously doubt if our endless discussion of problems gets very far; it is a vice of youth to debate every question without feeling the need for arriving at concrete convictions which must work out in action. Discussion is all very well if it gets somewhere; but mere open-mindedness on every question, and the ability to argue for other points of view than one’s own, or even for one’s own when held cavalierly and artificially, is not the same thing as growth in faith and knowledge, or in “holiness without which no one shall see the Lord.”

I recall a conversation reported by a friend. A group of theologians were gathered at Randolph (N. H.) one summer day to discuss various “methods” of religious education. The late George Foot Moore, of Harvard, the greatest scholar in his field of research, which was the history of religions, was of the company; but he had nothing to say about “methods.” At last someone asked his views, and he replied: “The first thing, I should say, is to pick out the religion you wish to teach; and then, proceed to teach it.”—There is much more in that wise answer than appears at first glance!

Such are some of the suggestions I believe we should do well to take seriously; and they all swing into line from the first principle of all, namely, the problem of presenting religion to youth is the problem of getting back to the vital heart of religion itself, which is the direct, immediate experience of God together with the consequences, personal and social, which inevitably flow from that transforming experience.

## Church Union in Canada and in the United States

WILLIAM E. GILROY

**I**T has been my lot to live my religious life in two countries, as well as in two denominations, and to have an active part in three movements for church union—one of them the largest and most unique of modern times—all of which came to full consummation.

The association of these things in my mind is more than a mere coincidence. In the backgrounds of this complex experience are found, I think, certain factors and observations that do much to explain essential differences, and that throw light upon the reason, for example, why organic union which has made such remarkable progress in Canada, has made, until recently at least, very little progress in the United States, though in this country movements of federation and unity of a definitely practical nature considerably antedate the Canadian movement and in some respects go beyond it in extent and depth.

It would be a footless thing to compare movements of unity and union in Canada and the United States, respectively, to the advantage or disadvantage of either; but it may be a very valuable thing to study the differences in relation to the history and sources of the religious life in the respective countries, the varieties of temper and attitude, and the authoritarian and organizational structures in which the popular movements of religion have found expression. A study of this sort may suggest much that will be helpful in the solution of interdenominational problems, and that will at the same time emphasize how much these two great North American democracies can learn from each other in the fellowship of a more intimate good will and understanding.

Broadly speaking, the dominant difference between the religious life of Canada and that of the United States seems to me to consist in the extent to which in Canada, historically and in its present aspect, the religious life has moved within the orbit of conformity to denominational authority and organization, in contrast with the way in which the religious life of this country has been from the beginning cast in individualism and separateness

and has had its later history and development in actual movements of revolt, paralleling in temper and sometimes in actual incident, the course of political revolution. Individualism in religion, separateness in polity, has played a small, though relatively important part in the religious life of Canada, whereas the religious history of the United States is shot through and through with minor and major movements of individualism and of a psychology of denominational separateness. To be more specific: In Canada the religious life of the people has followed in four main respective streams—Roman Catholic, Church of England, Methodist and Presbyterian. Congregationalists never numbered more than about 30,000 members and adherents in the entire Dominion. The Baptists, Congregational in polity, have been numerically stronger but their chief strength has been in a few centers, rather than in a proportionate strength in every community, such as one would find in this country. Other groups, separate in temper or polity, and outside the main stream of the highly organized and well established denominations, have been few and numerically weak. Contrast with this the mere list of names of more individualistic groups and organizations in this country, that have either existed or grown up alongside the great authoritarian and strongly centralized bodies: Congregationalists, Baptists, Unitarians, Universalists, Quakers, Christians, Disciples of Christ, with many similar groups, and other groups and organizations that combine large elements of individualism with a sense of authority and cohesive life.

Let us look into the matter more closely. Protestant settlement of Canada began late in comparison with that of this country. The first Congregational Church in Canada was not organized until over two centuries after the Pilgrims came to Plymouth. Methodism had its beginnings in the immigration to Canada of United Empire Loyalists who were opposed to the American Revolution and who suffered and sacrificed deeply for their convictions. Later Methodism had its growth, as had Presbyterianism and Anglicanism, by the process of normal immigration and increase of population. But Protestant development in Canada, in all of its branches, was still at a low point at a time when powerful movements of revolt—Unitarianism in New England, Campbellism and O'Kellyism in the Middle West and South, and similar sporadic movements of greater or lesser permanent importance—were becoming powerful and determining influences on the course of American life.

The sectarian spirit of the age found expression in Canada in the per-

petuation on this side of the Atlantic of the divisions into which Methodism and Presbyterianism had broken up in its native lands. Among Methodists there were Wesleyan, New Connexion, Primitive, Bible Christian, and Methodist Episcopal, and I know not what others; among Presbyterians there were the Church of Scotland, United Presbyterian, Free Church, Reformed Presbyterian, and other divisions.

But the general trends in Canada were toward union and centralization. Politically union was in the air, and when the Dominion was constituted as the federation of the Provinces under the British North America Act in 1867, the "Fathers of Confederation," taking a lesson from our decades of division and conflicts of states' rights, which had brought about our Civil war, reversed the process of our Constitution, ascribing to the Federal or Dominion government all authority and power not specifically assigned to the Provinces. Here, of course, the principle was that powers not specifically assigned to the Federal Government inhered in the separate states. How deeply this growing national consciousness affected the religious movement one cannot say, but the fact is that in spite of seemingly insurmountable lesser loyalties, or prejudices, the varieties of Methodism by 1884 had become consolidated into a solid, nation-wide *Methodist Church of Canada*, and at about the same time the various Presbyterianisms became consolidated into *The Presbyterian Church in Canada*. I have never quite discerned the significance of the *of* in one case and the *in* in the other in these official, and now historic, titles. I have assumed that the Methodist form reflected the solidly national and centralized authority of the Methodist Church *of* Canada, while the Presbyterian *in* suggested the seat of authority not in the national assembly, but in the respective presbyteries. The distinction was destined to have an historic and very important effect in the final vote upon the union proposals relating to the United Church of Canada. The Methodist Church voted ultimately as a solid national unit, but the Presbyterian Church voted in presbyteries, and ultimately in local congregations. The Presbyterian polity made disruptions easy, where the Methodist polity made for united action, despite the possible opposition of a minority. To prevent misunderstanding, it should be added that the Methodist vote was inherently, as well as technically, almost solid for union. What I am emphasizing, however, is the fact that these consolidations could take place in Canada half a century before movements toward similar denominational consolidations in this country have gained effective headway. It is significant, and



calls for some adequate explanation if the suggestion here offered seem insufficient.

The building of two such solid, nation-wide denominations might easily have constituted a barrier toward larger union, for each had a sense of strength and power, and a realization of the possibility of going on under its own banner. Also, there was an inevitable trend toward a very real, if unostentatious, rivalry in reaching out for a denominational foothold in the new settlements and rapidly enlarging frontiers. But forces were at work that were stronger and deeper than the pressure for denominational advantage.

Among these—and one should not underestimate it—was that growing consciousness of the reality of vital Christian experience and of the obligation to preach and practice the gospel as of deeper significance than building a denomination. Methodist loyalty, and Presbyterian loyalty, and Congregational independency, were all coming under the power of a deeper loyalty to Christ. It is the same experience, vision and emphasis that is more persistently finding evidence in expression and sporadic action on our own side of the border today; and what has happened in Canada gives hope of larger achievement here, though the manner and issue may not be precisely the same.

Another incentive toward a unified Canadian Protestantism, not always emphasized but always somewhere in the background, was the presence of a strong, unified Roman Catholicism, with its stronghold in Quebec, but with increasing numerical and political power in the other Provinces. There has never been in Canada, at least in any intensive or extensive way, such movements of anti-Romanism as have been common and widely entrenched in the United States. There have been sporadic movements, like the P. P. A. (Protestant Protective Association), and the nation-wide Loyal Orange Order—a product of strife-torn Ireland; but the Orange Order has long been more political than religious in its actual activities and influence, and the sporadic movements, very similar to anti-Romanist activities in this country, have never had much place or influence in the major Protestant denominations. It is to the credit of Canadian Protestantism that its dominant trends and emphases have been positive and constructive. It has not wasted much strength in negative activities. There has been, naturally, a zealous regard for civil and religious liberties and a watchful and jealous attitude toward any political preferment or con-

cession to Rome, but beyond that the average Canadian Protestant has been as much concerned that his Roman Catholic fellow citizens should possess and exercise the freedom of religion in a free state as that he should enjoy the blessings of civil and religious liberty himself. Nevertheless, a strong Protestant tradition in the presence of a strong Roman Catholic tradition must inevitably have produced a keen sense of the need of unity in the one case where unity was so emphasized in the other.

But a more immediately determining factor, if not one of equal fundamental significance, was the awakening of the churches to the sense of their social obligations. Up to the time of the great denominational consolidations, almost the only occasion when Christians of various churches got together locally was for the annual meeting of the Bible Society, but now such interdenominational organizations arose as the Dominion Alliance, fighting the liquor traffic, and the Lord's Day Alliance for protection of Sunday as a day of worship and rest. The widespread, persistent activities of such organizations, with intensive branches in local communities, brought Christians of various denominations and churches into association and common action such as they had never known before. It was inevitable that in a country and population where practical values were already outweighing theories and divisions in political and national life, the consciousness of common aims, the realization that Christian ends were supreme, and that all other distinctions and differences were secondary, should produce strong trends toward unity.

By the beginning of the present century these had become vital enough to crystallize into actual negotiations and movements. Methodists, Presbyterians, and Congregationalists by 1904 were definitely represented in the negotiations that culminated in the consummation of the United Church of Canada in 1925.

That effects and influences may operate differently in different countries or circumstances was evidenced in the fact that the World War which aided union movements on this side of the line—particularly in local communities where churches got together to save expense and conserve resources—might easily have wrecked the movement in Canada. The basis of union had reached the place for decision, and consequently the stage of bitterest conflict between the unionists and anti-unionists in the Presbyterian Church (Methodists were officially united in accepting the basis of union and all but about seven Congregational churches were pro-union) when the country

was plunged into war. There could be no compromise on the union issue, but the unseemliness of internal strife when the country was at war was recognized by those who shared a deep and common loyalty to their country, and the conflicting Presbyterian groups agreed upon a truce in which further debate and action were postponed until two years following the end of the war—a date at that time greatly longed for but very much in doubt.

A cynic might remark upon the fact that Christian men and women could achieve a unity of vision, purpose, and action in support of King and country that they were unable, or unwilling, to achieve for Church and Christ. But cynics do not always see deeply or truly. The intensity of conscientious convictions and the strength of the union movement were alike evident in the fact that two years after the Treaty of Versailles unionists and anti-unionists took up the matter where they had left off, with the results that are now historic—the consummation of the union in 1925 in the United Church of Canada, and the organization of the dissenting Presbyterians, about 30 per cent of the denomination prior to union, in the continuing Presbyterian Church.

What movement of union on this side of the line, one is disposed to ask, would have survived two years of silence from propagandism or debate, without being revived, revamped, or artificially stimulated? One must be conscious that here in this country we have had no widespread, thorough-going, determined concern about church union, such as has so powerfully motivated a vast part of the Canadian church constituency within the present century and with such definiteness of results and achievements.

But I am not quite content to leave the matter there; nor would the outward contrast be entirely in harmony with the deeper facts and the full truth. The period of my ministry in the United States, most of it spent in the vantage ground of an editorial office, is now almost equal to the years that I spent in Canadian pastorates. I have had unusual opportunities for observation, and coming from the Canadian scene I have had a particular interest in discovering and appraising the events, movements, and incidents that might in some degree correspond to the major trend and movement in the religious life of Canada. It is obvious that the union movement in this country lacks the solid phalanxes, the organized intensity, and the dominating psychology that have characterized the Canadian movement. The historic individualism, and the separatist spirit, in American religious life have been too persistent to permit the development of any highly integrated and

precisely detailed movement for union. Except in the measure of loose association for limited common action in the Federal Council of Churches—a large and significant measure—movements of church union in this country have been for the most part sporadic, if not also predominantly sentimental and emotional. There is plenty of passionate utterance and noble idealism, but progress is lamentably slow, proposals are vague and general, and there is little offered that is directed toward overcoming real and existing barriers to union.

Nevertheless, I am disposed to believe that the total volume and potential effect of union interests and movements in this country compare very favorably with, or even exceed, what one finds in Canada. The movement for Methodist union in this country represents numerically the largest scheme of union ever attempted, and though it will not mean a triumph over denominational barriers, if it succeeds upon a real and favorable basis it will mean a triumph over sectional and racial prejudices of a sort that often lie deeper than theological or organizational differences. But I do not refer so much to movements of this sort, or like that of the union a few years ago of the Congregational and the Christian Churches, numerically comparable with the Canadian union, as to the propagandism and movements that operate within the atmosphere of the traditional attitudes and dominant trends in our American church life. These have made possible large and significant movements of federation, where their spirit and organization have not been favorable to organic union. It is hardly necessary to point out that the great distinguishing difference between the Canadian movement for church union and union movements in this country is that the former has been from its inception to its consummation a movement for *organic* union while in this country there has been little effort toward organic union except among groups that already shared a common source of historical or spiritual origin.

Church union is a matter that must be considered in the light of ideas and ideals as well as from the standpoint of definite goals and achievements. It seems platitudinous to emphasize once more the fact that church union and Christian unity are not necessarily the same or coterminous; but no fact is more needful of recognition and of constant remembrance. It would be a libel upon the Christian leaders who have achieved the vast organism of the United Church of Canada to suggest that they are less concerned about Christian unity than their brethren on this side of the line who have been

engaged in vast schemes of federation, such as in the Federal Council of Churches, or in the numerous and not less significant local movements of federation; it is my judgment, however, that in the minds and activities of its outstanding exponents in this country Christian unity represents something deeper in vision and larger in catholicity than anything that the Canadian movement has sought or attained. It is my judgment, also, that insofar as individuals are putting the ideal into practice, there is a spirit of unity that goes beyond the limits of an organic movement, and to which an organic movement in its very nature—unless it be upon the basis of a simplicity of creed and polity as yet nowhere contemplated—tends to set limits. Let us examine whether this be so.

A movement for organic union has obvious advantages. It is concrete, and definite; its goal is well defined, and when it is attained, the achievement is equally definite; old and sectional prejudices and loyalties tend to be wiped out in loyalty to the larger organism, and if this be not true in the immediate consummation, it tends to become both true and real in the coming generations who have known only the larger and united organism. Young folks growing up in the United Church of Canada today are likely to have an outlook, psychology, and attitude quite different from that of the young Methodist, Presbyterian, or Congregationalist of a generation ago. This would seem to be the chief advantage of organic unity and it is very real. There is much to be said for the idea that the way to get rid of denominationalism is to get rid of the denominations. But in renouncing them for something larger, there is the possibility of building only a larger denominational organism. It is here that the limitations of organic union in relation to Christian unity tend to become marked. No one who knows the facts would underestimate what the United Church of Canada has achieved either in the extent of the union effected or in the conquest of seemingly insurmountable barriers of sectional loyalties. Nor would one underestimate the effect of the Canadian example in other lands and in other communions. It has been little short of inspiring. But there are negative aspects of the Canadian movement that have never been quite adequately taken into account, and there is a sense in which the Canadian movement in the very nature of its achievement has come to an impasse.

Except in the sense that I have respect for the conscientious convictions of others, no matter how much they may differ from my own, I have never had any high regard for anti-union elements in the Canadian scene. They



have seemed to me to represent the most immovable and recalcitrant sort of denominationalism. But it must not be forgotten that about 30 per cent of the former Presbyterian Church in Canada decided to continue as Presbyterian rather than United Church. Despite my sympathies and antipathies, I could never quite understand that Presbyterianism which had at one time been a matter of pride, should in the eyes of many of its former professors become suddenly a matter of reproach. But this is an incident of union movements, and I am only recording facts. The anti-unionists were faced with a policy of divisiveness if they were to have anywhere to go. Intense litigation over rights and property was begun, and in many communities disruption rather than either union or unity was the result. In my own home town there were Methodist and Presbyterian Churches, substantial and of about equal strength. Both churches entered the union, but a group of anti-unionists withdrew from the Presbyterian Church and built a new "continuing Presbyterian" church. The Methodist and Presbyterian churches, in opposite ends of the town, continued as separate organizations in the United Church, but a short time ago united locally. The result is that with two good properties available for use, and with strong sentiments, preferences and loyalties associated with each, a most divisive issue has been emphasized, and there is anything but the strength and unity that are sometimes too sentimentally and too positively associated with unions. I do not cite this case as typical, but neither is it altogether exceptional.

I have spoken of an impasse. What I mean is this: The logic of union in Canada calls for further action, but the only direction in which it could come on any large scale would seem to be between the United Church in Canada and the great Episcopalian body known in Canada as "the Church of England." Many in both communions would favor such a union and anticipate its coming. But it could be achieved, unless this estimate is entirely mistaken, only at the cost of the refusal of many in the Church of England to enter union, following the course of the anti-unionist Presbyterians.

Progressive movements cannot always wait for the timid and reluctant; nevertheless, if I were to derive one lesson from the Canadian experiment, it would be that here in this country, while not withholding any truly advanced step, we should study as far as possible to proceed toward unity and union in such ways as to give the least possible occasion, or incentive, to movements of reaction. No consideration of church conditions in Canada

is adequate that takes account only of progress, without regarding the nature, causes, and effects of reaction.

It may seem a strange thing to say, but I believe that in many respects religious life on this side of the line, at least in some of its potential and ultimate aspects, is less sectional than in Canada. If I were asked to define the most significant thing in the religious life of the United States today, I think I should say that it is the extent to which our seemingly divided churches have produced individuals and groups of essentially ecumenical mind, spirit, and influence. Think of the men and women whom one can name who are affiliated with various denominations, but whose religious outlook and fellowship are so large that no one denomination can any longer claim them! Take, for example, such a figure as the late Doctor Cadman. His influence extended far beyond Congregationalism to all the Protestant Churches, and beyond Protestants to Jews, many of whom regarded him with deep affection, and to many Roman Catholics who valued his counsels. There are many men in this country who, in lesser degree, represent much the same position and influence as Doctor Cadman, yet I can think of no man who quite corresponds to him in Canadian religious circles. There are men of his spirit, who partake in considerable measure of his abilities, but the sharpness of Canadian denominational divisions tends toward a limitation of their influence. The greatest leader in the United Church who speaks with inspiration to his own communion may be a feeble influence among continuing Presbyterians, or those of other continuing denominations. Protestant preacher or Roman prelate, no matter how distinguished, speaks chiefly to his own.

Despite the progress of union in Canada, there is little that is ecumenical. Here in the United States, though there is little progress in union, there is a great deal that is ecumenical. It is the spirit of much of our thinking and attitude. If we think of Canada as having in some measure harvested its crop, we are at least sowing the seeds of what may prove a great future harvest.

Nor is what I am citing manifested in individuals alone. One thinks of the vision and purpose underlying such organizations as the National Council of Jews and Christians, encouraging a community of action between Jews, Catholics, and Protestants, and an effort toward mutual understandings, of a sort that, so far as we are aware, has originated only in American religion. Nor is it inappropriate to call attention to the broad basis upon

which such organizations as The Greater Boston Federation of Churches have brought into fellowship with the conventionally evangelical churches, Unitarians, Universalists, and liberal Jews. Roman Catholics have not been included, only because up to the present time they have declined overtures to participate; though it should be recorded that individual Roman Catholics have shown a responsive spirit, and a Jesuit Father recently occupied an important part on the program at a representative regional gathering in Springfield, Mass., of Congregational ministers from the Eastern and New England States. In all this there is little movement for organic union, nor would much in that direction be possible. The churches concerned are in a measure products of their history, perhaps too much so. But, none the less, cannot one see a feeling toward something larger, a sense of an ideal and a moving toward it?

It is not within my province to discuss the relative advantages of federation and organic union as respective methods. If I have suggested anything along that line, it might well be forgotten. What I have sought to do, and what I think is really important, is to suggest the trends which the conditions, backgrounds, tempers, and traditional attitudes seem to determine as most effective in either country. We must seek to conquer, but we cannot ignore, the spirit of independency and of separatism that has been so deeply dominant in our religious history. If we do not ignore it, we shall probably realize that we are not likely to conquer it by emphasizing, or seeking to compel, conformities that would tend only to arouse that spirit into action or reaction, but rather by utilizing the freedom of that spirit of independency to enforce the obligations of love and of Christian fellowship. What we build in organization has limits—it would be indeed a narrow view that recognized no strength of conscience—though the limits may extend far beyond our present narrowness; what we build in love has no limits. Where love and Christian fellowship lead, they still lead on; we cannot go so far, without going farther. Where the spirit of the ecumenical Christian is today, the churches may be tomorrow—the Church, insofar as it consists only of those who have the spirit of Christ, is already there—but the churches as a whole will never be there until the spirit of the ecumenical Christian be all pervasive.

The ideal of Christian catholicity and its practice in the experience, outlook, and attitude of every Christian cannot be too strongly emphasized. We are wont to assume that we can unify the Christian church by movements

and unions to the partial neglect of the fact that ultimately a truly catholic church implies truly catholic Christians and catholic experience. The spirit of separateness either in the individual or in a denominational group must always be an offense against the Christian spirit, and against true catholicity. But on the other hand, where independency is touched with the spirit of love, and with that magnitude of heart and mind that reaches out toward understanding and fellowship with all, there is a foundation for unlimited co-operation and unity.

We must not disparage or weaken in our American church life the sense of this one great ultimate foundation of Christian unity in the reality of supreme Christian experience. If every professor of the Christian way were thoroughly imbued with the spirit of Christ, we should be as near to one another as Christ is to each of us, and the attainment of unity in work and organization would become a matter of technique and adjustment.

The importance of technique and adjustment motivated by this supreme Christian experience and purpose ought not to be minimized in glorifying the ideal. If I have seemed in any way to minimize the magnitude and significance of what the Canadian movement has shown us in technique and adjustment, it is necessary to correct such an impression. The movement that consummated in the United Church of Canada stands as a lasting witness to what can be achieved to overcome sectional views and loyalties in adherence to larger views and larger loyalties. It is a lasting rebuke to those who say that the motivations and boundaries of our denominational life must always remain as they are, or must persist in some form in spite of all the adjustments that we seek.

Emphasis upon the realities of religious experience in this country that have been so widely and so largely expressed in terms of independency and revolution, should not lead us to put a value upon organizations and movements of the past to the deprecation or defeat of the larger experiences and organizations that the new day and the new spirit demand. The participation of hundreds of thousands of Canadian churchmen in a successful movement uniting denominations in something newer, larger, and better, stands strongly in support of those who seek a larger way and a broader field for a religious life in this country which is still confined to denominational bounds that are all too narrow and unnecessarily narrow. Progress toward the ideal, if it be at all in harmony with the spirit and trend of American life, must be in an atmosphere of freedom, and in free and unhurried ways.

But it is a poor use of freedom to encourage or occasion unnecessary delay where the churches can move forward. The natural method of union here would follow that of Canada in the consolidation of groups with an original denominational origin, or the consolidation of groups that already have elements of a common faith, attitude, and polity. But such denominational consolidation is already so long delayed that the spirit of the times is calling for something even larger, and it may be that by setting a goal for a larger interdenominational co-operation, if not in actual union, we shall achieve more than along denominational lines, even where these lines are greatly enlarged and broadened.

Perhaps in this survey I have failed to note one important aspect of union movements on this side of the line. That is the movement in local communities toward federated churches, community churches, or some other form of fellowship that looks toward the unifying of the religious life and forces. One reflects with a measure of questioning that much of this movement locally has been occasioned by circumstances that have not had much to do with Christian vision or idealism. Churches have refused to federate or merge while they could maintain their separate properties and communions, and financial stress or changed movements of population have compelled a federation or union where there was insufficiency of Christian spirit to bring this about through direct spiritual motive and action. However, the Lord maketh the wrath of men and stringency of circumstances to praise Him, and man's necessity in relation to this matter of larger fellowship has been God's opportunity.

It would be wrong to say that the Canadian movement was one of leaders and from above, making its way down toward the local communities and the common people. The reverse, in a sense, was true. Particularly in the inception of the movement it was the demand of the people that created the movement. But the movement became in its technique something of an overhead movement, going far beyond the local situation in its importance and significance. We must not minimize the importance of what is happening in local communities in the American scene. True progress in unity will depend very largely upon the drawing together of Christians in new understandings, co-operations, and fellowships in the local community. This, in a very real way, is the foundation of our whole American life, and we are learning in these later years to recognize how great are the weaknesses and defects of state and federal governments



when citizenship and democracy in the local community, in man's daily life with his fellow men, lose any of their significance and value.

If we would build a church of the future in a large and catholic way, we must remember the importance of the units, but it is well also to remember the wise remark attributed to the late General William Booth of the Salvation Army when some one, emphasizing the importance of individual salvation, remarked to him that you could not boil a kettle of water without boiling every drop. "Yes," replied the General, "but you do not boil every drop separately."

It is in considering what has happened and is happening on both sides of the border, in Canada in the United Church, and on this side of the line in numerous manifestations of the spirit of unity, that we may find a deeper incentive and a fuller and richer program for enlarging the boundaries of our church life and bringing it more in harmony with the fullness of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus. It is with this in view that I have endeavored to set down these impressions of comparisons, contrasts, and mutually encouraging examples, in progress toward unity in Christian churches of North America that are still too greatly separated by a political border line. If I were to add a deeper impression, it would be that it is a question whether the Church will ever conquer its denominational border lines until it has attained a vision of spiritual fellowship and responsibilities that transcends geographical and political border lines as well. If we should ever attain to one great consolidated Protestantism, it would transcend our boundary lines, and would bring into one rich communion in North America trends and influences that, hitherto working separately, would work together for a larger goal. There is much in Canadian church life that would be as a wholesome leaven in ours, and there has been a great deal in our diversified and revolutionary American religious life that in its proper effects would be valuable in the religious life of the Dominion.

One should add the welcome, encouraging, and significant fact that the United Church of Canada is now associated with our own outstanding achievement in closer interdenominational relationships, The Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America.

## The Foolishness of Preaching

WILLIAM G. CHANTER

**R**ECENTLY a distinguished clergyman created a sensation by a demand for a moratorium on preaching, a demand which seems to have been based on the idea that most contemporary preaching was altogether too foolish. But in the sense in which Saint Paul used the word, it is safe to say that most modern preaching is not half foolish enough. For he held that the gospel was so radically opposed to the whole system of ideas and practices accepted by the world as wise and good that by worldly standards it must seem to be stark folly. Yet this folly was the world's only hope of salvation; it was divine wisdom while in reality this human wisdom was folly, presenting the fantastic spectacle of futile stupidity decking itself in the scholar's gown.

It may be, then, that there is room for a plea for more foolishness in preaching, for on this matter of preaching, and especially of Christian preaching, Saint Paul may be considered an authority. He saw the world as fundamentally worthless and false, so that the very essence of salvation was the power to live in opposition to its standards, so that its disfavor was a mark of achievement. Do we feel like that? And is our preaching an expression of such an attitude?

Of course we might dismiss the question by saying that this attitude was due to the condition of the world in which the apostle lived. It was then a wicked, a pagan world, and he represented a minority group which was despised and oppressed. Now, however, the world has improved so much that it is no longer the City of Destruction that it was in the first century. But I do not think that this optimistic view will stand examination. You will remember that Saint Paul's remark about the foolishness of preaching was not called forth by the spectacle of the vile materialism of Corinth, but by the academic culture and intellectualism of Athens. It was after he had failed in an attempt to adapt his gospel to Athenian intellectualism that he realized that his message was and must be, in the eyes of the world, downright folly. He saw that in Jesus there was the revelation of a conflict between the world, not in this or that phase of its life, but between the world in its essential qualities and character, and the kingdom of God.

He saw the world as the glorification of the powers of the human intellect as all sufficient; as the exaltation of the visible and the material; as the acceptance of rank in the existing social system as the sure mark of success and worth. The world as a political system, Rome, had nailed Jesus to a cross. The world as a religious system, Jerusalem, had provided the accusation which doomed Him. And now the world as culture and intellectualism, Athens, rejected Him as a figure of folly. Not the world at its lowest, but the world at its highest, saw the cross as foolishness. For Saint Paul this meant only one thing and that was the condemnation of the world. He saw the best achievements of the unaided human intellect as inadequate to reach reality; he saw the emphasis on the material as the dreary road to a dreary futility; he saw social rank as nothing more than an indication of conformity to the fashion of the hour. He saw it all as empty and dead, a denial of God and a rejection of His kingdom. And this radical contempt for the world was due to his vivid realization that God was in Christ, the crucified Christ, reconciling the world into Himself by bringing it to see its own helplessness and worthlessness. For the cross had been inflicted upon Jesus by the world as the expression of its conviction that He had nothing to bring to it, that His message was folly and His claims to authority false. All that the power and wisdom of the world could do to mark their rejection of the message and the Messenger had been done. But Saint Paul had seen the triumph of the Crucified and from the glowing experience of that vision he preached the foolishness that the true life was to be attained only through faith in Christ. That is to say, when and only when a man came to see in that which to the world was the final badge of detected and thwarted folly the divine expression of true wisdom, was he possessed of salvation. Then and then only could he be enabled to live in time the life eternal. No, the Pauline contempt of the world was not due to the apostle's preoccupation with the darker features of the contemporary world. Nor is the worldly scorn of the cross a thing outmoded. Essentially the world of today is like the world of first-century Jerusalem and Rome and Athens in its attitude toward the true cross. That our world has made the cross the symbol of its worship and the badge of its highest honors is, of course, true. But it is not the true Cross, this pretty trinket of gilt and tinsel which is the world's substitute for the grim and hideous tree of Calvary. It is the expression of the world's cunning by which it seeks to dull the edge of the sword of the spirit and so escape its sharpness. No, we cannot

dismiss the Pauline contempt of the world as due to the passing conditions of his day.

Nor can we say that it is only Saint Paul's way of looking at the gospel, that Jesus Himself had no such attitude to the world. For if the story of the temptation means anything, it means that the Master had this same view of the world as in itself worthless, of the kingdoms of the world as the possessions of Satan. Salvation could come only to the man who was willing to lose his life. The cultured Nicodemus must be born again, the young ruler's fatal lack was inability to see that his great worldly possessions constituted a barrier between himself and the eternal life which he thought he desired, the multitude was warned against laboring for the bread that perisheth. And the cross was accepted as the inevitable lot of the Son of man, the only way to victory over the world.

The preacher of today, confronted with the comparative powerlessness of his preaching, confronted with the bitter need which he still seems unable to meet, can hardly escape the question as to whether he is failing because his message is not characterized by that radical foolishness which characterized the preaching of Jesus and His apostles. Hence I make this plea for real foolishness in preaching. Let us look at some of the standards of the world and see whether they should not be rejected by the preacher even at the risk of being called a fool.

## I

First, consider the intellectual standards of the world. How far should our preaching be rational? This may seem like a shocking question, but I am using the term rational in what I think is a false sense but one which is nevertheless prevalent. There is a tendency in the world today, as in the first century, to think of rational as equivalent to intellectual. The emotional and impulsive are under suspicion. Hence it is thought that the only rational message is one which is based on the severe categories of rigorous logic. Consequently the preacher is tempted to pride himself on his intellectuality, an intellectuality which delivers him from first-century foolishness certainly but not from twentieth-century futility. Consider, for example, this quotation from a contemporary journal of religion: "We have no faith at all in the persistence and permanency of any of the types of obscurantism referred to above." (The *reference* is to "supernaturalism, anthropomorphism, and any other features of conventional religion which

are repugnant to"—Professor John Dewey.) The quotation goes on, "Science is here to stay. It will in the end dominate human thought." And so on. Here is the attempt to say that the method of empirical science is the only way of knowledge, which is after all only one way of saying that the intellectual criticism of the evidence of the senses is alone rational.

But it must be evident that if the scientific method is the only rationality, if action in which evidence from other quarters is influential is irrational, if true knowledge comes only through that gateway, then there is little rational action, and rational knowledge is limited to knowledge of the things which count for the least. Men are moved by many things, and the intellect is but one of them, probably the least important as a real spring of action, if indeed it is a spring of action at all. And the knowledge of the great things of life is not the result of the application of the scientific method. Rather it is an answer to great human hungers, of one of which, the passion for truth, the scientific method is a tool. The thirst for righteousness, the passion for friendship, the clamant desire for a friendly universe, are mighty forces which come to self-consciousness through the medium of an experience which is as much richer and broader than the intellect as life is larger than logic.

This means that we cannot make any really valuable life contacts or discoveries by means of the intellect alone. Not even the scientific method will find God for us. The world through its wisdom knew not God, because God is a Person and no personal relation was ever achieved through the use of the scientific method alone. Sympathy is a necessary condition of fellowship, but sympathy is not purely or even chiefly a matter of the intellect. It is based on the possession of common feelings, aspirations, experiences, and on a vivid and more than intellectual consciousness of this sharing. Furthermore, any personal relation is based on one's willingness to surrender to the other member of the fellowship, a willingness which cannot ever be justified solely by the intellect. If then our preaching is aimed at helping men and women to come into relationship with God, it must have power to appeal to more than the intellect, and hence it cannot be rational in the sense of merely intellectual. If the final reality can be reached by the way of intellectual formulation, then final reality is impersonal if not abstract, and the gospel is not worth preaching, for the final reality is not the God and Father of Jesus Christ. Indeed, that reality is not the God of the religious



consciousness at all. Over against the pseudo-rationality of the world, our preaching will seem indeed to be foolish.

There is another reason for denying the religious value of this kind of rationalism. Intellectualism tends to ignore the fact that the religious relation involves the active participation not of man only but of God as well. It lays all the emphasis on the human element. When it decries supernaturalism it really means that God is like nature in that He is to be formulated, defined, analyzed. But if He is in any proper sense to be approached as a Person, then it is well to remember that the reduction of a person to a formula, while it may be an aid to knowing him, certainly cannot constitute a fellowship with him. Friendships are not made by one party to the relation constructing an intellectual formulation of the other. They are as likely to be disrupted as strengthened by that rather forbidding process. No, a friendship is born when each of the friends gives himself to the other and receives the other in return, and the process is not something which on either side is logically justified. There is a more than intellectual element here. In the religious relationship this more than intellectual element is called grace as it appears in God and faith as it is seen in man. And since the Gospel makes so much of these two words, we shall do well to retain them and their full meaning. Only when we do, we shall not be able to meet the world's standards of rationalism and shall have to submit to being set down as guilty of anthropomorphism and supernaturalism and even of other types of "obscurantism."

All this means that we must have a message which is rational in the sense of bringing together into an intelligible focus those great human needs and urges whose satisfaction means salvation. It will be the message of New-Testament Christianity if it leads men to find that salvation in a vision of a God who so loved the world that He gave His only begotten Son not simply as a Teacher to enlighten its mind, but as a Brother to show it the way of the abundant life through the cross which overcomes the world. Let me quote a modern novelist and critic, Mr. Middleton Murry: "Jesus was a teacher who died to save men who would not listen to His teaching. . . . It means that to the wisdom of the perfect teacher in Him was added the love of the perfect brother. There have perhaps been others as wise as Jesus, but none have had His love. Therefore there have been none so wise. To be wise and love, this is wisdom." It is something more than

an intellectual formulation which we have to preach, a wisdom not of this world, and therefore to this world foolishness.

At present we are confronted with what seems like a deadly choice between a barren intellectualism and an empty sentimentalism. The inevitable end of the tendency to make rationalism a game of intellectual dissection is to be seen in a book like Mr. Joseph Wood Krutch's *The Modern Temper*. Of course, if the life of reason is an exercise in intellectual analysis, then our most cherished values must go by the board, and we must be satisfied with the dreary discovery that the only things which have made life worth living are illusions. Our reward is the knowledge that it is our superior insight which makes it impossible for our race to retain its vitality, that the more vigorous races which are to supplant us will owe their victory to their ignorance. A discovery like that might in minds which call themselves rational lead to some distrust of the instruments with which the discoverers had been working. We who preach foolishness may well derive some comfort from the spectacle of a wisdom the wages of which is death.

And on the other hand, it does seem to me that the very substantial benefits of the Buchman movement are vitiated to a serious extent by the sentimentality which leads it to think that the capture of the national convention of a political party is either desirable or possible, or that a God-guided dictator could make the world over into a kingdom of God. More rigorous thinking is clearly needed in the counsels of this movement.

Neither Mr. Krutch nor Mr. Buchman are foolish in the Pauline sense. Mr. Krutch writes books which are captivating and are received with the applause of the world; and Mr. Buchman strikes the worldly man as being rather on the right track when he aims at the conversion of the big men that they may rebuild the world by using its own machinery.

Our task as preachers of the gospel is to point to the high way which is above the cleverness of the world. Our demonstration must be that of the Spirit, the higher logic which convicts the world of sin, and of righteousness, and of judgment. We must bring to men a wisdom which will mean power to live the abundant life, not conformed to the patterns of a barren intellectualism, not betrayed by a sentimental idealization of worldly vanity, but transformed by an inner renewal of a mind which knows God not through logical formulation but through an experience of fellowship.

## II

In the second place, think of the way in which the world worships what it calls culture, and demands that the preacher adapt his message to this new religion. What must be his attitude to this attempt to arrogate to the world's culture the ultimate authority? Dare he oppose culture, or should he? On the one hand he runs the risk of being called boorish and crude, and yet on the other he is face to face with the elevation of culture into a religion which tends to deny the reality of sin and to obscure the face of God.

Culture as a religion is always based on an implicit or explicit pantheism. Its gospel tells us that all we need for salvation, for the complete life, is a development of all the powers of human nature, the co-ordination of its impulses, and that for this task all the resources necessary are to be found in the human will. To quote one of the high priests of this religion, salvation is to "live resolutely in the Whole, the Good, and the Beautiful." "The end of life," says another and more recent apostle of this gospel of culture, "is to see the world as beauty." Behind all this is the belief that the world as it is is beautiful and is a unified whole. Its rawness and its cruelty are only apparent and disappear when we view them with the eye of the sophisticated man. Then they appear as power and vigor, possessed of a beauty like the beauty of the thunderstorm. Consequently the Puritan is denounced as an example of folly. His insistence on the reality and vileness of sin, his opposition to the life of impulse, his application of the moral categories to art, above all his steady conviction that God stands in judgment over against the world and that man without His help is lost—all these are held up to ridicule. And this ridicule is the expression of the superficiality which is characteristic of all pantheisms, which tends and must tend always to shy away from the problem posed by the existence of the moral distinction.

But the Christian religious consciousness cannot do that, because the very awareness of the glorious possibility of a filial relation to God makes all the more profound the realization of man's moral unworthiness. Just as the intellectual achievements of the scientist make him acutely aware of his littleness as over against the vastness he has discovered, so the man who sees most clearly the grandeur of God and his own imperative need of Him, sees also the full deadliness of his own moral weakness as an obstacle to the satisfaction of that need. And the clearer his vision of God the more absolute becomes this sense of the antagonism between the natural man and his

ideal, the world to which he is captive and the kingdom of God in which alone he can find the life he craves. The polished discourse of the apostles of culture sound in his ears as cruel irony, or, worse, as the blasphemy of those who do not know the real sacredness of the things of which they talk so easily, the tragedy of the longings they seek so lightly to appease, the deadliness of the warfare which goes on while they talk of a peace which is no peace.

Saint Paul at Athens, surrounded by the noblest art of the world, standing in the very center of its culture, was nevertheless stirred with a profound sense of the futility of a civilization which used the resources of its culture to glorify idolatry. Culture is apt to cry out against such an attitude as rank Philistinism, for the world's culture is too easily led into accepting beauty in place of truth. Think of calling these magnificent achievements of the sculptor idols! But for the Christian there is no substitute for truth, and beauty loses its attraction when it tries to be one. If human life is really a quest for the true God, if it is frustrated and incomplete unless it finds Him, then to lose one's self in the maze of an unusual polytheism, however artistic it may be, is the supreme tragedy. If this is Philistinism we must plead guilty to the charge.

The scientist who stands aghast at the immensity of his measurements can solace himself with the reflection that size is after all not a matter of ultimate importance. The vastness of the universe is no real indication of the insignificance of him who has discovered and even measured its vastness. But the lack of moral stature is not so easily dismissed. That is a matter of quality and of ultimate value. The lack of bulk is one thing, the lack of righteousness quite another. It stands as an insuperable barrier across the pathway of the man who through his vision of God has become acutely sensitive to the primacy of moral values.

Now this sense of moral inadequacy is met by culture with an attempt to deny its validity. We are told that sin is an outworn term, that the good life is a matter of a judicious, a measured, a restrained satisfaction of the human impulses; a matter of understanding them aright. What the Puritan calls sin is simply the rawness of the raw material from which the finished product of the good life is to be made. But the Christian religion demands a rebirth, a new focus for life, self-renunciation rather than self-realization. That is to say, salvation depends upon the abandonment of self-realization as a goal, it depends upon finding one's goal outside one's self. For religion

does not find God only within the soul, it finds Him outside of it, standing at the door and knocking. It finds God not simply in the world, but over against it. And the focus of the religious life is in God and not in the human self or in the world, so that culture which starts with the natural man and seeks to find in him by a process of harmonious development all that he needs, is a matter of spiritual isolation which has no value for the man who has made the discovery, at once terrible and glorious, that his life has a divine reference, that God has made him for Himself and that he cannot rest until he rests in God.

Evidently, then, the preacher must be content to run the risk of seeming to the cultured a fool. He will have to find some way of restating the fundamental antagonism between the natural man and the realm of the spirit. When the current magazines are sounding the praises of the latest apostle of humanistic culture, or publishing brilliant articles in which self-indulgence is glorified under all sorts of pretty names; when his own people are being led into damaging compromises with the current practices of a society which mistakes glitter for value; he will preach the magnificent folly of the cross through which the world in all its pomp and circumstance is condemned as empty and worthless, and God is seen as doing what the world's best culture cannot do, reconciling the world unto Himself.

### III

The world today is the scene of a great revolutionary movement and of determined resistance to it. What must be the message of the preacher to the social struggle? One thing he must do if he is to be true to the principle of a gospel not of this world—he must never let himself see in any existing or proposed organization of the world's forces the kingdom of God. For the kingdoms of this world were once and for all rejected by the preacher's Master. Concerned as they are primarily with the production and distribution of material goods, or with culture, or with political machinery and the power it brings, they can never be treated as ultimate, save at the expense of worshipping Satan.

The history of theocracies is an illuminating study for the preacher who is tempted to espouse propaganda for social change as the primary aim of his work, or is inclined to make himself the prophet of the *status quo*. It might be well for him to study the life of Jeremiah as that of a true prophet who was radically disillusioned as to the value for religion of the



reorganization of Church and State. This does not mean that Jeremiah was one whit less the unflinching preacher of a truly social gospel—but it does mean that he found that no organization of the State, not even one in which the constitution is based on religion and the king has to spend part of each day in the study of the divine law, is the kingdom of God.

Now this calls attention to a fact that we tend to overlook when we class the prophets of Israel with the social reformers of all ages. That fact is that their message was not primarily based on observation of the oppression of the masses, but on a vision of God over against which the oppression of the masses was hideously intolerable. It was the voice of God and not the cry of the suffering masses that moved Amos to speak, moved him with an imperative like the roar of a lion. To a man with the prophetic vision of God, the suffering of finite man takes on infinitely tragic significance, the agony of a passing generation becomes a matter of eternal import. We have an echo of that terrible prophetic passion in William Blake's,

"The soldier arm'd with sword and gun,  
Palsied strikes the summer's sun."

It is not simply the butchery of man by his brother man, but the fact that such butchery is an offense against the cosmic whole that arouses Blake's soul. Slavery becomes an ultimate abomination when Whittier cries:

"Who bids for God's own image?"

Now this means that prophetic preaching is never primarily concerned with the advocacy of any program of reform or with the defense of any given system, and that for two reasons. First of all, every such program is seen over against the eternal perfection of God. The preacher of the Word of God is free from that kind of orthodoxy which sees any system, proposed or actual, in politics, economics, or even in religion, as final and absolute. And second, the preacher knows that the kingdom of God is not to be brought in by human agencies alone, that God's own hand is at work and that without Him man can do nothing. The plans of men and the systems they create are useless unless God is using them, and the preacher is more concerned with preparing the way for the divine Spirit than in perfecting a mechanism through which human beings can act. He knows that waiting upon the Lord, while it is much less spectacular than managing a campaign, is much nearer the true wisdom of the prophet.

The preacher is never a pale neutral in the struggle for righteousness, but neither is he a partisan. Hence he is delivered from fear on the one hand and fanaticism on the other. For the man who sees in the actually existing system the perfect expression of the will of God must be in fear when that system is seen to be shaken by the assaults of worldly forces. Augustine's contemporaries were in despair over the fall of the city which they had thought to be eternal. But the great Bishop did not share their despair, because he saw that the eternal city was no earthly empire, was not the city of the Caesars, but the city of God. It is he who sees in any system not the eternal but the passing form under which it is all too imperfectly manifested, who can

"Heartily know  
When half-gods go  
The gods arrive."

From fear springs fanaticism. For an endangered Absolute indeed men may burn their brother's body for the good of his soul, and one man or many men, though innocent, may be made to perish for the good of the perfect system. To defend a perfect constitution in which the absolute ideal of government is flawlessly expressed that constitution itself may be violated. It is fanaticism which always plagues the Church, when it mistakes itself for the kingdom of God; or the State, when it makes the same mistake of imagining that it embodies the Absolute Value. It is this fanaticism which is making tragic spectacles of Russia, and of Italy, and of Germany, and which has not left America untouched by its plague. Americans need to be told that the American way is not the perfect way of the Eternal God and it is by the foolishness of preaching that they must be told. For if anything is to be read in the insane spectacle presented by contemporary history, it is that only in the prophetic message is there to be found an adequate corrective for the multiplied fanaticisms of mankind. Conservatives and radicals are alike in this; they need to be faced with the vision of the Eternal from which flow both strength and humility. Otherwise there is always a lack of poise and sanity, a tendency for conservatism to degenerate into reaction, for radicalism to become class tyranny, for the preaching of the gospel to become social propaganda.

Once the social gospel becomes a matter of the advocacy of any particular social system, it ceases to be the Christian gospel and that because

it tends to leave God out. Either he is left out entirely, as in the case of Communism which replaces Him with a mechanical dialectic, or the term God becomes a symbol of forces which are to be understood and manipulated rather than a name for a Being who is to be followed and worshiped and loved. The preacher of the true social gospel will base his message on a sure vision of God, and his hope on God as working hitherto and still working in the life of men. He will know that without God the efforts of man can end only in the deification of an imperfection which sooner or later will mock their hopes with the sense of frustration which is the lot of those who are without God and hence ultimately without hope in the world.

Preaching based on such conceptions will not please either the die-hard conservative or the root-and-branch radical. It will seem like folly even to the average man, who can understand the conservative or the radical because they talk in terms which at least approach those of practical politics, while the preacher with his talk of the Eternal, and his insistence that the Sermon on the Mount is the final authority, not only for faith but also for practice (the use of the words faith and practice as though they could be disjoined is, by the way, without New Testament warrant), is quite obviously Utopian. But in the long run, and the preacher is concerned with the long run, there is no other way of salvation. Fascist and Communist, conservative and radical, all alike are building on the sands of an over-optimistic humanism. And if the preacher of this divine foolishness is reproached by some of his brethren with a lack of realism, which is the contemporary ecclesiastical way of telling a man that he is talking nonsense, he can refer them to the case of Jeremiah.

#### IV

But there is so much folly in the world that a plea for more of it may well seem like perilous stuff. And so it is. Hence such a plea must close on a note of warning. The New-Testament kind of folly is divine wisdom and hence is not something to be easily achieved or lightly claimed. It is very easy to mistake one's own native or acquired silliness or crankiness or exhibitionism for the foolishness of the gospel. Hence the man who preaches a message which is to the world folly must not feel that he is in any sense released from the obligation to use every last atom of intellectual power and common sense which he has. Quite on the other hand, he is

under an added responsibility to show himself a workman that needeth not to be ashamed, rightly dividing the word of truth. He who preaches a message which is to the world foolishness must all the more set himself to the most rigorous study and the most relentless kind of hard thinking. Saint Paul could hardly be refused credit for intellectual powers of the first rank, even by his harshest critics. When he confronted the intellectuals of Athens it was a case of a first rank mind meeting with a whole multitude of fourth or fifth-rate men, and in the long run his rejection by the Athenians reflects only upon them. The preacher of the foolishness of the gospel will not be able to escape the accusation of obscurantism but he can and must see to it that the accusation is not justified. He can do what always needs doing; he can show that there is a true rationalism which the wisdom of the world always tends to forget. He can show that it is the foolishness of the preaching which will preserve the way to the truth if it is preserved at all.

Similarly, the preacher must be sure that he does not offend against true culture. Only when culture, usurping the place of goodness and of truth, becomes a shield for self-indulgence does it become a snare. Then it is that the truth which the Puritans dared to preach needs to be preached again, and men must be told that without God they are lost in a lost world, that nothing can take the place of truth, that there is no substitute for righteousness. But this does not excuse a preacher for using bad English, or for countenancing the building of an ugly church, or for conducting his services without due regard for order. There is much preaching which is more boorish than foolish. That holiness which is without beauty may well be under suspicion.

It is easy, too, to see how this conception of the gospel can be twisted into an abandonment of that appeal for justice, that interest in the progress of the masses toward a more adequate share of the material goods of life, without which talk of liberty is a mockery. It is true enough that many of those who decry the social gospel are fond of demanding a return to the New-Testament simplicity of the Christian message. But at the heart of that simplicity stands the cross of Him who came not to be served but to serve, and to give His life as a ransom for men. Can any one with that majestic and terrible simplicity really gripping his heart rest content with a system which, no matter how comfortable it may be for him, dooms multitudes to dreary drudgery, to sordid and dingy living conditions, to all the agony of anxiety which is wrapped up in the dread word unemployment?

Can any one stand by the cross of the Great Sufferer and say that the long anguish of mankind is inevitable, that multitudes of those for whom Christ freely died are doomed by the nature of the Father's world to live amid conditions that stunt their growth and twist their souls? No, the foolishness of preaching will not let Dives rest in comfort while Lazarus is ministered to by the dogs. It is not the preaching of the cross which will blunt the edge of the weapons of him who fights for social justice.

But it will guard his heart against that hate which is turning Spain into a shambles. The only thing that can prevent that same thing happening in any country is the planting in the midst of all the strife the true cross in the shadow of which all men must realize that they are but sinners, that no man has aught in which to glory save in that which all have in common—the gracious heritage of the love of God in Christ Jesus our Lord. When the Church knows, as the Spanish Church apparently does not know, that she is not an end in herself but only an instrument in the hand of God for salvation, she is not likely to appear to the masses as the tool of privilege and the bulwark of oppression. But it takes the inspired foolishness of the gospel to build a church which is willing to throw away its wealth and to see with more alarm than gratification its endowments growing greater and thereby making stronger the links which bind it to the established order. The preaching of the gospel of foolishness must be matched with an equal folly in the way in which the preacher and the Church live. What would it have profited Saint Paul had he not been able to say with noble folly, "From henceforth let no man trouble me: for I bear in my body the marks of the Lord Jesus."

And the validation of the foolishness of our preaching must be that plainly and visibly we are bearing our own cross. For the gospel does not command us to bear the cross of Christ—He bore that once and for all. We bear in our bodies the marks of the Lord Jesus when we bear our own cross, the cross that the world will thrust in mockery upon our shoulders as we, following our Master, espouse the unpopular causes and tread the unfrequented straight and narrow ways. To the which they who would be heralds of the cross are called.



## Walter Rauschenbusch

VERNON P. BODEIN

**A**T the heart of the social gospel of Walter Rauschenbusch is a mutual interpenetration and reaction of social and religious influences. Rauschenbusch cannot be understood without reference to the personal religious life that was so strong in him. Until he was about twenty-five years old this was of the orthodox German Baptist type. He was brought up in a very religious family which engaged daily in the worship of God. At about the age of seventeen he underwent a religious experience that changed his outlook upon life. He felt that he ought to be a preacher and save souls and live literally by the teachings and example of Jesus. The thought that every Christian ought to participate in the dying of Jesus and in that way help to redeem humanity gave his life its fundamental direction in the doing of Christian work.

Graduating from the Rochester Theological Seminary in 1886 he sought appointment as a foreign missionary, but the Society rejected him because his Old Testament professor had some doubt that he was doctrinally sound. Rauschenbusch then accepted the call of the Second German Baptist Church of New York City, located on West Forty-fifth Street on the borders of what was known as "Hell's Kitchen." He felt that he ought to do something for people, but did not know what to do. His idea was to save souls in the accepted religious sense. He had no acquaintance with social ills or problems, but here among the poor working people of his church and neighborhood his social education began. Experiences during this pastorate served to increase his social sense and to confirm his judgment that something was radically wrong with the social system. In the face of such conditions as he found, Rauschenbusch discovered that when he sought to apply his previous religious ideas they did not fit. He went to the Bible and became convinced that his social concern was in keeping with the teachings and ideals of Jesus. Then he began to write for newspapers and his ideas began to clear up. Here is what he faced: on the one hand he had his own personal religious life, and on the other he had caught a larger social outlook. This social vision had not come through the Church. In fact, his social interest was held down for years by the Church. He felt that he needed a unity of life and desired a faith that would cover his whole

life and include all his interests. His difficulty was how to find a place under the old religious conceptions for the task of changing the world, of making it more righteous, more brotherly. The idea of the kingdom of God offered itself to him as a solution for his problem. This concept was strangely satisfying and he felt a new security in his social impulses. From thenceforth all his work was inspired and guided by the concept of the kingdom of God which came to mean for him the social gospel itself.

In December, 1887, Rauschenbusch wrote his first paper on social issues—a description and a short biography of Henry George, who was running for the office of Mayor at the time when Rauschenbusch first came to New York. He was greatly influenced by Henry George and in this paper can be seen the roots of his own position on natural resources and monopolies. Bellamy's *Looking Backward* was defended by Rauschenbusch against an editorial attack in *The Inquirer*. Mazzini influenced Rauschenbusch very much. He regarded the former's *Essays* as a "book of religion."

Rauschenbusch became associated in his social thinking with two other young ministers in New York, Leighton Williams, pastor of the Amity Baptist Church, and Nathaniel Schmidt of the Swedish Baptist Church, later a professor at Colgate University and then at Cornell University. The idea of a true society of Jesus in which individual ambitions should be subordinated to a common and lofty aim took hold of the minds of these three young men. Some three years later, in 1892, together with the Reverend Samuel Z. Batten, of Philadelphia, and some others, they formed The Brotherhood of the Kingdom "in order to re-establish this idea in the thought of the Church and to assist in its practical realization in the world."

In 1889 Rauschenbusch and Williams, together with Elizabeth Post and J. E. Raymond, started a monthly periodical entitled *For the Right*. This paper, published in the interests of the working people of New York City, proposed to discuss, from the standpoint of Christian socialism, the needs, longings, and aspirations of the working class. Rauschenbusch, in the years 1890-1891, had an article in practically every edition, writing on economic and industrial issues, on politics, on separation of Church and State, on religion, and the kingdom of God.

Rauschenbusch evidently found that it was a hard task to arouse the working people to a consideration of the whole social question. He wrote an appeal for workers to consider the social and industrial problems that the mechanization of industry would present and pleaded with them not to

treat the problem too lightly, and, on the other hand, not to regard the case as hopeless. He told them that the lesson that could be learned from strikes is that ideas are powerful, that while men were prone to laugh at such books as *Looking Backward* or *Progress and Poverty*, ideas were more powerful than dynamite and a thousand times more helpful.

The editors of *For the Right* believed that men back of reform must themselves have clean hands. For this reason they did not endorse the Citizens' Movement in New York City in 1890. The men behind the movement were apparently "respectable" men as measured by the public standards of the day, but the editors of *For the Right* considered that some of the men who were in the movement made great fortunes by notoriously corrupt methods. They felt that reforms could only succeed when pure men inaugurated them, and that while they wanted social, political, and religious reform, they wanted clean men behind the movement.

As early as 1889 Rauschenbusch was speaking before church bodies on economic and industrial issues. At a meeting of the Baptist Congress in Toronto, Canada, in November, 1889, he spoke on "Natural and Artificial Monopolies," insisting that the latter ought not to exist and that any law that created them should be repealed. He stood absolutely opposed to individual ownership, believing they should be owned and managed by the community to which they really belong.

From 1892 on, Rauschenbusch directed practically all of his social activity into the work of the Brotherhood of the Kingdom, especially while he was a pastor in New York City. Up until 1897, and possibly later, he was the Corresponding Secretary. He was also a member of its executive committee. An essay on "The Kingdom of God" which he read before the first conference of the Brotherhood at Marlborough in 1893 set forth the aims of the Brotherhood and discussed the changes through which the idea of the kingdom of God had gone in the history of Christianity. In another article written in this same year, Rauschenbusch discusses the origin and purpose of the Brotherhood, and says,<sup>1</sup>

"We desire to see the Kingdom of God once more the great object of Christian preaching; the inspiration of Christian hymnology; the foundation of systematic theology; the enduring motive of evangelistic and missionary work; the religious inspiration of social work and the social outcome of a religious inspiration; the object to which a Christian man surrenders his life, and in that surrender saves it to eternal life; the common object in which all religious bodies find their unity; the great

<sup>1</sup> Rauschenbusch, Walter, "The Brotherhood of the Kingdom," *National Baptist*, sometime in 1893.

synthesis in which the regeneration of Spirit, the enlightenment of the intellect, the development of the body, the reform of political life, the sanctification of industrial life, and all that concerns the redemption of humanity shall be embraced."

One of the first tasks to which the Brotherhood set itself was the compilation of a series of essays on the Kingdom in its various relations. The writers of these articles met at Marlborough, New York, the summer home of the mother of Leighton Williams, in August, 1893. This discussion was considered so profitable that it was agreed to meet at the same time in the same place the following year. The second meeting was so largely attended and excited such public interest, that the third conference in 1895 was thrown open to any who were interested, and after that the yearly conferences were public.

Before the third annual conference of the Brotherhood in 1895, Rauschenbusch discussed the elements and tendencies of the social movement in which all Christians should concur, and what seemed to him to be the danger points of the whole social movement. The former he finds to be the conviction that every human being has inherent worth, and the principle of fellowship or association. The dangers are: the menace to individual liberty in the schemes of socialism, the impairing of the stability and importance of family life, the internationalism of social reformers with the consequent lessening of emphasis on the love of the fatherland, the hope that was being put in revolution, and the practical materialism of so many social reformers. It was natural that the question of the relation of the Brotherhood to socialism would be raised. In considering Rauschenbusch's position on this question one has to distinguish between socialism as a theory and movement and its political expression as a party. He never belonged to the Socialist party; he did believe in socialism. By socialism he meant the converting of society into a free and equal co-operative commonwealth where every person should have an equal chance to make a living and enjoy the comforts of life.<sup>2</sup> Socialism, he thought, contributes a new sense of social sin. It gives a feeling of complicity and responsibility for the sins of society in which all have shared. Rauschenbusch believed in organized socialism and in the utility of the Socialist party. He felt, however, that socialism, in its organized form, is but one section of a far larger movement which he preferred to designate as "collectivism." By this he meant "emphasis upon public welfare and public right, rather than private welfare

<sup>2</sup>Rauschenbusch, Walter, "The Social Movement and the Higher Life in Our Country," 1899.

and private right, and a desire to increase the amount of public property as against private property."<sup>3</sup>

D. R. Sharpe tells that a year or so after the appearance of his first book, a socialist leader stopped off at Rochester and urged Walter Rauschenbusch to join the party, but he did not agree with all the tenets of the party and did not deem it expedient to join, though his relations were friendly.<sup>4</sup> Rauschenbusch did, however, belong to the Christian Socialist Fellowship and was a member of its executive committee. This was a fellowship of socialist Christians who believed in socialism as a movement which promised social and industrial salvation, and which in its ideals approximated the economic gospel of the kingdom of God. Rauschenbusch believed in socialism as a movement which approached to a considerable degree his ideal of the kingdom of God, but, on the other hand, he could not agree with all the beliefs of the organized political expression of socialism.

An insistence on a combination of personal regeneration and political-social reform characterized Rauschenbusch's early thinking and this synthesis was consistently carried through his whole life. He felt that Christians must change the economic system in order to be able to live with their religious faith, but at the same time must strengthen their religion in order to be able to change the economic order. Rauschenbusch opposed the idea of social reformers that if only poverty and the fear of poverty could be abolished, men would cease to be grasping, selfish, overbearing, and sensual. He differed from many Christian men and women in his insistence on good institutions and the inadequacy of personal conversion alone.

Rauschenbusch's social gospel had a firm religious, one might say evangelistic, basis. This probably accounts for the fact that he was selected by the New York State Conference on Religion to speak before it on November 20, 1900, on personal religion, though at that time he was becoming well known for his social work. He reminded the conference that the increment of moral force must come from religion, and that in this search for a religious ideal that would be large enough to include social as well as individual salvation, there is danger of the personal religious life's being overshadowed. It is true that saving the individual does not necessarily save the common life, but it is just as true that saving the common life does not

<sup>3</sup> Rauschenbusch, Walter, "The Trend Toward Collectivism," *City Club Bulletin*, Chicago, April 19, 1912.

<sup>4</sup> Unpublished manuscript. (D. R. Sharpe was Rauschenbusch's secretary from 1907-1911).



save the individual. A human soul, he insisted, is of eternal value for its own sake, and not merely for the effect it may have upon society.<sup>5</sup>

In 1904 Rauschenbusch wrote an article which expressed dissatisfaction with the old evangelism and called for a new evangelism. He reminded the Church that it was not strange that humanity, amid the pressure of great social problems, fails to be stirred or guided by statements of truths which were adequate at one time but not pertinent now. In summarizing the powerlessness of the old evangelism, Rauschenbusch declares that the Church lacks an ethical imperative which could induce repentance; that in private life its standard differs little from mere respectability; that in commerce and industry it has no clear message and often claims to be under no obligation to have one. The Church suffers, he said, from the general resentment against the class with which it is largely identified. Rauschenbusch made his diagnosis in a spirit of personal repentance and heart-searching and not in a spirit of condemnation, feeling that all bear their share of the guilt.<sup>6</sup>

A report of an address given by Rauschenbusch before the tenth annual session of the Baptist Congress, at Philadelphia, in May, 1892, presents his position on the relation of the pulpit to social and political reform. He reasserts his conviction that the whole aim of Christ is embraced in the words, "The Kingdom of God." In this ideal is gathered the sanctification of all life, the regeneration of humanity, and the reformation of all social institutions. If there are any false convictions concerning any relation of life, the first thing for the Church to do is to spread right convictions, for its fundamental work is the dissemination of ideas and the spread of convictions. The Church should treat social and political issues when there is a question of righteousness involved, and should not concern itself when the matter is one of technical regard. The Church should treat moral questions before they become political issues. When questions of righteousness become political issues, however, the Church might have to throw its weight on one side or the other. At such times prudent conservatism might be more un-Christlike and more dangerous than headlong impetuosity.

"How Rich Have I a Right To be?" is the title of an article written by Rauschenbusch and published in several periodicals in 1894. His thesis is that the rightfulness or wrongfulness of wealth does not primarily lie

<sup>5</sup> Rauschenbusch, Walter, *Religion, the Life of God in the Soul of Man* (pamphlet), 1900.

<sup>6</sup> Rauschenbusch, Walter, "The New Evangelism," *The Independent*, May 12, 1904.

in the amount of wealth a man has, but in the relations which he sustains to God, to himself, and his fellow men in acquiring or retaining his fortune. These relations set limits to the amount a man may possess. There is the limit of justice. No man has a right to wealth he has not justly acquired. "We confine our discussion of wealth too much to the Christian law of giving and leave the Christian law of taking untouched." There is the limit of management. This is a limit beyond which the highest efficiency in the interests of humanity cannot go. There is also the limit of self-development. Up to a certain degree, wealth gives opportunities for self-development, but men decay when wealth accumulates, for it still remains true that man cannot serve simultaneously God and Mammon. Finally, there are the limits of love. In conclusion, Rauschenbusch says:<sup>7</sup>

"How rich have I a right to be? Not as rich as I can. I must cut off that I might acquire by the private appropriation of public powers and by the legal, but yet unjust exploitation of the labor of others. Next, I must limit myself to a fortune that I can really administer for others. Third, I must not let my money interfere with the full development of my personality. Fourth, I must not let my wealth come between me and the heart of my brother. And, finally, as long as my brother is in want, I must not allow myself the enjoyment of greater wealth than will keep myself and my family in the best working order for the service of humanity."

The restrained passion of a man aroused by an unfair and bitter denunciation of a just cause is seen in Rauschenbusch's reply to an article by Dr. A. J. Behrends on the Brooklyn strike of street-car employees in 1895. The men were right in striking, he declares, and the Brooklyn strike was the sudden discharge of wrath which the corporation had been storing up for itself by a long course of wrong. Apparently the only weapon that Doctor Behrends left to labor was the freedom of contract. Rauschenbusch answers:<sup>8</sup>

"Freedom of contract works justice only between equals. Freedom of contract between modern corporations and isolated working men is the freedom of contract between the lion and the lamb, when the lamb has the option between being put inside the lion or having the lion put outside it."

Doctor Behrends protested against the ill-treatment of the scab. Rauschenbusch replies that it is not a question of the right of the scab to earn bread, but of his right to secure that bread by sacrificing the bread and the rights

<sup>7</sup> *The Examiner*, May 10, 1894, also in *Altruistic Review*, Chicago, August, 1894.

<sup>8</sup> Rauschenbusch, Walter, "The Brooklyn Strike," *The Christian Work* (N. Y.), April 25, 1895.

and hopes of his fellow men. "Men may pity the scab and excuse him, but Doctor Behrends will never teach them to see a hero in him, and it would be an ill day for humanity if he could." He challenges Behrends' contention that the workingman had a sane and ready means of redress in the courts, and closes the article with two questions troubling to him:

"First, can it be fairly shown that, since Homestead, we as a nation have learned anything substantial about the settlement of labor troubles, except greater promptness in their suppression? Second, has the militia or the regular army ever been called out to protect the working people against the invasion of their rights by their employers? If not, is it because there has been no invasion of their rights equal in gravity to the wrongs committed by the men at Homestead or Brooklyn?"

In the realm of the relation of the State to the existing social and economic order, an article by Rauschenbusch in 1898 is interesting because it might well have been written in this third decade of the twentieth century. He points out that there are three possible lines of action in the relation of the State to the economic order: on the one extreme, economic individualism; on the other socialism; and between the two state interference or paternalism which seeks to stand on the basis of individualism, but mitigating its evil by measures borrowed from socialism.<sup>9</sup> Analyzing existing conditions, he concludes that there were many examples of state help or paternalism in government, though many were not recognized as such. Admitting that there were many serious objections against state help, such as people's learning to rely on state relief and thus growing less energetic, cautious, and self-reliant, he maintains there are other more serious objections against a policy of unrestricted *laissez-faire*. For one thing, there must be paternal interference, as it is often called, to protect labor against capital. Also, "the sacred name of freedom has been largely used of late by those who were not formerly its friends, to uphold a very different cause, namely, the sanctity of vested interests." Rauschenbusch believed that past experience demanded a fearless trial of state ownership of natural monopolies where state interference yields no remedy. However, to those who are afraid of socialism, dissatisfied with paternalism, and desirous of the largest measure of industrial individualism, he offers three suggestions:<sup>10</sup>

"See that any lingering inequalities in our laws are abolished, so that if the workingman is to fight for himself, he will at least not have to fight with one hand

<sup>9</sup> Rauschenbusch, Walter, "State Help Versus Self-Help; or Paternalism in Government," Article I, *The Standard*, December 24, 1898, p. 316.

<sup>10</sup> Rauschenbusch, Walter, *Ibid.*, Article II, *The Standard*, December 31, 1898, p. 336.

strapped to his back. Help self-help. Help co-operative stores and profit-sharing along; offer your services for the peaceful settlement of labor disputes; extend the organization of labor, back up just strikes. Strengthen public opinion in its demands for justice and humanity."

Rauschenbusch believed that there was danger of a more informal and insidious union of Church and State in the relation of the Church to money power than that against which the founders of this country stood. In this question he finds a number of symptoms that seem to prevent giving the Church a clean bill of health: that the teaching on wealth was not only infrequent, but timid and indefinite; that the Church has no discipline that guards against covetousness; that the influence of wealth is strong both in the churches themselves and in civic-religious work; and that the Church furnishes little leadership in movements for social righteousness. To remedy this situation, fearless thinking and faithful preaching is needed.<sup>11</sup>

"There are still five brothers of Dives in the land of the living. Let us see that they get Moses and the prophets undiluted. We must cease to sing the half-true lullaby of consecrated wealth and stewardship, and tell men that they imperil their souls and decrease their usefulness by making money unjustly and hoarding it after they have it. We must create a new public opinion in the Christian community, which shall exercise a strong hand of pressure in the direction of justice and mercy, and shall be satisfied with no substitute for Christ's own code of ethics."

In the early years of Rauschenbusch's pastorate in New York he had to restudy the Bible to find out Christ's teaching on the problems of life. In an article written in 1899 on "Social Ideas in the New Testament," there is definite expression of his thoughts on this subject during the ten years or so that had gone before.<sup>12</sup> He writes that if all the passages on property in the sayings of Jesus were to be cut out and put together, they would exceed in mere bulk his teachings on any other question of ethics. Also, "they would be conspicuous by a severity of tone not found in the treatment of other evils, except insincerity and hypocrisy." Jesus told his disciples that it was next to impossible for a rich man to enter the kingdom of God. The difficulty with understanding this statement is that one confuses "enter the kingdom of God" with "go to heaven." The statement should be paraphrased "How hard it is for a rich man to live a right life."

It is a hard thing for a man to become wealthy without offending against justice and the finer shades of honesty and truthfulness, and without developing the ac-

<sup>11</sup> Rauschenbusch, Walter, "The Church and Money Power," *Proceedings of the Baptist Congress*, XI: 10-17 (1893).

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, *The Treasury*, June, 1899.

quisitive instinct at the expense of the nobler faculties of the soul; it is hard for a man to possess even wealth inherited from another, without drifting into luxurious habits, associating with idle people, and being alienated from his poorer fellows and ceasing to be a brother of men."

As one reads the thought of Rauschenbusch as it is expressed in articles, addresses, essays, one feels that these are more alive than some of his published books. Of such a character is his address on "The Corporate Life of Humanity," delivered in 1895 and 1896.<sup>18</sup> In this he considers the problem raised by the fact that men suffer the consequences of sin they themselves never committed. He thinks of humanity as a collective, organic life, rather than as a group of different individuals. There are two moral beings, both dear to the heart of God: man and humanity. Every human life is precious in God's sight, and Christianity has taught men to regard with solemn awe the human soul, its worth, its dangers, and its possible destiny. But behind every individual there arises another ethical personality, "shadowy and vast; a macrocosmos, which also struggles and learns and sins and suffers, and rises or falls, and in whose heart heaven and hell have fought for supremacy in a conflict that has lasted for ages and will last till the holy city of God is built on earth." That is humanity. There are consequences of this conception for ethical thought, says Rauschenbusch, for if the individual is a member of a larger ethical organism which affects his life, this will have to be considered in judging the ethical value of actions of individuals. This collective conception results in the consequent realization that only a small part of a man's moral views and motives have been wrought out by himself. One of the most important consequences of this collective conception for society is that the latter has a part in the guilt of its members to the degree that the collective life offers any temptation or fails to give a good opportunity to live a moral life. If society, in its collective life, has a collective conscience and consciousness, then every one owes a duty to this collective life, Rauschenbusch contends. Since the morality or immorality of the life of society influences the individual life, the person who is primarily concerned with the saving of souls should not neglect this factor. Christians must learn that the individual is not saved in the fullest sense of the term as long as the collective life is not also saved.

<sup>18</sup> This unpublished address was delivered, according to a notation in the handwriting of Rauschenbusch, on the last page of the German manuscript, before the "Germania" of the Rochester Theological Seminary in October, 1895. The President of the Seminary, Dr. A. H. Strong, asked him to give it in English the following year before the whole seminary, and wrote a very enthusiastic commendation on the last page of the English manuscript.



The advancement of the collective life of humanity was the aim of Rauschenbusch. However, in this interest in the community he did not belittle the individual member of the group. He placed emphasis upon the individual as the unit of force in the social movement and considered that one's personality, his individuality, was worth more than anything else in social life, that it was not only one's most valuable asset, but the most valuable contribution one could make to society.

The life and work of Walter Rauschenbusch can be divided into three sections, the first of which extends to about 1892, when his thought about the linking of social work with personal religious experience resulted in the formation of the Brotherhood of the Kingdom. The next period is that between 1893 and 1907, when his thought on the kingdom of God and social problems was maturing, and during which time (1897) he assumed his professorship in the Rochester Theological Seminary. The last period dates from about 1907 to 1918, when he became famous as a leader in the social gospel movement, and published seven books, three of which were major works in this field of social religion.

Beginning his pastorate in New York in 1886 with only the idea of saving souls in the ordinarily accepted religious sense, Rauschenbusch developed in his social thinking so that, from about 1889 on, he stood for Christian union of churches, historical study of the Bible with especial reference to social problems, for purer politics, for abolition of privilege, for the rights of the people against corporations, for Christian socialism, and for the pre-eminence of the kingdom of God in Christian thought.<sup>14</sup>

Outstanding in the life of Rauschenbusch was his personal religion. He had, as it has been pointed out, an intense and emotional conversion experience that led him consciously to dedicate his life to follow Jesus no matter what it cost. He always regarded his work as that of an evangelist, and considered that it was in keeping with the evangelical tradition of the Church. D. R. Sharpe, who was his secretary from 1907-1911, tells that one day in Chicago, while they were waiting for a train, Rauschenbusch turned to him and asked him in what way he thought of his work. Sharpe answered that he always thought of him as an evangelist. "Rauschenbusch threw his arms around me," said Sharpe, "and with deep emotion said that

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Letter written to the 1907 Conference of the Brotherhood of the Kingdom, and published in *The Kingdom*, Volume I, Number 2, September, 1907.

he had always wanted to be thought of in that way."<sup>15</sup> This desire on the part of Rauschenbusch is revealed in his thoughts on evangelism and the personal religious life. Of course, it was not the "revivalistic" type of evangelism. It was a deep, spiritual movement in his whole life.

Born in Rochester, N. Y., on October 4, 1861, Walter Rauschenbusch lived through that period of American life bounded by the Civil War and the World War. The latter broke out two years after Rauschenbusch published his second major book, *Christianizing the Social Order*, in 1912. Social Christianity was practically forgotten amid the war concerns of all Christendom. Rauschenbusch kept on working during the early years of the war, but it affected him deeply and well nigh broke his heart. An insight into the personality of this man is afforded by some sentences from his "instructions in case of my death":<sup>16</sup>

"I leave my love to those of my friends whose souls have never grown dark against me. I forgive the others and hate no man. For my many errors and weaknesses I hope to be forgiven by my fellows.

"I had long prayed God not to let me be stranded in a lonesome and useless old age, and if this is the meaning of my present illness, I shall take it as a loving mercy of God toward his servant. Since 1914 the world is full of hate, and I cannot expect to be happy again in my lifetime. I had hoped to write several books which have been in my mind, but doubtless others can do the work better.

"The only pang is to part from my loved ones, and no longer to be able to stand by them and smooth their way. For the rest I go gladly, for I have carried a heavy handicap for thirty years and have worked hard."

It is certainly very probable that, with all his bitter disappointment at the way his social ideals had seemingly been crushed by the catastrophe of the World War, Rauschenbusch would have arisen after the war to carry on his work. But death claimed him before the end of the war. Suffering from an incurable disease, he went to the Johns Hopkins Hospital, Baltimore, in the spring of 1918. He died on July 25, 1918, and was buried in Mt. Hope Cemetery, Rochester, N. Y.

<sup>15</sup> A personal anecdote, told to the writer in November, 1935, by Dr. Doris A. Sharpe, Secretary of the Cleveland Baptist Association, Cleveland, Ohio.

<sup>16</sup> Excerpt sent to the writer by Mrs. Walter Rauschenbusch in March, 1935. The heavy handicap referred to was his deafness.

# The Crock of Gold

J. FREDERIC BERG

AT the foot of the rainbow, according to immemorial tradition, there lies hidden a crock of gold. The tradition may be ridiculed, of course, but ridicule is not disproof. Captain Kidd no doubt buried treasure which no one has ever found. Until someone steps on the rainbow's toes and then demonstrates by actual digging that no crock of gold is there, the tradition, while questioned and denied, remains unrefuted.

As in the case of depravity, man, "both by nature and by practice," is an inveterate searcher after hidden treasure. If this legend of the crock of gold does not stir cupidity, at least it awakens a certain languid interest as to what imputed values have served to keep the story alive. The explanation may be crude or subtle, absurdly false or eternally true, depending on whether we regard the myth as potential fact or as a philosophy of life.

## I

It is of course within the range of possibilities that the story of the crock of gold originated as a practical joke, and is but the invention of a not too brilliant humorist. Some credulous oaf is started off on a futile quest for the treasure hidden at the rainbow's foot by the solemn assurance of some local wit that a fortune is there for the digging. The story is too good to keep and is passed from door to door. The *dramatis personae* are soon forgotten, but the story lives. It is the tale of a fool's quest. A first adventure in "boondoggling." A fantastic short-cut to prosperity. Grotesque mistakes that cost us nothing may scintillate with humor. The progress of culture might be measured in part by what the world of any particular age considers funny. Much that is labeled "comic," whether in literature or in pictures, is but the story of a blunder or mishap. This is primitive. Being in some respects a primitive book, the Old Testament repeatedly resounds with laughter, but with laughter that is not pleasant. "He that sitteth in the heavens shall laugh," but his laugh is devoid of humor and is but the expression of ridicule and scorn. The funny man of the Bible is Samson, whose crude jokes and mad pranks were most amusing to those who were not their object. The funny book of the Bible is the

book of Esther. That the violent doings or schemings of Haman should come down upon his own pate was the height of the ridiculous. Even that seemingly spiritual injunction in Proverbs: "If thine enemy hunger feed him; if he thirst give him drink," crumbles to dust when the motive for such philanthropy is disclosed to be: "for thereby thou shalt heap coals of fire on his head." That is to say, it is all a great joke. The hungry enemy fairly purrs with satisfaction as his hunger is appeased and his thirst assuaged, the acme of comfort reached. Coddle your enemy into a sense of security, then douse him with coals of fire and see him writhe. What could be more ludicrous than that!

Next to physical disaster obscenity holds front rank as a form of humor. When the sweetly chaste Scheherazade had finished the detailed relation of some particularly dirty story, the great Harun-al-Rashid would roll on his back, overcome by inextinguishable laughter. The body of Harun-al-Rashid lies a-mouldering in his grave, but his sense of humor goes snickering on. Perhaps in some such fashion the serpent beguiled Eve, who in turn regaled her husband. Both were chuckling when the sound of divine footsteps robbed the story of its humor. "Why were you just now laughing?" is the inquiry. "Oh," replies Adam, "we were just laughing at these funny aprons Eve made." Then the story comes out, is traced to its source, and the serpent is made to eat dirt.

The world's greatest humorists have usually found satisfactory material in gross exaggeration. This accounts for much of the humor of Mark Twain and of Charles Dickens and Charles Lamb as well. In the sphere of speech burlesque holds the same inferior rank which is held by the practical joke in the realm of conduct. Each is a primitive as well as modern form of wit. It is impossible to credit the human race with symmetrical mental development so long as with some of its brain cells it ponders the fourth dimension and with another set of cells laughs with equal mirth at a libel or a fall.

The finest types of humor are those which reveal an unexpected truth with the help of an alert mind and nimble tongue and are usually ethical in character. Alike the practical joker, the salacious story, and the exaggerated burlesque carry with them implications suggesting a low standard of morality. Courtesy, if nothing more, finds nothing amusing in an accident or experience which if actually enacted would be either injurious or mortifying. To find food for laughter in any of these popular sources of amuse-

ment is to be oblivious to, or to ignore, their underlying ethics, and neither of these suppositions reflects great credit upon either the humorist or his audience.

Few cartoonists have been more deservedly popular than the late Mr. Briggs. His "Mr. and Mrs.," "Days of Real Sport," "When a Fellow Needs a Friend" portray no physical misadventures, convey no indecent suggestion nor glorify facetious falsehoods. They depict humanity as it is, its foibles but also its redeeming traits, and the pictures are funny because they are so true.

The world, perhaps, has not yet reached that refinement of humor which permits its intimate association with religion as its vehicle. Yet if this is humor, to reveal unexpected truth with the help of an alert mind and nimble tongue, then Jesus was the world's greatest humorist. Nothing has ever surpassed those verbal cartoons we call "The Parables" as a delineation of human nature, both in its weaknesses and its possibilities. We have these stories, no doubt, in greatly condensed form, but it is easy to conceive their amplification with detail so true as to be humorous. Dr. DeWitt Talmage used to retell these parables, such as "The Lost Sheep," "The Pharisee and the Publican," "The Prodigal Son," amplified by such detail as his fertile imagination suggested, and make his audience rock with laughter. While one would hesitate to affirm that in such fashion the parables were originally told, still Talmage's achievements, which on the whole were not irreverent, at least prove that humor is not wholly alien to their character.

Without pressing that point, it will be admitted that none has revealed unexpected truth with such startling clearness as did Jesus. "Ye tithe mint, anise and cummin and neglect the weightier matters of the law," a statement which put in modern language might mean: "You are generous with your salt, pepper and horseradish, while reducing a neighbor's reputation to a decimal." Again, when Jesus refers to "the righteous that need no repentance" he is employing irony which is the refinement of humor. Irony assumes to be true what ought to be true but which everyone knows is not true. From the personal standpoint the defect in Jesus' humor is not its subtlety but its truth. We have not yet reached the point where we can thoroughly appreciate a joke that is on ourselves. Religion as humor is handicapped by our sensitiveness. Truth loses much of its point by the necessity of remaining impersonal. Its peculiar style of humor is in advance



of the present day. The progress of culture may be measured by the world's sense of humor.

## II

Now of course this legend of the Crock of Gold may have a very different origin. It may be the effort of a philosopher to present in pictorial form that foible of humanity which leads him to attach fictitious value to that which he finds desirable, but elusive; for which reason he minimizes findings and magnifies losses.

Anyone taking the trouble for a few consecutive days to glance over the "Lost and Found" column in the daily paper cannot fail to be impressed by several obtrusive facts. For one thing, the most cursory examination will disclose the preponderance of things lost over things found. Over against some fifty articles reported "lost" will stand no more than half a dozen reported "found." Evidently losing is much easier than finding, though it may also be true that good fortune does not warble its blessings as piercingly as misfortune shrieks its woes.

Then, too, it is interesting to note that the value of any article "lost" seems greatly to exceed the intrinsic worth of such articles as honest finders are eager to return. Thus while the "lost" sparkle with precious stones, the "found" smell disagreeably of old leather. If the "lost" is a dog it will have a pedigree, while the casual description of the animal "found" will suggest that the finder was annoyed by the discovery that it was not even housebroken. People seem to be careless with bankbooks, and here the number reported "lost" is at times so great as to constitute a menace to traffic. That it is not possible for anyone at any time to step out in the street and pick up a bankbook is only to be explained by the indefatigable industry of our street cleaners, who, when seen leaning on a broom handle and gazing into space, are not to be condemned as indolent, since in reality they are doubtless composing the advertisement of a lost bankbook.

So much that happens in the world about us finds its apt analogy in what is going on in the world within us. People advertise their losses so much more extensively than their findings. People are cautious about jubiling over profits and when they do so, knock wood. But if reported losses exceed in number reported findings, a balance is not struck by cataloguing the losses as largely imaginary, but by a truer appraisal of the

findings. When Saul found a kingdom he was still disconsolate because he had not yet found the lost asses. This counterbalancing of losses by findings has produced what we call "the law of compensation." This may label an experience but does not necessarily either explain it or commend it. If it is difficult to estimate what is adequate compensation in dollars for a lost limb, still more difficult is it to estimate gains in terms of character which shall offset material losses. The health of the poor man does not make him unmindful of his poverty, for he wants both health and wealth. The largest value attaches to what eludes him. Under persistent elusiveness value so increases that it finally resolves itself into a Crock of Gold for which nothing can be offered in adequate exchange. What is optimistically called a "compensation" often appears to the recipient merely as a "consolation prize," that is to say, something not very consoling and not sufficiently valuable to be called a "prize." "Blessed are they that mourn," says the beatitude, "for they shall be comforted," a word which on its face seems to mean: "Cheer up! for the joyous thing about sorrow is that it doesn't last." The really aggravating thing about this trite word of comfort is the fact that usually this is just what happens.

For example, in Genesis 23 we read that Sarah died at the age of 127 years "and Abraham came to mourn for Sarah and to weep for her." Of course he did; he was no doubt inconsolable, for, as we are told in the next chapter (Genesis 24), "he was old and well stricken in years." Poor, lonely old man! But now in Genesis 25 we read: "Abraham took a wife and her name was Keturah and she bore him Zimran, and Joshkan and Medan and Midian and Ishbak and Shuah." From his grief for Sarah Abraham had recovered nicely.

However, Jesus' meaning in the beatitude can scarcely be: "Blessed is sorrow for it doesn't last," but rather that comfort in revealing a Comforter confers more than the sorrow removes. The finding exceeds the loss. The law of compensation which first meets us in the happy Epilogue to the book of Job is reiterated by Jesus if we may credit him with the words imputed to him in Matthew 19. 29: "Everyone that hath forsaken houses or brethren or father or mother or wife or children or lands for my name's sake shall receive a hundred fold." New-Testament teaching on the subject of compensation is sufficiently plain: the losses we lament are in the main material, the findings we so often depreciate may be largely spiritual. To lose wealth and find humility, to lose health and find patience, to lose great-

ness and find goodness may be life's "great gain," however persistently we classify such gain as loss.

It is perhaps the failure rightly to offset our losses by our findings that is responsible for designating the rising generation as "the lost generation." Precisely wherein their losses and findings consist it is hardly wise to assert with any great positiveness, and generalizations are never safe. Perhaps it is true that, losing practical experience, this younger generation has acquired a superficial intellectuality. Unduly prolonged attendance at schools and colleges resulting in the acquisition of merely ornamental academic degrees, while not producing expert scholars, has aroused unbounded respect for "the man who knows," in which class the teacher of religion, according to average youthful opinion, does not belong. Worshiping at the shrine of knowledge and paying incense to demonstrable truth, scant respect is felt for the advocate of faith whose "many infallible proofs" lie outside the bounds of the material world. Science is the word with which to conjure, since by ignoring the fact that many of its profoundest conclusions rest on hypotheses which lack a single shred of tangible evidence, it appears to deal with established facts whose reality is demonstrated by some mechanical gadget.

Sharing both the scientist's temple and incense stand the philosopher and psychologist, both dealing with systems of thought which, together with their quite unintelligible terminology, are wholly beyond the grasp of the youth of today. By employing, however, catchy phrases and by putting a premium on introspection, these intellectual leaders give an impression of profundity which makes a brilliant illumination on its background of obscurity. Were this the conclusion of the whole matter, then the inference would seem to be that the coming generation, while gaining the semblance of cold intellectuality, has lost spiritual culture, and since all the findings scarcely balance this loss, the description of the youth of the country as "the lost generation" would not be inapt. But such an inference takes no cognizance of the fact that there is no organic relation between intellectuality and spiritual culture. We characterize as "the dark ages" those times when humanity's heart was far ahead of mental culture. This does not mean that the standards and practice of morality were higher then than now. Men broke the decalogue then just as carelessly as do we. Also, religion and superstition were sadly tangled, and of science there was none. But crude and unlettered as men were, those times often produced characters

which for moral excellence have seldom since been equaled and never surpassed. If "the wisdom of this world is foolishness with God," it is not because of its errors but its limitations. "The world by wisdom knew not God," nor ever can. It may, however, suggest a method of approach which is by way of reverence for truth, whether that truth relate to electricity or to God. It may and does lay emphasis on authority which both science and religion must find in experience. God speaks through the decalogue in precisely the same way in which he speaks through the laws of nature. Both sets of laws have teeth which bite the transgressor, not because of offended majesty, still less for spite, but because the offender is off the track of health and well-being. Science by its cold-blooded materialism has forced religion into ways of sanity, compelling it to find its authority neither in God nor the Bible, since a statement is not necessarily true because the Bible makes it; but the Bible makes it because it is true. Thus authority lies in what is said, not in who says it, and ultimate authority must reside in that human nature which science may examine, label, and classify, but which God has formed and the Scriptures revealed. For the revelation of experience the youth of today is ready, and toward its findings he is to some degree reverent. When the history of the present age comes to be written it may be found that the losses in respect to courage, loyalty, independence, honesty, which are being written by the older generation into the current Book of Lamentations, will be more than offset by the new enthusiasms of the younger generation. If so, the budget will be more than balanced.

### III

Quite different from the solution of the philosopher is the idealist's explanation of the origin of this legend of the Crock of Gold. When the idealist places the crock of gold at the rainbow's foot, he is trying to tell us that the acme of beauty rests on treasures that are intangible and priceless.

If one test of culture is the world's sense of humor, another its estimate of gain and loss, still a third is its standard of beauty, and using beauty as a standard for the measurement of the world's progress it might seem at first sight as though there had been retrogression. Upon the beauties of nature man has always cast an appreciative eye, and it was logical that his admiration should crystallize into pantheism. So great were nature's glories that they were invested with all the attributes of deity, whose shrines were valleys, groves, and streams. Pantheism is man's supreme tribute to the

world's beauty. Iris walks on golden sandals. The rainbow, which is thus literally the apotheosis of beauty, stands on gold. Music, poetry and art have drawn some of their finest inspirations from nature's more subtle beauties, for underneath form and color there has throbbed a vibrant spirit without tongue or speech but quivering with eagerness to reveal a truth or convey a message.

Awakening from the ecstasy of the mere perception of beauty, man has first timidly, then more boldly, endeavored to imitate nature's patterns. Her frost crystals he copies with flax and produces lace; her forests he imitates in stone and erects Gothic cathedrals; her flowers he models with jewels and her vistas reappear in parks and gardens. The climax of beauty is achieved by the human body, or to be more specific, a woman's body; and no marble has been too rare or priceless to be chiseled into its counterpart. In architectures and sculpture the classic achievements of ancient Greece have never been surpassed, and so far as what is beautiful in line is concerned there has been no perceptible progress since.

With its praises of nature the Bible is stingy. Nature is said to reveal glory, not to be glorious. Solomon, we are told, was skilled in botany, but his reputation seems to rest on his Coolidge reticence, for he has uttered on the subject no recorded word. Jesus seems to have said little about the beauties of nature. He went to mountain tops for isolation; to Gethsemane because of its privacy. Even less appreciation of nature is shown by Paul. Mountains and sea speak to him of perils, not beauty. To our astronomical lore he has contributed only the information that some stars are brighter than others, while in his most extended metaphor of the wild olive tree he naïvely inserts a bad graft on a good stock. If aware of the solecism, he would probably have waved aside any criticism by remarking that while man may not do such a thing God does, for all the ways of grace are unnatural. Since the metaphor would not work except in perverted form, Paul had no qualms about perverting it. If nature's ways were not in harmony with God's then here was a matter that needed her attention. To the human body there are few complimentary allusions in Scripture. Nakedness is frequently mentioned, not as beautiful but as pitiful, calling not for art with canvas or marble but for charity with a bundle of clothes. Pope Leo XI in clothing Michelangelo's nudes must therefore be classified not as a prude but as a bureau of charity.

So far, then, as material beauty is concerned, whether animate or inani-



mate, neither humanity's appreciation nor powers of imitation seem to have made any substantial progress, and while the Church has been one of the most lavish patrons of art and some of its votaries, like Fra Angelico, have achieved distinction by its practice, ideas of material beauty have found enrichment, not new origins, through its patronage.

And yet even if art has found no models to surpass those "Daughters of men" who seduced by their fairness the "Sons of God," it is still possible to speak of progress in the world's conception of beauty, provided some higher standard be admitted than that supplied by line and color only. The poet is on the right track when he tries, often quite pathetically, to visualize the spirit of beauty or to hear its inarticulate speech. But mere poetry, meaning by that the adequate expression of a sublime thought, does not go far enough. Culture has traveled far since the female body, irrespective of its indwelling spirit, was considered the acme of beauty. The climax there came ages ago, leaving nothing for subsequent generations but variations on the old theme. What is new is the perception that the perfection of beauty cannot be satisfied with mere bodily form, but must take character into account. Certain philosophies of that same ancient Greece, whose ideas of beauty we today extol, demanded certain cardinal virtues which Socrates and Aristotle catalogued as "Wisdom, Courage, Temperance and Justice," all, be it noted, essentially virile traits. To say that "the Greeks sought after wisdom" sounds commendable until the wisdom sought is found to be a subtlety ending in sophistry. Temperance has a familiar sound, until we find a philosopher like Seneca preening himself on the practice of that virtue by the efficacy of which he has succeeded in refraining from oysters and mushrooms. History rudely discloses the fact that not temperance but previous gluttony was responsible for this distressing elimination of these luxuries from his menu. The word "virtue" has a masculine root and no woman could be virtuous in the Greek sense of the word. Justice was merely an "eye for an eye." All strong, not over-attractive, these cardinal virtues, and wholly masculine. The business of a woman was to be beautiful outwardly, employing to that end not cardinal virtues but cosmetics.

With the entrance of Christianity, character becomes the essence of beauty, of which feminine attributes are an integral part. The emphasis is now shifted from flesh to spirit, introducing a new standard of beauty. The word "character" does not appear in our English New Testament, and only once in the Greek, where Moffatt happily renders it "stamped with God's

own character" (Hebrews 1. 3), but none the less the ideas which it connotes pervade its whole teaching. The Old Testament had defined character in terms of conduct, and while mere passive virtues are accorded honor, Old-Testament religion is essentially virile. Martial music and metaphor run all through the Psalter and with such an ideal it is easy to see why the Hebrew saw no beauty in the "suffering servant" or in Jesus as his counterpart. In him, for the first time, masculine and feminine virtues are combined, and people found it hard to believe that in their union strength found added power and beauty greater permanence. It is hard for people to believe it today. "The beauty of holiness" is below the classical and pagan horizons, and while today there is reluctance to realize that ideal of beauty, yet people recognize it when they see it and are equally sensitive to its lack. "The beauty of the Lord our God" cannot be upon us unless it rests upon qualities which constitute the world's true riches. At the foot of the rainbow is the crock of gold.

#### IV

Plausible as may be these various explanations of the origin of the legend of the crock of gold, there still remains the possibility that it may be but the parable of a prophet.

After all is said and done, common and natural though the phenomenon be, the rainbow is inextricably associated with the origins of our religion. Even those who have but the most meager acquaintance with Scripture can scarcely see a rainbow in the summer sky without associating it, however vaguely, with the Genesis story: "I do set my bow in the cloud and it shall be for a token of a covenant between me and the earth. And it shall come to pass when I bring a cloud over the earth that the bow shall be seen in the cloud and I will remember my covenant that is between me and every living creature of all flesh."

No modern writer of fiction has ever conceived a situation comparable to that which confronted those sole survivors of the Flood. Defoe, to be sure, casts Robinson Crusoe on a desert island, but other human beings later appear and the castaway subsequently returns to civilization. Noah and his family disembark upon an earth from which their whole world has been swept away. Nothing of the accumulated civilization of past ages remains. The man who landed on a desert island isn't in the same class with the man who landed on a desert earth. Such an experience is only redeemed

from insupportable tragedy by the fact that man walks forth into that desolate world under a rainbow arch whose prismatic colors emblazon a heraldic device attesting indissoluble partnership between heaven and earth. The rainbow is a symbol of man's life, for what is life but an arch, "Dust thou art and unto dust shalt thou return." Dust connected with dust by those experiences which mark his rise from it and his reluctant descent back to it again. Experiences which are "but as a vapor appearing for a little time and then vanishing away," a vapor condensed into a cloud which is the embodiment of drops of sweat and tears and blood. But as these catch the rays that shine from Him who is life's light they turn into "blue and purple and scarlet" colors. The cloud loses its blackness and becomes the transfigured "veil of His flesh." God has set the bow of human life in the cloud which is ever changing and ever mysterious, but the arch of life rests in its origin on the wealth of love that is in the heart of a creative God whom we have learned to call "Our Father," and in its final destiny it rests on that redeeming love which we call "the riches of grace which are in Christ Jesus our Lord." Thus at the foot of the rainbow, either foot, lies the crock of gold.

## Religious Books Which Endure

EDWARD MACK

THIS theme, covering so wide a range and involving so much of personal appreciation and obligation, can only be considered by way of suggestion. An adequate discussion is beyond the reach of the pages of a magazine, for the Christian student and teacher has a distinctive and nigh boundless literature all his own. But he must also be informed about the famous books and songs and proverbs, upon which ancient pagan religions were founded, or which were the necessary expressions of such faiths. This is particularly applicable to such of these faiths as persist to this day. The Christian faith has nothing to lose by comparison with other age-old religions. The study of Comparative Religions is an aid to higher appreciation and clearer understanding of the world religion, which was founded on the two Testaments—probably I had said with more truth, which produced the two Testaments.

Although Confucianism is not a religion, but rather rules and incentives to a polite and balanced life, the sayings of Confucius will have their value to the end of time.

The Vedas of Hinduism, the Avesta of the Persian Parsiism, the Koran of the Muslim, Plato's *Phaedo*, and Aristotle's *First Philosophy* and *Ethics* will always be sought by students of soul yearning and aspiration, as expressions in part of man's long and hungry search for God. We shall wish to have at hand the volumes of Plato which reach out toward immortality with the arm of reason, and those of the Egyptian who stretched out the other arm of mysticism to grasp life after death. For the ancient Egyptian side of this soul question we shall always be grateful to the late Professor J. H. Breasted for his volumes of *Ancient Records of Egypt* and his standard *History of Egypt*. The speaker would give his personal expression of gratitude to Maspero for his pioneer and colossal volumes, particularly the first, *The Dawn of Civilization*. These volumes are mentioned only as suggestive of the many books of pagan origin, through which, as it were, we apply our stethoscope to the throbbing heart of man before its yearning found answer in a spoken and written Revelation.

As a Christian, I would in particular consider the permanent and living

value of the boundless expanse of Christian literature. More than forty years ago I asked the librarian of the Royal Library in Berlin for an estimate of the number of volumes in that vast collection. His reply was: "Something more than a million." In answer to the query as to the proportion of volumes produced by, or related to, the Christian faith, he answered: "More than fifty per cent." For the exactness of his estimates I cannot vouch; but his averages are impressive.

There are many books on the border line of the religious, rated among the classics, which deserve to be placed on the shelf of every devout reader, and to be written on his heart. Some of these are Milton's *Paradise Lost*, to give us our best view of Puritan theology; essays of Ruskin and Carlyle, who were always patrolling the frontiers of eternity; Goethe's *Faust*, which makes us feel our handicaps in the "wrestle with spiritual wickedness in high places."

The way men think has more to do with their making than what they do or have. If nationalities have been built upon faith, civilizations have been resultants of this or that philosophy. Give me the philosophy of a nation, and you may have its mines and its banking houses. Adventures of Francis Bacon in philosophy nerved the British sailor for adventures on Eastern and Western seas. Koheleth and Job and Plato and Seneca and Anselm and Kant will never die. I must have on my shelf an introduction to philosophy, a volume from each school. Personally I prefer the realism of the old Scotch School. But Berkeley and Descartes must be there too, the *Principia Philosophiae* of the one, and the *Principles of the Human Mind* of the other.

I cannot forget the thrill which came in early boyhood with the first reading of John Locke's great *Essay on the Human Understanding*. No *Thaddeus of Warsaw* nor story of Napoleon so deeply stirred my soul with the sense of Truth's romance. The facts, the premises, the deductions may all have been invalidated by the passing years, but romance which pervaded philosophy will remain.

The great men of the past have survived in record and recollection because of what they thought and wrote, or because of battlefields and blood, by the sweep of the pen, or by the stroke of the sword. But in the end the pen has proved mightier than the sword. Plato and Aristotle served two succeeding millenniums more richly than did Alexander and Cyrus.

There has been a rich and valuable contribution to the interpretative



and cyclopedic knowledge of religion, which has left useful deposits for every age, even for our book-saddled and ridden age. The concordance of Scripture is a gradual and ever improving growth of four hundred years. The work of Cruden will always be used, because it contains the consecrated lifetime of its author, and is the foundation of all subsequent concordances. There are two works of nearly a hundred years ago which remain, and will remain, a useful ally of the thorough Bible student. These are the Englishman's Concordances of the Old and the New Testaments.

The early Christian centuries produced a literature which has been thesaurus, interpreter, and guide to every age, in which Christian faith has had a renaissance. The translations into English of this extensive library of the Early Church has been accurately done, often in the best of style. Many of these translations are the work sources of our modern thinking, and our best encyclopedias of early Christian faith and practice. Eusebius' *Church History*, so well translated by A. C. McGiffert; Origen's textual work in the *Hexapla*, and his apologetic *Against Celsus*; Chrysostom's *Homilies*; Jerome's *Vulgate*; the *Confessions* and *The City of God* of Augustine live on, more cherished than in their time of production. The work of Athanasius on *The Incarnation* and the scant works of Arius remain as the exponents of the two ever-conflicting theological points of view, so called, conservative and liberal. If all my life I had not lived in close touch with technical libraries, these early Christian writings would fill space on my shelves. The masterpieces among them are having renewed reading today. Their books live, because those old warriors of the faith put their lives into what they wrote. We can almost hear them saying: "We believe, therefore we write."

But the morning of the great Renaissance had a lovely dawn. The new day began with heralds who ran before the sunrise. Some of these anticipations of a new day were: The mystical writings of the two Bernards, whose hymns are sung in our churches today; *The Divine Comedy* of Dante; Chaucer's *Canterbury Tales*; Wyclif's *Bible*; and the redemptive theology of Anselm. Dante strove for a better world by holding up the corrupt leaders of the old order to criticism and ridicule; Wyclif sought reformation in the awakening of the souls of the masses. We hold to their books, because they were heralds of this day of ours, and both battled for our spiritual liberties. Bernard of Clairvaux lives in literature, not for his intellectual greatness, but for his deep piety. Monk, mystic, crusader, he was

yet a man of action, humane, practical, beloved. Wherever he came, disputes ceased, and peace also came. We keep his hymns and his letters, because of the great spirit which is in them.

He will be a wise man indeed who can gather out of the theological and devotional driftwood of the Reformation the books which should ever remain. In England Puritan and Anglican and Romanist crowded printing presses not only with pamphlets, but also with books, many of them having folio proportions. An address of John Knox has the following title: "To the generation of Anti-Christ, the pestilent prelates and their shavelings in Scotland, the congregation of Christ Jesus within the same sayeth." The title of the first edition of Baxter's *Theology* has this comprehensive and ambitious title:

"Catholick Theology: Plain, Pure, Peaceable: For  
Pacification of the Dogmatical Word-Warriors."

The titles of Anglican and Romanist volumes were equally vigorous. Unfortunately they did not, as modern senators, amble amicably to friendly afternoon teas, after the blows of the Word-Warriors were ended.

Richard Ward's commentary of 1640 has this tremendous title: "Theological Questions, Dogmatical Observations and Evangelical Essays upon the Gospel."

It is not strange that the vast expanse of this ocean of theology and controversy has now become an untraveled waste, with only an island of known and loved visitation here and there. *The Institutes* of Calvin will not pass away. Luther's commentaries, his *Table Talks*, his songs, his *Liberty of the Christian Man*, will not be forgotten. Hooker's *Ecclesiastical Polity*; Erasmus' great gift to Biblical text accuracy in his *Textus Receptus* was the boon of the New-Testament translators. Tyndale's New Testament based upon Erasmus' critical text, remains an English classic.

The service of Francis Bacon in the fields of both philosophy and popular literature and of William Shakespeare in drama and poetry ushered in a new era in English thought and expression. The religious classics of that age, which will be the cherished treasures of many ages, are many. This quickstep review can pause for the mention of but three: Foxe's *Book of Martyrs*; Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress*; and the so-called *Authorized Version* of the Scriptures of 1611. In this latter the remolding and beautifying of the English Language by Shakespeare and Bacon was crystallized for attractive and expressive speech during three succeeding centuries.

There remain for consideration the Victorian and the very modern periods; the former distinguished by its devotional and critical productions, its historical and theological volumes, its scientific and its speculative works; the latter by the flood of books of every type, which has almost congested the mentality of our day. Koheleth must have had prophetic sensing of our times, when he wrote: "Of making of many books there is no end"; and "in much wisdom there is much grief." We are not now in a position to judge the permanency of much of our modern religious and scientific output.

An evil which has harassed one teacher through a third of a century of seminary service is the inclination of the young mind to accept the theses and outlook of the last book to be read. If we might say that principles are hitching posts, an evil of our day is that too many readers carry their hitching posts along with them. There are continually new and better phases and presentations of truth, but the elemental and fundamental things are as old as Sinai's hills. My apple tree makes new and wider leaf-arrangements each year, and clusters its blossoms in varied, and possibly better, order. But there would be no foliage and no blossoms and no fruit without a deep root and an abiding trunk. "Prove all things, hold fast that which is good" applies to books as well as to apostolic morals. Time has proved the old books which remain. A few decades will prune the luxuriant growth of today, which has leapt from the trellises and is climbing over all the walls.

What are the enduring values in books? One value is their assurance of eternal truths and the tenacity with which they hold to them. There is truth; there is divine reality. Great books are, in the terms of the electricians, not the creators, but the conductors of these elemental realities.

Another value in books, which gives them life, is that the soul and the mind of the author have been wrought into his book. Hamilton Mabie was wont to say that a great book, a book to be great, must always contain the life story of its author. Because it holds within itself a life, it lives.

The Hebrew lawgiver was looking ahead into the changing centuries through which his people Israel must pass. He therefore bade them teach generation by generation the unchanging verities; and to fix them fast on doors and gates of outgoing and incoming, lest they forget. It is the high duty of teacher and librarian to keep eternal realities before the minds of those who pass along the perilous paths of books.

## Recent Theological Books: British and Continental

R. BIRCH HOYLE

“OF making many books, there is no end,” said the Preacher in the Old Testament. “And much study,” he added, “is a weariness to the flesh.” American readers may think that the policy of national economic self-sufficiency might well be applied to book production. And yet, as the recent books by E. E. Aubrey on *Present Theological Tendencies* and W. M. Horton’s *Contemporary English Theology* attest, American theologians are constantly looking across the Atlantic to see what is being thought and said on matters theological. Like the radio, books pass all frontiers: the republic of letters is as wide as the globe.

A notable feature in England is the issue by publishers of books in series taking up the leading theological doctrines. For example, in The Christian Challenge Series (Heritage, London), there are some good books. The Methodist, Dr. W. F. Lofthouse, has one on *Christianity in the Social State*. This takes in a history of the relations of the Church to the State in the Christian era. It shows how more and more, “our grandmother the State” (as the great Lord Salisbury sarcastically dubbed the never-ending appeal to governments to shoulder loads our individualistic self-sufficient fathers bore themselves), has trespassed in education, economics and civic regulations on territory once occupied by the Church. Then the present position in Europe—and America too!—is analyzed, and good suggestions made on what Christians have to do about it. In the same series, Dr. J. Kenneth Mozley explains *The Doctrine of the Incarnation* as constructed by the early Church at Nicaea, Ephesus and Chalcedon. Doctor Mozley’s book might stand alongside of his volume on *The Atonement*—quite a classic. The chapter on “The Doctrine in Relation to Philosophy” is full of practical guidance in the thorny problems of Christology.

Another interesting series, The Diocesan Series, is issued by The Student Christian Movement Press. The opening volume, *Our Faith in God*, is by Dean Inge’s successor at St. Paul’s, London, Dean Matthews. This leading Christian philosopher has made his book a delight to read, and not

"a weariness to the flesh." On the same subject, Doctor Garvie, the doyen of Nonconformist scholars, supplies a useful book in the new series Duckworth is issuing. He, as usual, covers an immense area, overlapping Doctor Lofthouse's and Canon Mozley's topics.

Hodder & Stoughton (London) are launching out into the deeps of theology with their "London Theological Library." The first four volumes are out: Dr. Wheeler Robinson supplying *The Old Testament: Its Making and Meaning*, and the Methodist, Professor F. Bertram Clogg, has written *An Introduction to the New Testament*. Both books supply a long-felt want. For other books on these two great themes are usually too overloaded with details. These are intended for the general reader as well as the student being "introduced" to the two parts of the Bible. The thousand-year "making" of the Old Testament is well outlined by Doctor Robinson and, better still, the religious "values" of the various types of literature, Historic, Prophetic, Wisdom and Devotional, are clearly brought out. To many the Old Testament will become a richer possession through this. And Mr. Clogg has succeeded admirably in putting fairly all the various aspects of bristling New Testament problems. This book of his should become *the* textbook in every college for theological students.

In the same series, Dr. Sydney Cave, successor to Doctor Garvie, gives a history of *The Doctrine of the Work of Christ*. This volume is a companion to the same author's *Doctrine of the Person of Christ*, and, like that, surveys the New Testament, Patristic, Scholastic and Reformation views of what Christ accomplished by His death on Calvary. The chapter, "An Approach to the Doctrine," ably points out the merits and defects of the many theories on the inexhaustible theme, the Atonement.

The fourth volume in this series, *The History of Christian Worship*, is by a High Anglican, Dr. O. Hardman, Professor of Pastoral and Liturgical Theology in London University. In contrast with Evelyn Underhill's book, mentioned later, which deals with worship more from the aspect of the worshiper's moods when responding to the divine approach, this book is more objective, presenting the development of liturgies, orders of divine worship, in the various sections of Christendom during the past twenty centuries. As an introduction to the study of Christian liturgies the book is very useful indeed, for nowhere has the vast amount of literature been so well summarized as here. Non-Anglicans may perhaps feel that not enough is said on Calvinistic, Presbyterian and Methodist orders of worship, and



hymnology is scarcely touched. But in view of the Ecumenical Conferences this year, the book will put men *en rapport* with the Greek, Roman and Anglican views of the sacraments, the Church Orders administering them. It will be interesting to see how German Lutherans and the Ecclesiastical Reformed Church react at the "Conference on Faith and Order," for Doctor Dibelius has already stated that the German Evangelical (that is, the Confessional) Church "will demand that all ecclesiastical traditions shall be tested by the Word of God, and that only those things which can be justified by that standard shall be acknowledged as the common possession of the one Christian Church."

Anglican Church theology has always been strong on the side of church history—especially the Patristic era. Two new books on the history of the first five or six centuries deserve attention. *The Way and the Faith*, by A. B. Browne (Macmillan), has been wittily described as "theology in plus fours." Every reader I have met sings the praises of this bright, accurate and racily written story of what the early Church passed through and thought out. Written for senior scholars in day schools, this book appeals to experts as well. It is very clear on all shades of the Arian controversy. The Archbishop of Brisbane, Dr. J. C. Wand, who used to be at Oriel, Oxford, has a book, *A History of the Early Church to A. D. 500* (Methuen), which gives a clear survey of that momentous period. It can be commended for its accuracy and distinct marking out of the stages of development in church organization, in theological development. Another Anglican scholar, Dean Malden (successor to Dean Armitage Robinson, at Bath and Wells), is very strong on the historical side. In *The Promise of the Father* he has packed a lot of first-rate material from his previous works on the Church of England's history, the breach with Rome, and also much harvesting from his studies of Bible Inspiration, The Apocrypha. This book represents what W. M. Horton calls "The Central Party" in Anglicanism. Its main purpose is to discuss the problem of regaining unity in Christian Churches: the Holy Spirit being the unifier. A useful book in view of the Ecumenical Conferences at Oxford and Edinburgh this year.

Evelyn Underhill's book on *Worship*, in The Library of Constructive Theology Series (Nisbet, London), is by a writer whose name is universally known as an authority on mysticism. In this book all types of worship in all the communions of Christendom—and even in Biblical Judaism—are described: historically, analytically, and devotionally. Perhaps the atmos-

phere of the book is too cloistral for American "go-getting-ness"; but it is an admirable survey of the principles and practice of worship—congregational, confessional and private.

Readers of RELIGION IN LIFE are fully aware that the problem of the relation of Church and State is most pressing in Europe today. On this topic, Dr. Theodor Heckel has much to say of weight in his brochure, *Oxford 1937*, which reproduces his article for Germans in *Auslanddeutschtum und evangelische Kirche*, for 1936. He says that "the Totalitarian claim is directed toward controlling and shaping the entire life of the nation, and this marks a new fatalistic epoch in the history of mankind. It is a problem of decisive importance for the future of mankind, whether these views are compatible with the Christian interpretation of human life, or denote a more or less radical rejection of these claims. Christ's Church throughout the whole world is seen to be in presence of a crisis of immense magnitude: the Church universal is forced to hold council together on this great problem." Doctor Heckel puts clearly the two opposed views on the legitimacy of the State. Most theologians relate the need for the State on the Fall of man into sin. The State, in that view, is part of God's maintenance of sinful creation, "guarding mankind in a world of sin and of conflict against chaos and making a life of society possible." He cites Brunner's book (mentioned below) on this view. The other view starts from the point that in Creation prior to the Fall, the State is God's ordinance for collective life: each nation, by creation, expresses the divine purpose. On this Nazidom, with its religion of blood and race, claims equality with, if not superiority over, the Christian view of the State as bulwark against human sinfulness. The solution of this contrast is not to be seen as yet. But for Americans, it is important that Brunner's book *Das Gebot* should be known, since he asserts that "the Church's primary interest is not the connection of the Church with the State, but keeping at a distance therefrom."

The Person of Christ is always the centre-point to which theology turns. A very good book is issued by T. and T. Clark, *The Transcendence of Jesus Christ*. The work was thesis for the Ph.D. degree in Edinburgh, offered by a Baptist, Doctor Cawley, who has been a missionary in India, and who, after a period of doubt and distress, found in Christ the way out, and "the Truth." The late H. R. Macintosh strongly commended its publication, to which he supplies a warm foreword, especially noting the author's affinity with the Johannine type of mind. The chapter on "The

Solitariness of His Cross" is a deep, heart-moving study of what our redemption cost our Saviour, and a section on "Eschatology as Veiled Christology" has some striking things to say on a bothersome theological topic.

"The world is too much with us," sang Wordsworth. Browning, however, thanked God that he found "it hard to be a Christian" in such a world. Emil Brunner's great book on the Protestant *Ethic* has at last been rendered into English by Miss Wyon, who translated Brunner's *The Mediator*. The English title is *The Divine Imperative* (Lutterworth Press); the German title is *Das Gebot und die Ordnungen: The Commandment and the Orders*. The great commandment, "Love to God and thy neighbor" is the starting point. The "Orders" are the arrangements into which we are plunged in the world: the family, industry, the State, the educational community, and the Church. Within these "Orders," of "creation" and of "maintenance," as Brunner analyzes them, the life of love has to be lived. The distinctive feature of the Christian ethic, according to Brunner, is that "the summum bonum" is God Himself: not human comfort, personal development, Utopian social adjustment, nor individual pleasure. Brunner surveys all historical ethical systems, and shows that they are either "idealistic," making man, not God, the centre—"all too human"—or too legalistic, whether in Pharisaism, Romanism or Kantianism. A "new man" is needed to live the love-life: a new dynamic is required, such as Romans VIII gives, to live The Sermon on the Mount; and the Protestant theology of the new birth, justification by faith, the bestowal of divine grace supplies that dynamic, and settles practical problems left unsolved by all other ethical systems. There is an amazing range of topics discussed: marriage, the family, the problems of Church and State, Christianity and war, pacifism, the use of force, the web of industry in which the individual is entangled: hundreds of "burning questions" of the day are examined by this keen, clear mind. And the literature used is truly international, cosmopolitan. Interesting is Brunner's way of refusing to split ethics into Individual and Social: and his examination of the pagan ethics which have penetrated Christian thinking in Roman and even Protestant circles.

Two earlier books of Brunner's, *God and Man* and *The Philosophy of Religion, From the Standpoint of Protestant Theology*, have been translated into English (Student Movement, the first: Nicholson and Watson, the second, publishers). These books give the bases of Brunner's thinking, further elaborated in *The Mediator* and *The Divine Imperative* (Lutter-

worth Press). As such they supply a good training in the current criticism of philosophy, ethics and theology, enabling the diligent student (and he has to be diligent!) to see where the focal points are today. One essay in *God and Man*, on "The Philosophers' Idea of God and the Creator God of Faith," stimulated a striking book on Barthian lines, *God the Creator*, by a Scotch theologian, Professor G. S. Hendry (Hodder and Stoughton). "Scottish theology," he says, "has to find its true affinity with the theology of continental Protestantism rather than with that of England or America." By "England" he has in mind Dean Matthews, Doctor Inge, and a fierce attack is made on *The Library of Constructive Theology* (Nisbet).

The paradoxes of "The Theology of Crisis," and Dialectical thinking, come to the fore in current theological literature. In Nicolas Berdyaev's *The Destiny of Man*, (Bles.) the paradoxical survey of all the problems of man's origin, life-history, collisions with brute nature and human society, marriage, State, industry, and the life after death, is tremendous in force: all these problems are viewed from the standpoint of human soul-liberty. It is a liberal education in philosophy and theology, to compare Berdyaev, with his Russian-Greek Church background, with Brunner's Calvinistic presuppositions. He (Berdyaev) gives light and power as he works out a view of creative ethics which should appeal to American faith in freedom. With Berdyaev we are in touch with one of the greatest thinkers alive today.

Not only Presbyterians, but all keen theologians, will be interested to see how Karl Barth deals with the problems of predestination in its "double" form. Kaiser of Munich has issued the four lectures (*Gottesgnadenwahl*) Barth delivered last summer in Hungary. We have no space to detail how Barth modifies Calvin. But the supplementary discussions, which fill over a score of pages, show, in the twenty-four questions, how brilliant Barth can be in pure theology. Americans, priding themselves on "neutrality," may see how Barth (p. 39) condemns Swiss "neutrality" as sin! Herr Hitler has forbidden the Munich publisher to issue any more of Barth's brochures in the Series, "Theological Existence Today!"

Three more volumes have appeared in The International Library of Christian Knowledge, of which series Dr. William Adams Brown, in America, and Dr. Bertram L. Woolf, in England, are the Editors. Doctor Woolf is joint translator of Brunner's *The Philosophy of Religion*, already mentioned, and sole translator of Hans Lietzmann's *The Beginnings of the Christian Church*. Lietzmann is Harnack's successor in Berlin, and has

something of Harnack's brilliancy and thoroughness of knowledge of early Christianity. The background to Christianity, in Judaism, the Roman Empire, the Hellenistic world, is well outlined; the salient points in the stories of Jesus, John the Baptist, Paul, and "John," with Ignatius and Marcion in later days, are finely presented. The study of Gnosticism is very illuminating, but the critical attitude is rather radical. The book is a first-rate guide to an understanding of the first three centuries of Christianity.

In the same Library appears Dr. W. Oesterley's *A Fresh Approach to the Psalms*. "Fresh" is to the point, for not only does the author discuss the parallels, with their differences, in the Psalms of Babylonian and Egyptian literature, and the probable dates of the Psalms—where he insists that many are "I" psalms, the "I" representing individuals, and not the community—but chapters are devoted to the study of the Music of the East, and among Israelites; the poetical structure and liturgical use and modification of psalms, and their use in the worship of the synagogue and the Christian Church. Further, there are important studies of the theological contents of this literature, especially bearing on the messianic ideas and the problem of immortality. Written simply and for the average reader, the book yet presents a wealth of subjects which experts also will gladly read.

Readers interested in the relation of the Church to the kingdom of God will find much helpful instruction in *What Is the Kingdom of God?* by Canon V. F. Storr of Westminster Abbey. The Old Testament material is reviewed as it influences Jesus' teaching; the later attempt by Augustine to make Church and the Kingdom identical; the medieval balance of Church and secular States; the recent studies of the meaning of the terms as transcendental, and the "Social Gospel" are clearly exhibited. The Church and State problem, as well as Communism, Socialism and Internationalism are sanely discussed. Some statements may make readers of RELIGION IN LIFE prick up their ears. "To reduce Christianity to a Social Gospel is to misunderstand it completely." "If we try to turn Christianity into a Social Gospel, we invert the order of Christ's method. He began with the man and not with his external surroundings."

This long survey of recent theological literature should put good heart and hope into Christians, for Christian thinkers are facing up to the greatest problems, and worthily confuting the enemies at the gates.



## Book Reviews

**Rule of the Road.** By ANNE BYRD PAYSON. New York: The Abingdon Press. \$1.50.

This is an absorbing case-book of the awakened Christian life. When "Mrs. Payson" wrote her earlier volume, *I Follow the Road*, she stirred the interest of countless people. Hers was the story of a society woman who was suffering a great spiritual starvation, and who found food for her spirit in the teachings of E. Stanley Jones. A profound transformation and renewal of her life took place. The luminous account of that deep-reaching change, set forth intimately in her book, brought to her a procession of inquirers. Courageously she sought to make known to them the source of power and joy which had been opened to her. *Rule of the Road* recounts, with the fascination of a novel, but with the candor of a student, some of her outstanding successes and failures in this endeavor.

The author's personality, shining through these records, has many facets. She appears to be a high-spirited, intense and impetuous lady. She says in one place: "I believed, as I believe now, that I had every reason to be furious with them." At another place she says of a stubbornly unchanged friend: "As yet, and by fixing my mind on the lesser cruelties of ridicule that saints and servants have endured, I have not unstopped the vials of my wrath and poured out their invective." She speaks of the indignation which burned in her toward another recalcitrant. Relative to one old man she writes: "I love him with a mad sort of fervor that I am continually

laughing at." She wishes that one bothersome person would let her alone. She reveals ingenuous joy at her own success in changing from her usual role of clever conversationalist, by giving a series of serious lectures to growing audiences. She shows eagerness to find the truth impartially.

This very human and fervent personality comes into contact with a series of maladjusted individuals—a young man who is trying to escape from his mother; a brilliant young drunken sot; a woman who has grown rich by being a fake spiritualistic medium, and who is trying to escape from her own fraudulency; a woman who was snubbed by her husband's relatives, acquired social power by giving lavishly to churches, and then used her power to persecute those connected, even innocently, with her former humiliation; a married man of wealth who had acquired first a mistress and later a religious consciousness, without being able to work out the conflicts between the two; a man who thought he was dying, and was agonized by his realization of the evil of a lawsuit which he had started to put a young rival out of business, and the injustice of a company-dominated town for which he felt responsible; an idealistic artist, who had married an unfortunate woman who seemed to be wrecking his life through her drunkenness; and others.

Most of these seekers were already aware, to a greater or less degree, of a disturbing Power beyond themselves which made their unworthy lives intolerable. One of them said: "What in God's name does a man do with sympathy for

Christ in this damnable world? Why do I feel it? What right have I to it? How can I get rid of it?" The adventures of the book consist in attempts, by the author and by others, to release into full effect this Christ power. One gets into "the grip of the communicable Christ." One experiences the release of a new and inner enthusiasm. One finds the power to do right. One begins to employ the "proven forces" of the spiritual world. One brings his individuality to Christ and asks him to wear it as a modern garment. One may acquire an unlimited awareness of Christ, and take him in one's reverent heart into all sorts of ventures.

"We agreed that a physical result from prayer—health, financial betterment, restored memory, reformation of errant children—might be given those who are very near to God and unclogged channels of his power, but to us who traveled the road such gifts might or might not be entrusted. If they were withheld, it had not to do with any limitation but our own. . . .

"They realize that Christ's mind is a soil in which we grow high and hopeful, putting out words beyond our own wisdom, as a plant puts out leaves and flowering, in a manifold sympathy and discernment."

Many of the outstanding points in Mrs. Payson's message are paralleled in the teachings of the Oxford Group Movement. She keeps reiterating her stress upon meditation—"thought patterns" and holding people up inwardly in the Christ presence. Guidance beyond ordinary human wisdom keeps cropping up in her story. Life changing through the Christ power is central. The process of sharing experience and aspiration, including the outpouring of the story of one's guilt, keeps recurring. Changes in social relations and in the economic order are seen

as resulting from changes in individuals through the Christ power. Yet the author is not a Grouper. She sees the weak as well as the strong points in that movement. She shows a similar reserved but understanding appreciation of Christian Science and of Quakerism.

To those who hunger for the good life, and who find it easier to think in terms of personal drama than in abstract ideas and systems of thought, this record will have absorbing interest and quickening power.

HORNELL HART.

Hartford Theological Seminary.

**Healing in the Name of Jesus.** By JOHN MAILLARD. New York: Harper and Brothers. \$2.25.

Spiritual healing has not yet found a place of definite favor among thoughtful Christians. It has for the most part been associated with sects and groups on the outer fringe of the Christian Church. Undoubtedly the work of Alexis Carrel has admitted the matter of spiritual healing if not to our acceptance at least to a new curiosity. Carrel declares that "the only condition indispensable to the occurrence of the phenomenon is prayer" and continues with the even more startling statement—"but there is no need for the patient himself to pray or even to have any religious faith. It is sufficient that someone around him be in a state of prayer."

The author announces that he knows nothing about occult practices and has never dabbled in them, nor is he a psychic or in any way interested in so-called modern spiritualism, but he believes positively that "there is nothing better that the Church can do than to turn again to its mission of healing." "The Church," he continues, "is crippled with unbelief and in our unbelief we do not see beyond the resources and remedies of material sci-

ence. In his Poplar Parish Mr. Maillard met a clergyman who was interested in the healing ministry. He went with him into the homes of the sick, where he noticed many remarkable cures. Among them he tells of witnessing the spiritual healing of a girl crippled with infantile paralysis. The healing in this case was perfect, he says.

The author has aroused widespread interest in England through his healing ministry which is under the supervision of the British Ministry of Health. The fact that the author thus recognizes and co-operates with orthodox medicine increases our respect for the entire procedure. Prayers and healing services occupy an important place in the program of rehabilitation of his patients. He asks—"What should happen where men and women believe in the living presence of Christ? Surely His presence would inspire and guide them and His power will be manifested in their life and work. It is the power and love of the living Christ upon which we count in our work amongst the sick and suffering." He intimates that there would be no incurable diseases if we fully accepted Christ's statement that "all power is given unto me in heaven and on earth." That power, he indicates, is at our disposal. It all depends upon the extent of our surrender.

This point of view is not entirely without scientific support for Doctor Hadfield, neurologist of Oxford, points out that the greatest psychologists tend toward the view that the fundamental source of power is to be regarded as some impulse that works through us and is not of our own making. Bergson referred to it as the *élan vital*. Janet calls it mental energy. Jung speaks of the libido or urge, a force which surges through our lives. These views suggest that we are not merely receptacles but channels of energy.

While many of the findings of the author are open to question, the spirit of the book is helpful and it possesses much thought-provoking material.

NORMAN VINCENT PEALE.

Marble Collegiate Church,  
New York.

**The Vision of God and the Social Order.** By J. EARL GILBREATH.  
New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. \$1.50.

Here is a book that ought to be read by laymen and clergymen alike. To be sure, there will be those who will say that the conception of social action belongs to the last generation; but for the majority there will be numerous thought-provoking passages which may aid in orientation in a very difficult period of religious development.

I did not begin reading this book with any great enthusiasm. In the last three months I had read six others on the same general theme, written by men on both sides of the Atlantic who had gained distinction in five different fields of endeavor—so this would be just another book by an unknown author. And I must also admit that the first part of the title annoyed me for I feared that here was a plea for a mysticism that had small place in a redeemed society. I was wrong. True, we are introduced again to Meister Eckhart, Suso, Tauler, and others—but here is a healthy, creative mysticism that is vitally related to social action. Step by step the author leads up to his thesis that in worship of God is found the only enduring motive for social effort. Not for a moment is the mistake made that a redeemed person guarantees a redeemed and changed society. He contends that when the Christians came out of the catacombs and received the protection of Constantine, the principles of the society of

Christ were surrendered and the welfare of the State became their concern. Early Christians accepted a new King and joined a new kingdom. Now the individual all too often accepts the new King, but rejects the kingdom, remaining a "redeemed" individual in a pagan society. So our social work became an adjunct of faith and has been aptly described as "Protestantism with a tincture of sociology."

Many will heartily disagree with the last chapter, "Building the City of God," but in so doing they will be compelled to re-think their positions. All in all, here is a book at times exciting, always thought-provoking, written in a pleasant, easy, and often fascinating style which will well repay the reader.

NORMAN A. HALL.

First Methodist Episcopal Church,  
Flushing, N. Y.

**Ethics for Today.** By HAROLD HOPPER TITUS. Boston: American Book Company. \$2.50.

Professor Titus of Dennison University has furnished us with a new manual of ethics. Like most recent texts, it is written from the point of view of the theory of self-realization. But it does not present or aim to present any new ideas in the interpretation of this theory. It is intended for beginners, and its chief emphasis is not on ethical theory, but on practical applications. In fact, the discussion of theory is divided between Part I (Evolutionary and Theoretical Backgrounds of Morality) and Part III (The Nature of Morality) in such a way as to lack unity of treatment.

The reader of this book, even if he is given no new insights into ethical theory, will be led to see that morality is a natural and reasonable manifestation of human nature and not anything arbi-

trary or merely conventional. He will be taught intellectual fairness in evaluating opposing views, and above all he will be encouraged to apply ethical principles to the concrete facts of everyday living, both personal and social. The exercises at the end of each chapter are helpful in illustrating the problems. Doubtless an occasional perplexed student will wish that Professor Titus had analyzed a few of his own exercises and had suggested a solution now and then. But the author would doubtless reply that the essence of morality is that each one must decide for himself.

The bibliographies are extensive and should prove useful, in spite of certain defects. It would have been helpful had the author more frequently mentioned the best chapters or sections instead of listing entire books. He once calls my *Moral Laws* by the name *Moral Values*. Let this serve as a stimulus to every reader to consult W. G. Everett's excellent work by the latter title. One may question the inclusion of such books as Pitkin's *More Power to You*, and the like. But every reader will have his attention called to some books that he has overlooked, and will not be inclined to resent a few superfluities. The literary style of the book, like that of most college texts, could be improved.

The brief chapter on freedom is not very thorough, but is a fair-minded opening up of the issues to the elementary student. The same may be said of the chapter on "Morals and Cosmic Support." These chapters, and the entire book, exhibit intelligent appreciation of the higher values, combined with objective and scholarly methods of treatment. *Ethics for Today* is a useful book for students, and also for the perplexed layman.

EDGAR SHEFFIELD BRIGHTMAN.  
Boston University.

**The Christian Answer to the Problem of Evil.** By J. S. WHALE. New York: The Abingdon Press. \$1.00.

AN age-old problem is here treated with such clarity and brevity as to cause one to wonder why men continue to publish long, dry-as-dust books when they could just as easily—even more easily—publish short, interesting ones. President Whale has given in four concise, readable chapters—lectures they were originally—the substance of what other writers and speakers have taken several times the space to develop.

What is the answer to the problem of evil? Intellectually, President Whale affirms, there is no answer. But there is a practical solution. Indeed, there have been four classic answers: (1) that of sheer determinism, which attributes responsibility for evil to God himself; (2) that of a view of the universe which says there is no evil, only illusion; (3) that of a dualism which attributes evil to the devil, a being believed to be the eternal rival of God; (4) that of an outright denial of the existence of God, which denial makes the solution of the problem of evil unnecessary. The argument of chapter 2 is concerned with theism, which postulates an ordered, evolutionary, purposive universe in which the possibility of evil is necessary to the "best possible" world—a world of free personalities, not mere machines.

The Christian answer to the problem of evil, however, is not on purely intellectual grounds. It is, rather, on practical grounds, in the realm of experience. The Christian looks evil, both physical and moral evil, squarely in the face, recognizes its grim reality, and then finds a way of overcoming it, if not of turning it into positive good. This way is illustrated in what Jesus did with evil

on the cross. He let it do its worst in him. Then he conquered it. And after death, there came his glorious resurrection. Thus he overcame evil in the realm of the physical, where we, too, can overcome it through faith in him.

JOHN C. SLEMP.

Nashville, Tennessee.

**Some Problems of Life.** By RUFUS M. JONES. Nashville: Cokesbury Press. \$2.00.

To those who seek the mystical in religion a book by Rufus M. Jones is always an event, for he is certainly one of the outstanding exponents in our times of the inner spiritual values. It is not surprising that in this new book he deals with "intangibles, imponderables, and invisibles." With him it is the qualitative and not the quantitative which counts. One of the best parts of the book is the introduction, and a high point is struck there when the author declares that the present depression of humanity is to be traced, not to our degraded sense of our origin, but in our destiny—what can we make our lives mean.

In chapter four Doctor Jones deals with the essential characteristics of a person and considers that much used and little understood term—personality. He answers the question, "What is a person?" in such pungent phrases as: "To be a person is to be living by foresight and expectation." "To be a person is to be an ideal-forming being." "To be a person is to expand life in ideal directions." "A person is self-transcendent. He thinks beyond his achievements."

It is one of the outstanding features of this book that when you read a chapter, like the fourth, you think—"here is the high-light"; but when you turn to the fifth you are in the midst of something equally good on the subject of the



"springs and agencies of life-formation." To note but one thought, the author suggests that in place of the drive to convict of sin, which may harden rather than soften or convert, it would be better to convict the individual of the possibilities of goodness and righteousness, to awaken his spirit to the pursuit of the unattained, to quicken his imagination, to arouse in him the irrepressible urge to explore, to adventure, to make something of his life. And, after all, is that not what Jesus sought to do in most of His preaching?

Necessarily much of the material has been through the mill before; none the less, Doctor Jones has given it a personal touch and a consequent freshness which makes the book of great value to those who really try to solve these pressing problems of life. It may be confidently recommended both to the clergy and the laity.

By way of suggestion may we note that a fairly complete outline under the heading of each chapter is highly desirable in a book like this, and that an index would be of value, since many readers will be likely to keep the book for reference. Both are missing—unfortunately.

JOHN E. CHARLTON.

Morrow Memorial Church,  
Maplewood, New Jersey.

**Concerning the Ministry.** By JOHN OMAN. New York: Harper & Brothers. \$2.25.

Here is a book of real eloquence, and yet one in the reading of which the reader soon forgets the rhetoric in the content, because of the wealth of meaning, though the enjoyment of the words fitly written remains throughout.

It is really the higher eloquence which lies in the worth of what is said rather than in the manner of its saying. But the

profit of its reading is not lessened by the sheer pleasure derived therefrom.

For two consequences in the mind and heart of the reader outweigh admiration and enjoyment of the moving excellence of the book as literature. One is its immediate serviceability. The other is in a singularly high degree of actual impartation to the reader of the inspired and inspiring personality of the author. The book is intensely practical. It is useful and usable; a book for preachers by the diligent and discriminating use of which better and greater preachers are certain to be made. And this not by shallow devices but by clearer perception of the task and more power for its performance. It is a book to uplift the soul, to expand mind and heart, to quicken and energize the preacher's inmost self.

It is an achievement to compress so much of guidance and so much of uplift into one book. One feels, and rightly, that here is the condensation of a man's whole life. Without being an autobiography, it is yet the living record of those things that Oman found to be in all living most meaningful and most worth while. But this by no means signifies that the writer is constantly conscious of himself. He really is so forgetful of self that he can be personal without being egotistical. He writes from experience because he has had it; indeed, because experience has had him.

It takes big men to deal adequately with big themes. But when really great men deal with really great themes it is the theme which "increases" though it need not follow that the man must "decrease." And in this case there is so much of the man in the book that it is impossible to review the book without reviewing the man. It is evident that he did not write the book until he had lived it. Then it wrote itself. And the great thing about

it is that it is a book which will help other men also and in like manner to live.

It is about the lightest heavy book I have ever come across. And so widely ranging, so many-sided, many-angled. It contains enough to give an understanding reader a liberal education. And certainly it has rich store of mental food and spiritual drink for any student of the fine art of preaching. It deals with Style and Speaking, with Reading and Writing, with Preparation and Plan and Illustration in the most sensible and matter-of-fact way, and yet in these very chapters are crystal sentences and flashing insights and awakening reaches of penetrating thought.

The only way I would know of giving a summary of this book would be to quote it all. To know Doctor Oman personally must be a privilege. Any one may in a degree have that privilege by reading his book, for uniquely the book is the man.

J. PERCIVAL HUGET.

Shelter Island Presbyterian Church.

**The Structure of Religious Experience.** By JOHN MACMURRAY. New Haven: Yale University Press. \$1.50.

This little volume by the distinguished professor of philosophy of mind and logic in the University of London has relatively little to do with religious experience as commonly understood and as conceived in the classic treatises on the subject. Religious experience in the historical sense of the term denotes an experience in which there is an awareness of or reference to Deity. This is its essential nature. Without it the experience would not be distinctively religious. But of this aspect of religious experience Professor Macmurray takes little account. He speaks of the religious man as one who "comes to worship." But "the atti-

tude of worship" does not figure appreciably in the structure of religious experience as he develops it. He refers a few times to God, and in one instance tells us that the idea of God is inseparable from religious reflection. "The existence of God," he says, "cannot be rationally denied without self-contradiction." In some unrevealed way God is said to be "a universal person," "the universal Other," to whom the self stands in universal relation. He is also said to be "that infinite personality in which our finite relationships have their ground and their being." But as for a direct personal relation to Him there is nothing to indicate that this is the unique and distinctive element in religious experience.

Religion, according to Macmurray, differs from science, which has to do with utility values, and art, which has to do with intrinsic values, in that it is concerned with personal fellowship or communion. "The field of religion," he says, "is the field of personal relations, and the datum from which reflection starts is the reciprocity or mutuality of these. . . . The religious attitude is that attitude of mind for which our relations to other people are central. The religious life is the life which is dominated by the belief in the centrality of personal relations." These personal relations may include communion with Deity, but the latter to all appearances is incidental to religious experience and not constitutive of its essence.

The author has much to say about the "empirical" method. He opposes it to the "traditionalism" and "dogmatism" that have characterized religion down to the present. If religion is to survive, it must become "empirically-minded." In this respect it "must either transform itself or fade away." But just what religious empiricism means, is not made alto-

gether clear. At times the author seems to mean by it a rather crude philosophical naturalism. At other times he seems only to mean that religious beliefs must be tested by their significance for our common human experience—a truth that has underlain modern empirical theology since the time of Schleiermacher, though our author seems not to be aware of it.

Equally unclear is the author's conception of the relation of God to nature. Apparently he conceives of God as related in some necessary way to persons, but not to the natural order.

The fundamental element in religion he has for the most part passed by. He says much that is of value concerning the social or ethical implications of religion. But the heart of religion, its dynamic, receives little attention. The author, perhaps unintentionally, throws his influence on the side of those who think that we can get the fruits of religion without religion or at least without very much of it.

ALBERT C. KNUDSON.

Boston University,  
School of Theology.

**Indian Thought and Its Development.** By ALBERT SCHWEITZER.  
New York: Henry Holt and Company. \$2.50.

THE borderland of our realistic West and the metaphysical East is too often crossed by western thinkers without adding to our lay understanding. As to Hinduism, the most metaphysical of oriental systems, our philosophers either abandon their critical apparatus and become submerged in its devastating dialectics or they are repelled by it. Nor has the Hindu thinker approached us with curiosity or as a torchbearer, perhaps because he has hitherto been uncritical of his own system of thought. Nonetheless the Western impact on the

East has been more positive and rewarding. Hindu thinkers are now exploring the jungle for the first time since, in the last century, Christian scholars aroused them to a study of their Sanskrit sources and the socioreligious problems which defiled those well-springs. Today, alert minds like those of Gandhi, Tagore, Radhakrishnan, Bhattacharyya and Chatterji are engaging Indian speculative thought.

The difficulty, as Doctor Schweitzer suggests, lies in finding precise technical definitions for India's metaphysical negation of our world and life of reality. Bishop Whitehead of Madras, has told us of Bishop Gore's despair when a Hindu university graduate insisted that a lamb chop and the idea of a lamb chop were the same thing! We are only too acutely aware of it, because a meretricious system has been superimposed upon Hindu thought by cults like Theosophy which have exploited our ignorance and bowdlerized the terminology. Although today, since the unveiling of Lhasa, we know all about the legendary Mahatmas that Madame Blavatsky conveniently hid in inaccessible Tibet, the Hindu *swamies* still cast their spell over our twilight parlors and lecture halls. Doctor Schweitzer's book should be of service in finally unveiling Isis.

With a master musician's instinct for clarity, the author goes to the heart of the problem, "fully conscious of the difficulty of describing definite lines of development in a philosophy which possesses in so remarkable a degree the will and the ability not to perceive contrasts as such, and allows ideas of a heterogeneous character to subsist side by side and even brings them into connection with each other." Thus he juxtaposes our western "world and life affirmation," which is his way of expressing it, against the "world

and life negation" of the Upanishads and Brahmanas and the ninth century teaching of Samkara, all of which extol absorption in the Universal Spirit or Atman, and yet affirm the world of reality in Karma and the doctrine of transmigration.

Doctor Schweitzer points out that Christianity also contains the "world and life negation," since Jesus assumed that the kingdom of God is not to be realized in the natural world; but that Jesus fully recognized the imperfections of the natural world and devised his ethics for it. With all his mystical absorption in Hinduism, Gandhi has unreservedly admired the Christian ethic, and Hindu thinkers of today are aware that the inactive ethic of self-perfection accounts for the sterility of Hinduism in a world in which India is destined to play her part. Long ago Professor Max Muller observed that "in India you find yourself between an immense Past and an immense Future." Doctor Schweitzer's book is timely and should be read by every Christian missionary in India, and by all those who are interested in that immense future.

W. G. TINCKOM-FERNANDEZ.  
New York City.

**Abraham: Recent Discoveries and Hebrew Origins.** By SIR LEONARD WOOLLEY. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. \$3.00.

SIR LEONARD WOOLLEY now presents us with another stimulating book from the background of his excavations at Ur. It contains several novel suggestions regarding the connections of Abraham with the city of Ur, but the volume will probably be valued most for its detailed descriptions of the city of Ur in the twentieth century B. C. Woolley vividly reconstructs for us the pulsing life in

ancient Ur, and we may move through "Baker's Square" and "Paternoster Row" to a private residence, or we may visit a school to see the students at their studies and look over their shoulders at their practice texts and reading lessons. Then we may attend the chapel of the goddess Pa-sag at the corner of "Straight Street." Our most exciting experience will be a visit to the sacred area of the Moon-god Nannar, where we climb the walled platform of the Moon-god's terrace which is surmounted by the Ziggurat, and mingle with the crowds which make the forecourt look more like a market than a place of worship.

The social conditions of Ur during this period are analyzed, with comments on the commercial activities, the classes of society, the position of women, and the legal procedure. Despite some pretense to grandeur, this city of the time of Abraham was passing through a period of decline, after the rich culture of the Third Dynasty of Ur. It was now under the dominion of Rim-Sin of Larsa, who was being threatened by Hammurabi of Babylon.

The enlightened student of the Bible will have little quarrel with Woolley's brief summary of the documentary sources of Genesis, and will find an excellent estimate of these documents as historical data. There may be greater difference of opinion regarding the relation of the Ur data to Abraham.

The author explains the migration of Abraham from Ur as a part of a general migration of the Habiru tribe, perhaps under pressure of the local government when Hammurabi was threatening the city. Although Habiru are mentioned as early as this, the term can hardly have reference to a racial group such as assumed by Woolley. The author suggests that the flood story and the laws of Ham-

murabi were brought into Canaan by Abraham, and that the laws were later to be codified by Moses as an affirmation of the then half-forgotten tribal laws. Abraham is represented as the founder of a new religion which he achieved by elevating the nameless Sumerian family god and giving up the worship of Nannar when he left Haran. The religion to which he was thus "converted" was monolatrous and without definite moral content. An attempt is made to explain the tradition of the long lives of the patriarchs. The biblical Abraham is described as a composite of two people of similar name, separated by one generation.

H. G. MAY.

The Graduate School of Theology,  
Oberlin College.

**The Source of Civilization.** By  
GERALD HEARD. New York:  
Harper and Brothers. \$3.50.

WE have here the concluding volume of a trilogy, its predecessors being *The Ascent of Humanity* and *The Social Substance of Religion*. The author approaches his subject as one who girds himself for the performance of a mighty task. In the second sentence of the preface, he informs the reader that his book is "the third part of an inquiry into the foundations of society." Naturally no author should flippantly or precipitously plunge into the discussion of a subject of such broad and deep implications. And the most captious critic cannot accuse Mr. Heard of doing this. He builds his foundations with the utmost care. The work begins with a twenty-seven-page preface, which outlines the thesis of the study. The author first asks, "What holds society together?" In grappling with this question he states that the cohesive power is not force, instinct,

or religion. He then propounds his hypothesis that there is a way of social union through psychology, and the entire book is an elucidation of this principle.

After wrestling with the long preface, the reader feels a thrill of anticipation as he believes himself about to turn to Chapter I. But not yet! This is no book where the bewildered reader is thrown into the material to sink or swim, survive or perish. Next comes a twenty-page introduction. Now we are ready to proceed. As those who have read the author's earlier books know, he believes that an untrammelled individualism, rugged or otherwise, is disruptive and eventually leads to war. He further avers that humanity can be rescued from war and other decivilizing influences through teaching men how to enlarge their consciousness. This is the central idea of the book, although it is too rich in ideas to be adequately summarized in a few scant sentences. The author's purpose seems to be to provide a psychological and philosophical basis for the eradication of the war spirit. His discussion is panoramic. Comparatively seldom does the reader take up a volume which impinges upon so many phases of thought. In spite of Mr. Heard's exceptional care in marking the intellectual path upon which his reader travels, by no means is it always easy to see the relation between certain chapters and the main idea of the study. And occasionally the importance of certain forces in the broad sweep of history is much exaggerated. It is not minimizing the idealism or the influence of the Society of Friends to say that the reading of this book would give one the erroneous impression that Quakerism has been one of the two or three pre-eminent movements of history. There is, though, some justification of the author's special attention to the stand



of George Fox and his followers against militarism in all of its aspects.

Stylistically the book is uneven. It is meticulously outlined but at times confusing. It contains brilliant epigrammatic, Emersonian sentences. Yet on some pages the wheels of the author's style drag heavily. *The Source of Civilization* is not a substitute as reading matter for a mail-order catalogue or an even longer widely selling novel. It was written by a thinker for thinkers. To take exception to its main proposition would be difficult. On the other hand, many of its incidental ideas will set the reader to debating with the author. This is most certainly not a fault. Such a book is certain to stimulate cerebration. He who reads it will have a hard time to forget its contents. Again and again will he find himself grappling with some thought which he has garnered from its pages. This work, built upon such a massive scale and dealing with the most significant aspects of history, belongs to the literature of suggestion.

LEWIS H. CHRISMAN.

West Virginia Wesleyan College.

**The Old Testament, Its Making and Meaning.** By H. WHEELER ROBINSON. Nashville: Cokesbury Press. \$2.00.

A book so often in agreement with the reviewer's own volumes in the same field naturally gets approval. The author, principal of Regent's Park College and reader in Biblical criticism at Oxford, has ably introduced background, content, character and canon of the Old Testament, on a scholarly basis satisfying to the deeper student, yet readable for the less skilled. In the main, it is quite up to date, refreshingly in advance of the critical views of a few decades ago in

spite of the influence of Budde, Driver, Moore, *et al.*

The appendix, with the clever chart depicting the chief lines of development of the Old Testament, is a pedagogical tool of no mean value. It could be an adequate syllabus by itself. The volume as a whole is so good, the factual content so extensive, one hesitates to criticize. However, the author does seem to ignore many important suggestions from American scholarship. Mention might have been made of the possibility that Ezekiel is a pseudoepigrap; that the Hebrews might have an Anatolian origin; that Ezra might be a fictitious figure, though the tangled threads of the Ezra-Nehe-miah problem are beautifully threaded for the novice. There is no treatment of the philosophical aspects of Habakkuk, or the theory of its Greek period origin. Esther is still considered nationalistic; Ecclesiastes is viewed only from the pessimistic angle. The Phoenicians receive undue credit for the alphabet, in spite of Petrie, Gardiner, and the Sinaitic texts so ably presented in publications of the University of Chicago and the American Schools of Oriental Research.

One feels also that though replete with data well presented, the literary fire, the appreciation of religious dynamic, is obscured. Micah and Isaiah do not live vitally for the reader, though deftly analyzed. Nahum's perfect mastery of the technique of Hebrew verse—a thrilling and brilliant illustration which every student should know—is passed over. Analysis and structure outweigh other considerations.

Yet it is a good book, full of information, pleasing, worth-while as reference or text.

CARL SUMNER KNOPF.

Dean, School of Religion,

The University of Southern California.

**Christ's Way and the World's—In Church, State and Society.** By HENRY SMITH LEIPER. New York: The Abingdon Press. Cloth, 90 cents; paper, 65 cents.

It would be hard to imagine how a more clear and enlightening picture of the leading forces and trends in the world today, as they are related to the Christian Church and the kingdom of God, could be put into the short space of 140 pages, than has been done in this book of Doctor Leiper's. Certainly, in the baffling business of trying to discern, even dimly, "the signs of the times," I have never received more help from a small book than I have from this one. And I must confess that that was a great surprise. Not that I had any doubts about Henry Leiper. I have read him too much to be surprised at the wide knowledge and vigor of the writing to be found in the book. It was rather that I have had a long and not very happy experience with little books decked out in promising titles, written in furtherance of some special interest or project. So when I read on the title page, "A Study prepared in consultation with a committee of the American Advisory Committee of the Oxford Conference on Church, State and Society; under the auspices of the Universal Christian Council for Life and Work," I feared the worst. That would be enough to sink Thomas Carlyle. Books brought into the world under such austere and overwhelming auspices, usually limp forth, frail little invalids from their birth, and soon reach an early grave. But Leiper's book is a baby Hercules, very much alive, grappling with the biggest serpents in the world. And it has a tough grip.

The author has thrown off the handi-

caps of being a study prepared for a conference, on page one. He has decided that the largest contribution to the Oxford Conference next summer will be to get people to do some vigorous thinking. If the Oxford Conference faces contemporary issues with anything like the forthright honesty, courage, and penetration displayed in this volume, it will be a real event in Christian history.

The largest service to the reader will be done by indicating the scope of the book. The title is a fair description of the purpose. It deals with the world confronting the Church, and what the Church has with which to confront the world. It is a remarkable piece of condensation, without superficiality. Its various chapters—"What Christianity Offers the World," "The Church's Strength and Weakness," "The Church and the Changing State," "The Church and the Economic Order," bring clear and robust thinking to bear on what is perhaps the most exciting and crucial hour of the Church's history since the first century.

Two features of Doctor Leiper's work make vivid impressions. The first is the astonishing range of knowledge, detailed, timely, and pertinent. His knowledge of Europe is, like Sam Weller's knowledge of London, extensive and peculiar. He knows what European Christianity is facing, knows it from wide personal contact. The book deserves the widest circulation, if only for its discussion of the threat of Fascism and of incipient Fascism and Caesarism in the United States. Added to this is the forthright, indeed passionate, warmth of the writing, his conveying of the sense of urgency and momentousness of the issues.

That, of course, is what one who has followed Doctor Leiper's courageous work for the victims of the Nazi regime

in Germany would expect. A word of gratitude is fitting in this connection. Doctor Leiper is part of one of the real mysteries of present-day American Protestantism. That "mystery," and I use the word in a very real and serious sense, is how in the providence of God it is that we have in the very center of the Federal Council of Churches, which by all precedents might easily be a very citadel of sterile officialism and embalmed bureaucracy, some of the freest, most outspoken prophetic leadership in America, in men like Samuel McCrea Cavert, Walter Van Kirk and Henry Leiper. One comes to expect most official headquarters to be a total loss as far as pioneering Christianity is concerned. The present book of Doctor Leiper's is one additional item in a large sum total for gratitude.

HALFORD E. LUCCOCK.

Yale Divinity School.

**Christian Worship.** Edited by NATHANIEL MICKLEM. London and New York: Oxford University Press. \$5.00.

THIS book is a systematic study of Public Worship, written from the viewpoint of English Non-Conformists, the authors being members of Mansfield College. As is the case with nearly every symposium the chapters are of unequal value; and it is surprising that in a survey so wide in its scope no consideration should be given to worship in the Church of England or in the Society of Friends. But the historical studies are of exceptional interest, and the interpretation of the common tradition of the Reformed Churches is so discriminating as to make this one of the most important books in its specialized field.

Throughout the book it is assumed that there is "one specific and essential kind

of religious act"—namely, worship. Worship is necessary as an expression of religion; not of course as a substitute for ethical conduct, but as complementary to it. Essentially as well as etymologically, worship is the recognition of God's worth. It has no direct reference to the edification of the worshipers. It is an offering to God, acceptable to Him, and incumbent upon man.

The corporate character of worship, fully exemplified in the Old Testament, receives adequate recognition. There is sympathetic reference to the Talmudic saying, "In prayer a man should always unite himself with the community." This is especially evident in the Lord's Supper, which the authors justly describe as the central act of Christian worship. "The whole of Christ's Church, militant and triumphant, is present at the Table. Any individual experience that may be granted is dependent on the individual's acceptance of his place within a corporate experience." To those ignorant of the faithfulness with which the Reformers followed the main stream of Christian tradition, it may occasion surprise to be told by Non-Conformists that "a non-sacramental Christianity tends to become nonsupernatural, or else takes refuge in a mysticism which is not distinctively Christian because it has lost the living link with history." The Eucharist is a perpetual witness to the fact that our faith rests on history, and it is good to be reminded of the fact.

The Reformation laid primary emphasis on the Word as the basis of faith and worship. "Protestant worship recalls the Word-Service of the Synagogue rather than the Mystery-Service of the Temple." To restore the preached Word of God to equality with the sacraments as a means of grace was one aspect of the Reformers' mighty task. But this did not involve

neglect of the sacraments, and it is noteworthy that Calvin asked for a celebration of the Eucharist at least once a week. "Even if we call these ordinances symbols," say the authors, "we do not necessarily reduce them to mere *signs*, for a symbol is effective only as it also conveys what it signifies."

The authors are rendering weighty service when they demand that sincerity and reality shall not be sacrificed to continuity and conformity. It is quite true that chants and hymns and liturgical prayers sometimes express a theology that has been superseded, and that "God is often approached as a despotic monarch rather than as the Loving Father." It is not the least merit of this valuable book that it supplies quite incidentally some excellent "liberal evangelical" theology.

HOWARD CHANDLER ROBBINS.

General Theological  
Seminary.

### The Use of the Bible in Preaching.

By CARL S. PATTON. Chicago:  
Willett, Clark & Company. \$2.00.

DOCTOR PATTON lays timely emphasis upon the modern need for Biblical preaching, not only because of widespread, prevailing ignorance of Scripture on the part of clergy and laity, but "because of the vast amount of new Biblical knowledge which has made the Bible a new book." "The pulpit," we are told, "is no place for lectures. What a preacher knows about the Bible should permeate his preaching and pervade his sermons."

It is disconcerting to be told in almost the next sentence that "all preaching should not be Biblical. Far from it. . . . Current happenings call for comment and interpretation. It is idle to pretend that the only things we

need talk about in the pulpit are to be found in the Bible. . . . It is a waste of time to try to find a Bible text for every sermon." "Uninterrupted Biblical preaching would be as monotonous as any other kind of unvaried preaching." Such statements will hardly meet with universal approbation by those who have been accustomed to understand by Biblical preaching the presentation of any truth for which there is scriptural authority which finds its illustration in or its application to modern conditions and events or to individual experience.

By "the vast amount of new knowledge which has made the Bible a new book" Doctor Patton means the Higher Criticism, to which is ascribed "rich homiletic value." Higher Criticism has given us a new story of the production of Biblical literature; a new chronology; a new idea of authorship, and has shown the composite character of many of the several books of the Bible. The homiletic value which the author claims for the Higher Criticism dissolves under his handling of it and reappears as a City of Refuge to which the minister may escape when pursued by a parishioner too inquisitive as to the miraculous element in Scripture. He can explain that the event happened centuries before its record and the writer invented the miracles to embellish his story. Thus "the miracles ascribed to Elijah and Elisha are really as much out of place as a story of Jack the Giant Killer would be in a history of the Pilgrim Fathers." But thus saved from Scylla, Charybdis yawns. The next question is easily anticipated: "How distinguish between the things you will believe and the things you will not? How will you know where to stop? By the use of your common sense." It is to be suspected that the line will rather

be drawn by what it is and what it is not convenient to believe.

The New Testament, being more familiar, receives less attention. The minister's attitude toward "Form Criticism," by which is meant the effort to distinguish between what Jesus actually said and what is attributed to him by the evangelists, should be, according to Doctor Patton, one of openmindedness, since intellectual honesty shrinks from quoting an evangelist under the impression that the quotation is a saying of Jesus. It really seems that even a scholastic use of the Bible in preaching might dispense with such fruitless industry as that required by "Form Criticism." Can anyone be so fatuous as to suppose the ipsissima verba of Jesus will ever emerge!

The busy minister will read Doctor Patton's book with profit and find it stimulating to more intensive Bible study which will result in the enrichment of all his preaching.

J. FREDERIC BERG.

The Reformed Protestant Dutch Church, Flatbush, Brooklyn, N. Y.

**City Man.** By CHARLES HATCH SEARS.  
New York: Harper and Brothers.  
\$1.50.

**CITY MAN** is the inhabitant of the new metropolitan community personified. Doctor Sears knows him and loves him. A service of more than thirty years as executive of the Baptist City Mission Societies of metropolitan New York, following a city pastorate, has made Doctor Sears one of the best interpreters of this strange being, who as someone says, seldom stops to look at himself. Doctor Sears is not only a pastor and a church executive, but he is a sociologist of real standing. He always brings interpretation to his accurate summary of facts. This book reveals that he also is some-

thing of a poet, as he begins with a somewhat mystical chapter on "City Man Looks at His City."

The book has most interesting factual studies about the growth of the metropolitan community and its genius. However, as one progresses with the book, the question arises as to the accuracy of the opening sentence, which is, "During the past quarter century a new creature has appeared upon our planet." On page 32 there is a reference to "the sudden emergence of the metropolitan community." The analysis of *City Man* and his problems is stimulating, but one wonders whether the transformations are as rapid and cataclysmic as is hinted in the opening part of the book. The later chapters, which deal primarily with the city church and its message and program, do not suggest much that would not have applied for a long time and anywhere. Great metropolitan communities are features of life which are perhaps more dominant than they have been since ancient Rome, but they are gradual developments, and perhaps as rapid changes have been taking place in the thought and life of those dwellers of less fortunate or more fortunate areas outside.

This book is, however, not primarily a study of *City Man* himself, but a discussion of what the Church ought to do about him. Here Doctor Sears is perfectly at home and stimulating in his suggestions. A fundamental question should perhaps be raised which does not appear in definite form. If the city is doing something to its inhabitants, should the mission of the Church be primarily along the lines of the city pattern? Or, on the other hand, should it see that *City Man* is a warped individual, and concentrate on a ministry to the sides of his nature which the city process neglects?



Some of Doctor Sears' comments are apparently on one side and some on the other. His splendid analysis of creative religious education is a statesmanlike study of the way in which City Man can be educated to move along with city life with a religious interpretation. He stresses three points: a. Social imagination. b. Creation of loyalties. c. Social responsibility. Along the same line is the important emphasis on a new cultural synthesis to take the place of the vanishing neighborhood and the good neighbors of simpler days. On the other hand, we have such valuable points of emphasis as the ministry to individuals, the ministry to groups, the culture of the individual soul, the development of local sentiment and interest. In the opening chapter is the interesting sentence, "The mechanical net has a private loophole for each man it has entrapped." Is it the business of the city church to be a part of the net interwoven with the other strands of enmeshing life, or should it try to enlarge the hole, enabling man to squirm through as best he can, or at least to look through and cultivate his soul by visions of the beauties which are not part of his immediate surroundings?

THEODORE F. SAVAGE.

New York City.

**Prisons and Beyond.** By SANFORD BATES. New York: The Macmillan Company. \$3.50.

During this past year the writer of this review has been permitted to make some personal visits to prisons in Russia and in the United States. These experiences have made this volume particularly interesting, and have furnished some unusual comparisons between the author's ideas and the reviewer's practical observations. Every page of this unusual book reveals the authoritative character of the man

who wrote it. Mr. Bates has had twenty years of experience dealing with prison problems, and is as well informed on his subject as anyone in America. He is frankly progressive in his interpretation of methods for handling criminals, but is so well supported by facts that his positions are difficult of contradiction.

The author realizes the social protection which prisons must give, but he is particularly interested in the unfortunate human beings who are confined in them. He believes that a prison system should have as its purpose the social rehabilitation of the inmates, not only for their sakes but as the best ultimate protection to society, itself. Therefore, penal administration must be adapted to the individual needs of the prisoner and every contribution which can be made by teachers, physicians, social workers, psychiatrists and others must be united to help the prisoner to find a useful place in society when his term is over.

If proper morale is to be maintained, prisons must provide their inmates with work, but such work should preferably be for state use and should not be allowed to compete with or interfere with outside labor. One of the chief problems in present prison administration is the overcrowding of our institutions with all the attendant evils created thereby. Prison discipline is best maintained not by cruelty or severity but on the basis of privileges for good behavior and equal treatment for all. Politics should be taken out of prison administration, the spoils system removed, and civil service universally adopted. This will improve the personnel of those dealing with prisoners and will attract a superior type of individual into the service.

Mr. Bates is a strong believer in the parole system despite the occasional lapses of paroled convicts. He holds that it

gives the public the added protection of supervised release and offers an incentive for good behavior, sends the prisoner out of prison under an obligation rather than with a score to settle, reduces expense and has other valuable features. This book not only contains up-to-date information regarding the most modern and progressive methods of penal administration, but it is very readable because of the human interest element in it. There are vivid descriptions of some of America's foremost prisons, including the famous Alcatraz, fascinating narratives of the contribution of modern science to crime detection and in prison work, and many touching stories out of the lives of prisoners themselves. Anyone who wants real information and desires to get it in interesting and dramatic style should read this book.

ALFRED GRANT WALTON.

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Brooklyn, New York.

**Victorious Living.** By E. STANLEY JONES. New York: The Abingdon Press. \$2.00.

Under the unyielding allurements of his "Magnificent Obsession," the author has fashioned a fascinating fabric. He has followed an annual pattern involving a multitude of daily designs, yet with each portion both inseparable and distinct. The one thread that runs from cover to cover is the persisting conception of the kingdom of God on earth. Everything else is subsidiary, collateral.

There are very few bits of involved weaving. For the most part, each thrust of the thread of his purpose is precise, swift, staccato. As in his spoken messages, Doctor Jones comes quickly and frequently to the point. In the main he follows a pragmatic plan. "Is life a bubble or an egg?" Test it, he would

say, and see, in the long run, which answer will most accurately and adequately account for reality.

In the earlier sections of the volume an intimate, individual approach to reality is made. Out of his rich fund of Christian experience, vitalized by his Ashram sharing, and with a keen sense of observation and a disarming candor, he leads the reader, step by step, into a more abundant consciousness of the reality of Christ in individual experience. That reality is neither academic nor anaemic. The ethical implications of the individual Christian life are not blinked. *Victorious Living* is saved from being a mystical effusion by the detailed interweaving of the strands of exacting ethical ideas and requirements, but more especially by insistence upon the larger implications of victorious living in corporate and universal terms. The tangled threads of suspicion, fear and rivalry, which not alone spoil the beauty of the garment but render it untrustworthy and unserviceable, are handled without gloves by the author. Whether it be the implications of the unethical, economic, political or racial barriers that keep people apart, or the evils of competitive denominationalism that have so sadly hindered the coming of the kingdom of God on earth, *Victorious Living* grapples with them frankly and with a high degree of constructive sagacity.

Doctor Jones rises to his heights as he blends the historic, the experimental and the corporate aspects of Christian faith into one surpassing reality. "We have seen the Life revealed in a life," he says, "but that life passes from the historical into the experimental. . . . We do not remember Christ, we realize Him. But that personal experience may be an hallucination if alone. It must be corroborated by the collective witness."

It is difficult to put one's finger upon any particular spot in this closely woven fabric of faith and to say, "Here are the threads of evangelical fervor, here of ethical insistence, here of mystical experience, here of theological presupposition, here of social passion." These various strands run through and through the whole, under an artistry largely effortless because of the glory of the perfect pattern let down from the skies in human form, upon whom the author seldom ceases to fix his eyes.

Those who have heard Doctor Jones in recent days, notably in the National Preaching Mission, will recognize not a few of his recent most telling utterances in the pulpit or around the conference table. In both the written and the spoken word the same unmistakable identity is disclosed.

*Victorious Living*, a theme fraught with rare promise and yet subject to the perils of the counsels of perfection, has been given such simple, straightforward unfolding at the hands of one of the foremost Christian disciples of this or of any generation that it may well take its place as a masterpiece of Christian experience. Somewhere between the mystical approach of Thomas à Kempis in his matchless *The Imitation of Christ*, and the less profound but not fruitless pragmatism of Charles M. Sheldon's *In His Steps*, or *What Would Jesus Do?* E. Stanley Jones in *Victorious Living* leads those who are willing to follow his sensitive, disciplined mind and spirit, into experiences of such a conclusive sort that it is not presumptuous to call them, in the concluding words of the author's own introduction to his volume, "certain, adequate, victorious."

WILLIAM HIRAM FOULKES.

Old First Church,  
Newark, N. J.

### Return to Philosophy. By C. E. M.

JOAD. New York: E. P. Dutton and Company. \$2.50.

Many book reviews are written from a jacket or a preface, but few are written from an index (as this one is going to be), possibly because few writers are methodical enough to furnish an index for their books and fewer still furnish an index so utterly fascinating and propelling as C. E. M. Joad's in his *Return to Philosophy*. Here, exactly as they appear, Casanova steps out with Chesterton, Mrs. Eddy with Einstein, Galileo with Greta Garbo, Dean Inge with Jack the Ripper, Plotinus with Puccini, Bertrand Russell with St. John of the Cross, Richard Wagner with Edgar Wallace, and Virginia Woolf with William Wordsworth. The pairings are, of course, alphabetical rather than intentionally blasphemous; nevertheless, by an accidental logic, which Joad himself would be the first to appreciate, they suggest the major conflicts in modern thought, with which he deals in this amazingly comprehensive and constructive book, thus: license vs. authority; revelation vs. relativity; religion vs. crime; music vs. mystery novels; and surrealism vs. mysticism. These are all aspects of the underlying struggle between mere vividness and values, unreasoning impulsivism and a reasoned idealism. This Joad fights out victoriously against such favored opponents as Freud, Jung, Adler, D. H. Lawrence, and Aldous Huxley.

The latter, Joad thinks, is especially influential in shaping English thought at the moment; accordingly he reserves his most devastating arguments and his most barbed epigrams for what he delights to call Huxley's "Cult of Lowbrowism" and Huxley's "Snobbery of Anti-Culture." To escape from these Joad proposes a return to the discarded "Dowag-

ers," who formerly dictated taste and morals: Truth, Beauty, and Goodness. These, he insists, are reasonably to be preferred to the tawdry substitutes proposed for them by the "new educators," new-realists, sur-realists, and voluptuaries, namely: Trial-and-Error, Grotesquerie, and "Guts." Joad doesn't like the term but he uses it (p. 145) because he knows his opponents will respect him if he throws in "a beautiful monosyllabic word of infinite coarseness"; also because it is the lowest common denominator of D. H. Lawrence's confessed divinity of "the abdomen (the "quotes" are Lawrence's not Joad's), where the great blood stream surges in the dark, falling back from the mind, from sight and speech and knowing, back to the great central source where is rest and unspeakable renewal."

"Quite," an Englishman would interpolate, by way of commending the unintentionally nice use of the adjective "unspeakable": also by way of applauding Joad for letting Lawrence summarize his whole philosophy in a single sentence, so that the Hydra's heads, having been reduced to one neck, can be more easily severed.

This *coup de grace* Joad administers, after the manner of Cyrano de Bergerac, "exquisitely." Realizing that "only the greatest philosophers achieve a perpetual twinkle in the eye," he lightens his logic with wit as subtle as Santayana's and satire as trenchant as Lewis's but kindlier, keeping always "a liberal mouth with happy corners."

This suggests the eminent readability of the book in spite of the profundity of its subject-matter and the extent of its achievement, which is nothing less than the establishment, beyond cavil, of the validity of values and their motivations, ideals. In fact its unflagging interest and unfailing artistry place it in the super-

category of philosophical writing set up by a wag's comment on the James brothers (Henry and William):

"The one of them, a novelist, wrote novels that read like philosophy; the other, a philosopher, wrote philosophy that reads like a novel."

In this book Joad unquestionably takes a place beside William James as one of the literary artists who did not consider his art wasted on philosophy, and, so, added to Truth, Beauty, and to Beauty, Livingness.

EARL MARLATT.

Boston University.

#### **A Program of Religious Education.**

By J. M. PRICE, L. L. CARPENTER, A. E. TIBBS. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. \$2.50.

#### **The Philosophy of Christian Education.**

By HERMAN HARRELL HORNE. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. \$1.50.

#### **Character and Christian Education.**

By STEWART G. COLE. Nashville: The Cokesbury Press. \$2.00.

ABOUT all there is in common in these three books is that they deal with Religious Education. The second two are both philosophical, however different the basic argument may be, while the first is a detailed text on organization and administration of Religious Education in the local church.

*A Program of Religious Education* is valuable in its detail, though consequently verbose, and the fact that it brings together in one volume a total educational program for the church. The material is based largely upon the more formal methods of instruction and procedure, though Tibbs does develop the principles of creative teaching. The entire book is delimited in its usefulness,

however, in that its terms are specific and refer to organization, training unions or mission effort of one denomination only, as it is written definitely for leadership education in the Southern Baptist Church.

It is stimulating and refreshing to have a book written by Doctor Horne which goes solely to the Bible for the philosophy of Christian education. Doctor Horne makes a real distinction between "Religious Education" and "Christian Education," which is centered in the teachings of Christ and Paul. He feels that "what 'Religious Education' as a movement in our country has lost in general esteem, 'Christian Education' can and will recover."

The author states that "the Church today can fulfill its mission only as it takes four looks: first, back to the historic Jesus; then, within, to the indwelling Christ; then, without, to a needy and sin-sick world; and then up to the Risen Lord." This is the whole Gospel, both individual and social, as it has its source in Christ.

The numerous Bible references used as "proof texts" are not always convincing, and one wishes the author had taken into consideration the contributions of higher criticism as they might have modified certain conclusions drawn. But Doctor Horne has determinedly limited his discussion in this respect. The method and philosophy developed need to be weighed carefully in our program of religious education today. Surely, "Christian Education is the perfecting of man in the image of God, as revealed in Christ."

The book by Doctor Cole gives us an entirely new approach to the philosophy of Christian education. It suggests a solution for one of our greatest problems in modern philosophy. That is, the hiatus between ideals and action, or be-

tween moral or character and religious education.

Dewey recognizes this dualism, but solves it by eliminating ideas and taking religion, soul, and God out of the picture. Cole rather identifies religion and life, and solves the problem by recognizing both, but making them one. Speaking of Dewey, Kilpatrick, and Otto, he says, "It is not by chance that these men refuse to afford the religion of the churches a formative place in their treatment of high character processes." Later on, he states the very center of his own philosophy when he says that character in the process of formation is religious. He identifies character and Christ in the following statement, "What the secular idealist calls character, the Christians term Christ. The symbols 'character' and 'Christ' represent the same spiritual reality in a person, only they belong to two different traditions." Accepting this philosophy, every character-forming agency—Scouts, 4-H Clubs, Public Schools, High "Y," and all the others—becomes a developer of religion in the life of the boy or girl, and this religious aspect should be recognized and utilized. It is a challenging philosophy.

There are many places where one would wish the author to go further in his thinking. The last chapter is especially disappointing, for instead of being climactic, it ends in almost a reversal of thought in that the church program is suddenly made a separate entity again, and all the one-ness of the process is broken. We look forward with great anticipation, however, to further works from President Cole, and more clear focusing of the unity of all religion and life and the identity of inarticulate and articulate religion in one process so that we may have "a religion that is pledged



to spiritualize the human energies of an industrial and scientific age."

J. HENRY CARPENTER.

Executive Secretary,  
Brooklyn Church and Mission  
Federation.

**First Adventures in Philosophy.** By  
VERGILIUS FERM. New York:  
Charles Scribner's Sons. \$2.00.

THIS book, by the scholarly editor of *Contemporary American Theology*, is something new in introductory texts. It is written in a jocular style for the "first adventurer" in the field, and is enlivened by a wealth of illustration and interesting pictorial diagrams. Anyone imagining philosophy to be a dry and pedantic subject will find this illusion dispelled. Yet the book gives a remarkably comprehensive treatment of the most important problems and types of philosophy, past and present. It takes courage to attempt to make clear to the first adventurer, in four pages, the intricacies of Professor Whitehead's philosophy, terminology and all.

My impression is that the author attempts more than can be accomplished with full success. The earlier pages are clear enough to be understood by anyone who reads the English language. But when the types begin to be explained, the statement of unfamiliar concepts and terminology gets involved in so much detail that I fear the first adventurer might—as Berkeley once put it—be "lost and embroiled in inextricable difficulties." He would need a guide.

The book is not only full of important material but it is eminently fair-minded. It has as little of personal bias as a book can have without being spineless. Many systems are spread before the reader and he is invited to take his choice. The treatment of personalism is less satisfactory

than of most. After a page and a half on Herbart and Lotze, the Boston school gets a half page and a footnote. This is accurate as far as it goes, though I question whether personalism and panpsychism are as close together as Professor Ferm suggests.

The author's treatment of religion does not satisfy this reviewer, though to define religion in a way to suit everybody would of course be impossible. Like Professor Dewey, Professor Ferm distinguishes between *religion* and *religious*, preferring to define the latter as the more fundamental term. After showing why it ought not to be defined as any one aspect of our total mental life, or as a type of belief, or as ethics, or as something so vague that it means nothing in particular, he offers his own definition and defends it as avoiding these mistakes. "For one to be religious," he says, "is to effect in some way and in some measure, individually or socially, a vital adjustment to *w(W)hatever is reacted to or regarded implicitly as worthy of serious and ulterior concern*" (italics his). In my judgment this "*w(W)hatever*," which the author says need not be God but may be "an indefinite and general Something to which the adjustment is made," is too indefinite to give religion any distinctive character. It might be the State or one's family, or, as Professor Ferm admits, it might be one's business; but to make political, domestic, or economic loyalties *per se* a religious adjustment is to vitiate the term. The author prefers *ulterior* to *ultimate* concern because the latter "smacks of finality and the absolute," but one may question whether "ultimate concern" is not exactly what religion must have in order to be *religious*.

The book will prove very useful to those whose college philosophy has suf-

fered the "vitiation of memory" and needs renewal. It will provide it in a fresh and interesting manner.

GEORGIA HARKNESS.

Elmira College.

**Worship.** By EVELYN UNDERHILL.  
New York: Harper & Brothers.  
\$3.00.

This very valuable and informing book is one of a projected series by representative authors to meet "a great though silent crisis confronting the Christian Church." The author is eminently fitted by a rich spiritual experience and broad culture. Evelyn Underhill is a practical mystic, one of an illustrious company, which includes Paul, "the abundance of whose revelations" inspired and energized "the abundance of labors" which paved the way for Christianity into Europe; Saint Ignatius, whom William James called "one of the most powerful human engines that ever lived"; Saint Teresa, who with all her raptures kept insisting upon her nuns that "the real object of spiritual communion was work, work"; Saint Bernard, Luther, Cromwell, Wesley, George Fox, and others, who have given form and pressure to modern society.

The conception of worship in this volume is of the most exalted character, combined with a full and sympathetic knowledge of the religious needs of all Christian worshippers. Miss Underhill writes that she has been criticized "because I have failed to denounce the shortcomings of Judaism with Christian thoroughness, that I have left unnoticed primitive and superstitious elements which survive in Catholic and Protestant worship and that I have not emphasized the liturgic and sacramental shortcomings of the Protestant sects. But my wish has been to show all these as chapels in one

Cathedral of Spirit; the love which has gone to their adornment, the shelter they can offer to many kinds of adoring souls." This tolerant spirit is like that which appears in "The Christmas Eve" of Robert Browning. He and other spiritually minded persons recognize that Christ's seamless garment of love covers all human frailties of worship, giving them warmth and inspiration.

In the chapter upon worship of the Free Churches—the Baptist, Methodist, Congregational and Quaker—Miss Underhill pays an eloquent tribute to "that 'royally, generous wind,' which blows through the Gospels with its freshness and freedom, its unlimited love and pity for sinners yet positive demand for a life set toward Holiness, which is of all constituents of Christianity, one of the most life-giving, most precious and most easily lost."

No lover of Methodism could write more justly and appreciatively of its worship. "The driving force of its founder was the driving force of the saints; the passion for Holiness, and the conviction that Holiness was the proper aim of every Christian life. . . . The secret of primitive Christian worship was caught again; the realistic certitude of God; transforming grace poured out on men, the light, life, and love of the Transcendent made accessible to every soul 'in Christ.'" "In those early Methodist hymns, which spread through England the forgotten spiritual treasures of Christian spirituality . . . we find reminiscences of all the masters of adoring worship, Catholic and Protestant alike."

In the concluding chapter, which is full of suggestion, she states that "the devotional and liturgical path is at once Evangelical and Eucharistic. Here the renewed emphasis on the person of Christ and the centrality of the Eucharist, found

in various ways and degrees in all parts of the Christian Church at the present day—all point to a fresh recognition of the close dependence of man on the Divine self-giving and of the Eucharistic rhythm as the supernatural theme of human life." "The selfless spirit of worship pours itself out in that sacrificial effort which seeks to transform the sacrificial order and especially the human scene—cleansing, healing, saving, reconciling."

DANIEL DORCHESTER.

Lexington, Mass.

**Jesus Christ Our Lord.** By OTTO JUSTICE BAAB. New York: The Abingdon Press. \$1.75.

Here is a book which undertakes to do for this day and generation what the councils of Nicaea, Basle, and Chalcedon did for theirs; namely, "to declare the divinity of Christ in terms that have definite meaning and value" for living men. Its language, therefore, is not the language of historic creeds. It is the living language of today; a fact to rejoice in, for it certainly is high time that Christian faith should be set forth in terms that are understandable by people who can listen unconvinced and unmoved to the formulas of fourth-century metaphysics yet who desperately need to believe that God was—and is—in Christ reconciling the world unto Himself. To all such this book will be more than welcome. It is honestly and courageously written. No attempt is made to use language which, being vague and ambiguous, may have different meanings for different minds and thus prove acceptable at once to the extreme orthodox and to the extreme liberal point of view. The reader, of whatever theological persuasion, is left in no doubt as to what the author means when

he declares that Jesus Christ is the Son of God.

For Doctor Baab, God is "particularly to be seen in human communion and intercourse, although His activity upon other levels of existence must not be overlooked." He is the eternal power who "fosters and sustains sacrificial adjustments between an increasing number of persons and groups"; He is the power that "organizes the men of earth into larger and larger circles of spiritually and ethically harmonious beings." And for Doctor Baab, Jesus Christ is the Son of such a God. "We mean, then, that Jesus is so uniquely and concretely related to the power we call God that His divinity is beyond dispute. In Him dwells all the fullness of the Godhead bodily. In Him the power of mutual and sacrificial love has come to men.

The author, however, is not content to stop with this heartening view of God in Christ. Declaring that "the curse of religion is our absorption in neat theological definitions and pretty ceremonies and our timid refusal to live with God on the plane of mutual love and sacrificial understanding," he proceeds in following chapters to point out the practical implications and demands of faith in such a God. What does Christian faith call for in the economic order? "Christ as the unique embodiment of the spirit of inclusive love must be made central and dominant in the economic life of society" (p. 84). What does it call for in the international order? "If a man loves this God of inclusive love, then, he will consecrate his manhood to the task of overthrowing war by every ethical and intelligent means at his disposal. What does Christian faith mean for race relations? "In the possession of a common humanity all races are physically and spiritually one. In Christ there is but one

race—the human race whose members are potential sons of God” (p. 117). What does it mean for sex relations? “In no other relationship can effective sacrificial communion be so fully operative. Once more let it be recalled that in such communion practiced by mature people God is active and at work. Christ is uniquely the Son of God; so that a man and a woman whose hearts are aglow with mutual love and understanding are by their very mutualism allowing Christ to enter their lives, provided they are ever willing to enlarge the circle of their love that it may include other human beings” (p. 137).

In his last chapter, “Christ and Salva-

tion,” Doctor Baab shows the falsity of the customary distinction between the gospel of individual salvation and the social gospel. . . . To be saved a man must be reconciled to the God whose nature demands reconciliation with his fellow men” (p. 185).

Here is a book, written by a competent scholar, which with rare insight exhibits the complete and all-important relevancy of Christian faith to the situation in which human beings find themselves today. This reviewer, for one, devoutly hopes that it will find many readers.

ERNEST FREMONT TITTLE.  
First Methodist Episcopal Church,  
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## Bookish Brevities

The article, "Religious Books Which Endure," was read by Doctor Mack at the Annual Conference of the American Library Association. The Conference passed a resolution favoring the publication of the paper in RELIGION IN LIFE.

R. Birch Hoyle has been engaged to supply each quarter a summary of recent theological literature issued in Great Britain and in Europe. Doctor Hoyle is world famous as a reviewer of religious books, has contacts with publishing houses which afford him early knowledge of new books, and has acquaintance with the needs and desires of American readers through a residence of several years in the United States. The first of his contributions appears in this number.

In response to repeated requests from readers of RELIGION IN LIFE in Great Britain, who complain that they find it inconvenient to negotiate the exchange in subscribing for the magazine, arrangements have been made with The Epworth Press (25-35 City Road, London, E.C. 1) to receive subscriptions at the rate of nine shillings and sixpence per year.

Dr. Donald B. Aldrich, speaking of the Church Congress, of which he is the Chairman, states that one of the needs for which it is organized is to provide for guided study among the clergy of the Protestant Episcopal Church, of whom it is estimated that not more than twenty per cent are doing systematic study after being more than five years out of seminary.

When suggestions reach the Editorial

Board of RELIGION IN LIFE that the magazine would have a wider reading if its articles were written in more popular style, they remember the scornful line in Dorothy Wordsworth's *Journal*, where (referring to her brother) she notes, "William is wasting his mind in the magazines this evening." The Board does endeavor to see that any difficulty that may appear inheres in the profundity and not the obscurity of the author.

The Russian Press admits that religious belief not only has increased in the Soviet Republic, but has a growing hold upon the young. Freedom of belief and the practice of religion are guaranteed by the new Constitution. To meet the new situation the Communist Party is trying to bring itself to a sterner, more alert, and energetic opposition to religion.

*The Publisher's Weekly* reports that Susan Laurence Davis has filed suit against the publishers of *Gone With the Wind* for infringing the copyright of her book, *Authentic History of the Ku Klux Klan*. She demands damages amounting to the unprecedented sum of \$6,500,000. Miss Mitchell declares she had never seen nor heard of Miss Davis' book. The violation of the copyright is not apparent to the average reader.

Amid all the dissent aroused by the annual award of the Pulitzer prizes, the recognition of Robert Frost as the foremost poet of the generation and of his book, *A Further Range*, as the most distinguished volume of poetry of the year, has been unchallenged. Mr. Frost's description of poetry is worthy of remem-



brance, "A complete poem is one where an emotion has found its thought and the thought has found the words."

The leading literary magazine of America asserts that despite widely distributed announcements of compensation for such, not one adequate unsolicited article on contemporary popular literature has come to its office for almost a year. It receives an embarrassing plethora of good articles on historic literature, but interpretations of the best literature of general appeal are difficult to find.

RELIGION IN LIFE finds it similarly difficult to obtain intimate, objective, comprehensive interpretations of present-day religious life and thought.

The ideal reviewer has been defined as a person who is a specialist in the field of the book and so knows what he is writing about; who wanted to be a novelist and so knows how to express what he thinks; and who has been around and so knows what the world is like. Such a one can be depended upon to treat a book honestly, fairly, and intelligently.

The American Library Association announces that about one third of the population of the United States has adequate library facilities and one third practically none. In West Virginia, Arkansas and North Dakota, over 80 per cent of the population is without public-library service. In Massachusetts, the District of Columbia, and Delaware, every inhabitant can obtain library service, while New Hampshire, Connecticut, and California provide library facilities for all but 2 per cent of their population. In yearly circulation of books per capita Mississippi is at the bottom, with .36 volumes, California at the top with 1.14. Mississippi spends two cents a year per

capita upon its public libraries, Massachusetts, \$1.08. Wyoming has a highly efficient library system, which is popular. During the past five years, through the public libraries in thirty-one of the larger cities, there has been a gain of 22 per cent in the circulation of books on science, economics, sociology, and history.

The Librarian of Wesleyan University, Fremont Rider, has been studying the work of the binding of the famous *Codex Sinaiticus*, recently acquired by Great Britain from the Soviet government. The process took over six months, every leaf requiring individual expert repairing. Each section was sewed by chemically tested linen thread to extended guards, and no adhesive touched the precious leaves. Originally it was planned to bind the completed volume in special pigskin, as the most durable of all leathers, but to avoid offending the religious sensibilities of some of the subscribers, morocco was used instead.

In the 1935 Summer Number of RELIGION IN LIFE, Dr. Stanley A. Hunter of Berkeley, Cal., wrote an article on "Favorite Hymns," which has been published as a pamphlet. Among the favorite hymns that have been added since the article appeared are "Spirit of God, Descend Upon My Heart," as the favorite of Gaius Glenn Atkins and of Harry Emerson Fosdick; "Rock of Ages," as the favorite of Kathleen Norris; "Be Thou My Vision," of Mrs. John Finley Williamson; "Eternal Ruler of the Ceaseless Round" of John C. Bennett; "Fight the Good Fight" of Bruce Curry; "When Wilt Thou Save the People," by Charles Stelze; "Holy, Holy, Holy" of Arthur H. Compton; "Not So in Haste My Heart" of Eugene W. Lyman.